Equity Extraterritoriality by Park, S. Nathan
PARK PUBLICATION VERSION(DO NOT DELETE) 12/5/2017 1:42 PM 
 
99 
EQUITY EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
S. NATHAN PARK∗ 
ABSTRACT 
Territoriality is a foundational principle of international order, and 
U.S. laws have always operated on a territorial basis.  However, when U.S. 
jurisprudence speaks of extraterritorial application of its laws, it is usually 
assessing whether the legislature or the court has jurisdiction over persons, 
properties and conducts outside of the territorial borders of the United 
States. This paper argues that such a conception of the extraterritoriality 
doctrine only reveals half of the picture, because U.S. courts may indirectly 
apply U.S. law beyond U.S. borders through extraterritorial court orders 
without relying on extraterritorial jurisdiction. I term such exercise of 
extraterritorial power “Equity Extraterritoriality,” because the court’s 
power to make such extraterritorial orders stems from the equity tradition. 
Under Equity Extraterritoriality, U.S. courts first obtain jurisdiction 
over a person, then indirectly exercise extraterritorial authority by ordering 
the person to take certain actions outside of the courts’ territorial 
jurisdiction, or dispose of properties located outside of the courts’ territorial 
jurisdiction. Importantly, to Equity Extraterritoriality—which covers 
everything that happens in litigation other than jurisdiction, including 
provisional orders, discovery orders and post-judgment orders—there is 
hardly any application of territoriality principles, causing problems 
typically associated with extraterritoriality, such as causing a diplomatic 
strain. This contradicts U.S. law’s general respect for territoriality, as well 
as the application of territoriality principles to limit judicial and legislative 
jurisdiction. This paper provides a brief overview of Equity 
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Extraterritoriality’s historical development, explores the problems posed by 
Equity Extraterritoriality’s extraterritorial reach and under-development, 
and proposes a conflict-of-laws-based solution to apply territoriality 
principles so as to curb the worst excesses of Equity Extraterritoriality. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
CPLR [New York Civil Procedure Law and Rules] article 52 contains no 
express territorial limitation barring the entry of a turnover order that 
requires a garnishee to transfer money or property into New York from 
another state or country.  It would have been an easy matter for the 
Legislature to have added such a restriction to the reach of article 52 and 
there is no basis for us to infer it from the broad language presently in the 
statute.1 
*                                *                                * 
Territoriality is a foundational principle of the international order.  
Since the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, the world has been organized as 
multitudes of sovereign nations, each exercising exclusive governing 
authority over a defined territory.2 This understanding forms the basis of our 
current international law. The United States, having come to existence in 
1776, has always operated its legal system on a territorial basis.3  A major 
expression of the territoriality principles in U.S. law is the presumption 
against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, which has existed in U.S. 
jurisprudence for nearly as long as the Republic itself.4  While it is true that 
the relative strength of that presumption has waxed and waned throughout 
history,5 today, the doctrine of presumption against extraterritoriality is 
undergoing glory days. In a series of decisions during the last few decades, 
the Supreme Court repeatedly pronounced that as a general matter, U.S. laws 
 
 1.  Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 12 N.Y.3d 533, 539 (2009). 
 2.  See Derek Croxton, The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of Sovereignty, 21 INT’L 
HIST. REV. 569, 569–70 (1999); KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE 
EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 8 (1st ed. 2009). 
 3.  See James Weinstein, Early American Origins of Territoriality and in Judicial Jurisdiction, 37 
ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 1, 2–3 (1992). 
 4.  See, e.g., Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).   
 5.  See discussion infra Sections III.B.2., III.C.1. 
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apply only within the territorial borders of the United States. The holding in 
Morrison v. National Australian Bank, a 2010 case in which the Supreme 
Court decided that the implied cause of action created by Section 10(b) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not apply beyond U.S. borders, 
encapsulates the strength of territoriality principles in the U.S. law today:  
“unless a contrary intent appears” in the statute, the law “is meant to apply 
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”6 
Given the strength of the presumption against extraterritoriality today, 
the above-quoted language from the recent case of Koehler v. Bank of 
Bermuda is surprising in its flagrant disregard of that presumption.  In 
Koehler, the highest court of the State of New York found that Article 52 of 
the New York Civil Procedure Law and Rules (“CPLR”) authorized a New 
York court to order the defendant to deliver certain stock certificates located 
in Bermuda.  In so holding, the court first (correctly) noted that the text of 
CPLR Article 52 has no extraterritoriality limitation. And instead of 
eschewing extraterritorial application of Article 52, as the U.S. Supreme 
Court instructed in Morrison, the New York Court of Appeals took the 
opposite path and refused to “infer [a territorial limitation] from the broad 
language presently in the statute,” reasoning that “[i]t would have been an 
easy matter for the Legislature to have added such a restriction to the reach 
of Article 52.”7 
The highest court of the United States says the law is to be applied 
within the territorial jurisdiction unless the law specifically states otherwise; 
the highest court of the State of New York says the law may be applied 
beyond the territorial jurisdiction, unless the law specifically states 
otherwise. How can these two seemingly contradictory propositions, issued 
just one year apart from each other, stand together?  I suggest that the origin 
of this contradiction goes deeper than the superficial distinction between 
federal court and state court, or that between a substantive statute and a 
procedural statute. The contradiction originates from the fact that the New 
York Court of Appeals was applying a different tradition of the 
extraterritoriality doctrine in U.S. law, which developed on a track quite 
separate from that of the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
This separate doctrine may be described as “Equity Extraterritoriality.”  
A succinct definition of Equity Extraterritoriality may be “the court’s 
authority, originating from the court’s equitable powers, to order a person to 
take certain actions outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction.” Equity 
 
 6.  Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010). 
 7.  Koehler v. Bank of Berm. Ltd., 911 N.E.2d 825, 829 (N.Y. 2009). 
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Extraterritoriality is an indirect form of extraterritoriality.  Rather than 
asserting jurisdiction directly over actions occurring beyond its territorial 
jurisdiction, the court (typically, but not always) first establishes its own 
jurisdiction over a person, then orders the person to take actions outside of 
the court’s territorial jurisdiction.  In this sense, Equity Extraterritoriality 
stands in opposition to “jurisdictional extraterritoriality,” i.e. the court’s 
authority to directly reach beyond its territorial jurisdiction. 
Undoubtedly, Equity Extraterritoriality is an application of U.S. laws 
beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States. The fact that Equity 
Extraterritoriality reaches beyond U.S. borders indirectly through a person 
under the court’s jurisdiction does not change the end result that a U.S. court 
is demanding compliance with its orders beyond its territorial jurisdiction. 
However, throughout its long history and to this day, U.S. territoriality 
doctrine has considered extraterritorial court orders as “territorial.”  This is 
so because the court usually establishes in personam jurisdiction over the 
person through which it is effectuating the extraterritorial order (although in 
practice, that is not always the case).8  Once the court obtains jurisdiction, 
the current U.S. territoriality doctrine considers everything occurring 
thereafter to be “territorial,” notwithstanding the fact that extraterritorial 
court orders are no less an application of U.S. law beyond U.S. borders.  In 
other words, the U.S. territoriality doctrine has focused almost exclusively 
on the question of “jurisdictionality,” i.e. whether the court may assert 
judicial jurisdiction beyond its territorial jurisdiction.9  Once the 
jurisdictional hurdle is cleared, there is no meaningful application of 
territoriality principles to everything else that happens afterwards in 
litigation. 
This means under Equity Extraterritoriality, the court may order the 
person under its jurisdiction to take a wide variety of extraterritorial actions, 
including:  disposition of tangible and intangible property located outside of 
the court’s territorial jurisdiction;10 preservation and delivery of evidence 
located outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction;11 discontinuation of a 
legal action filed in another country;12 prohibition of business transactions in 
 
 8.  See discussion infra Sections II.A., IV.C.3. 
 9.  See John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 352 
(2010) (noting that much of “presumption against extraterritoriality” may be more properly described as 
“presumption against extrajurisdictionality”). 
 10.  See, e.g., Koehler, 911 N.E.2d at 829. 
 11.  See, e.g., Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 522 
(1987); Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 255 (2004). 
 12.  See, e.g,, Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 909 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
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another country,13 or nearly any other activity occurring entirely outside of 
the court’s territorial jurisdiction.14  Yet there is essentially no legal test that 
limits this broad operation of Equity Extraterritoriality. The Supreme Court, 
which has been very active in the recent years in defining the contours of 
territoriality as applied to jurisdiction, has made virtually no attempt to 
address Equity Extraterritoriality. In some cases, the severe under-
development of Equity Extraterritoriality surprised even the Supreme Court 
itself.  During the oral argument for Baker v. General Motors, a 1998 case 
involving Equity Extraterritoriality, Justice Stephen Breyer exclaimed with 
incredulity: “In 200 years of history, it must have come up before . . . I’m 
amazed that there isn’t something written [making this issue] absolutely 
clear.”15 The result of this under-development is the inconsistency in the U.S. 
territoriality doctrine that can be observed from the contradiction between 
Koehler and Morrison. Even as the Supreme Court admonished that U.S. 
laws must not be construed to apply beyond U.S. borders unless the law 
clearly authorized extraterritorial application, the New York Court of 
Appeals applied a New York law over the property located in Bermuda 
because the law did not clearly prohibit extraterritorial application.  This 
inconsistency allows parties to achieve extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law that they generally cannot under the principles of territoriality. 
The practical consequences of this inattention to Equity 
Extraterritoriality are significant. By reaching beyond their territorial 
jurisdiction via Equity Extraterritoriality, U.S. courts often contravene the 
interests of foreign sovereigns and cause diplomatic rows.16 The lack of 
meaningful check on Equity Extraterritoriality also allows U.S. courts to 
routinely put parties under conflicting legal obligations, holding them in 
terrorem to choose between disobeying a U.S. court order and breaking a 
foreign law.17 When the Second Circuit overextended the reach of Equity 
Extraterritoriality, its decision nearly destroyed banking in New York.18 
These consequences will become more severe in the coming years as the role 
 
 13.  See, e.g., NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), LEXIS 168292 
at *9–*11 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012), aff’d 727 F.3d 230, 248 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2819, 
2819 (2014). 
 14.  See Thomas Carl Spelling, Treatise on Injunctions and Other Extraordinary Remedies Covering 
Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo Warranto, and Certiorari or Review 5 (2d ed. 1901) (“The 
range of purpose for which this remedial writ [an injunction] may be invoked is almost infinite.”). 
 15.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 222 (1998) (No. 
96-653). 
 16.  See discussion infra Sections IV.B.1., IV.B.2. 
 17.  See discussion infra Section IV.B.3. 
 18.  See discussion infra Section IV.C.1. 
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of Equity Extraterritoriality will only become more prominent in the future. 
A U.S. party engaged in global commerce has every incentive to try to 
control the activities occurring beyond U.S. borders by way of U.S. court 
adjudication. In addition, the ever-increasing importance of intangible 
properties—assets with no physical presence, except through the persons 
who control them—makes the indirect control of extraterritorial property 
through a person even more critical.19 
Despite this urgency, scholarly attention to Equity Extraterritoriality 
has been scant. During the oral argument in Baker, Justice Anthony Kennedy 
inquired:  “What I’m looking for is the case or the law review article in 200 
years that went into what I would think was the most simple basic 
question[.]”20 If Justice Kennedy resumed the search for a law review article 
discussing the topic today, two full decades since Baker, he would be mostly 
disappointed. Although extraterritorial application of the U.S. law is a topic 
that inspires a great deal of legal scholarship, such scholarship almost 
exclusively focuses on jurisdictional extraterritoriality.21 To the extent they 
exist, studies of Equity Extraterritoriality are fragmented, as they do not treat 
it as a standalone inquiry.  They either analyze the situation where Equity 
Extraterritoriality is incidentally connected to jurisdictional 
extraterritoriality (for example, when the court issues an extraterritorial 
injunction to apply the Sherman Antitrust Act abroad),22 or where a 
particular type of Equity Extraterritoriality happens to emerge as an issue in 
a discrete area of law (such as collection of evidence from abroad or 
protecting intellectual property across state borders).23 The most 
 
 19.  See discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 20.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 222 (1998) (No. 
96-653).  See also Linda Greenhouse, Court Weighs Whether One State Must Obey Another’s Courts, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1997 at A25.  As discussed further in this paper, the Baker opinion was a long way 
away from addressing the full array of problems associated with Equity Extraterritoriality because Baker 
only represented one genus of Equity Extraterritoriality.  See discussion infra Section III.C.2. 
 21.  A typical example is: RAUSTIALA, supra note 2, an excellent discussion of the history and 
current practice of extraterritorial application of the U.S. law that nonetheless focuses its attention almost 
entirely on the question of jurisdiction.  Similarly, Justice Breyer’s recent and highly acclaimed discussion 
of the extraterritorial applicability of U.S. law contains no meaningful analysis of extraterritorial court 
orders.  See STEPHEN G. BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW GLOBAL 
REALITIES 112 (1st ed. 2015).  This could also be due to the general lack of scholarly interest in the 
history of equity in the United States.  See John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789–1835, and the 
History of American Judging, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 1425, 1428 (1998) (noting the “extremely limited” 
knowledge about the history of U.S. Supreme Court equity). 
 22.  See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, The Local Law of Global Antitrust, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 627, 
641–42 (2001); Breyer, supra note 21 at 95–107. 
 23.  See, e.g., Geoffrey Sant, Court-Ordered Law Breaking: U.S. Courts Increasingly Order the 
Violation of Foreign Law, 81 BROOKLYN L. REV. 181, 181–82 (2015) (collection of evidence); David S. 
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comprehensive scholarly analysis of Equity Extraterritoriality, by Professor 
Polly Price, is nearly 20 years old (written partially in response to the 
Supreme Court’s inquiry in Baker).24 While Price’s article is highly 
insightful, it only considered half of the problem of Equity 
Extraterritoriality—namely, the domestic Equity Extraterritoriality situation 
in the context of U.S. federalism.  There is virtually no scholarly discussion 
as to international Equity Extraterritoriality, in which no legal superstructure 
harmonizes the exercise of sovereignty by various nations. 
This article attempts to fill this gap. Focusing only on jurisdictional 
extraterritoriality does not address the problems of Equity Extraterritoriality.  
To limit the excess of Equity Extraterritoriality, there must be a legal test 
that more forcefully applies the territoriality principles whenever the court is 
contemplating an order that may have extraterritorial implications. To that 
end, I propose a test that may be characterized as a “comity-fueled conflict 
of laws” test that mediates the competing sovereign interests that an 
extraterritorial court order may implicate.25 
*                                *                                * 
The remainder of this paper will proceed in four parts. Part II describes 
the operation of Equity Extraterritoriality in greater detail by presenting a 
case study on how Equity Extraterritoriality applies U.S. law beyond the U.S. 
borders. Here, I note that the operation of Equity Extraterritoriality depends 
on two links of control:  the court’s control over a person, and the person’s 
control over actions or things outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction. 
These links are, in engineering lingo, potential points of failure.  When the 
strength of the control that makes up each link is compromised—either 
legally or practically—the links fail and create a problem. 
Part III will offer a brief history of Equity Extraterritoriality, in which I 
argue that the origin of Equity Extraterritoriality may be traced to the 
landmark case of Pennoyer v. Neff,26 which applied territoriality principles 
to judicial jurisdiction but not to court orders issued after the jurisdiction was 
obtained. This section observes the growth of Equity Extraterritoriality in the 
early 20th century, when it saw a brief period of harmonization with 
jurisdictional extraterritoriality. Then this section describes the split in 
attitudes toward territoriality principles in the late 20th century, leading to 
 
Welkowitz, Preemption, Extraterritoriality, and the Problem of State Antidilution Laws, 67 TUL. L. REV. 
1, 2–4 (1992) (protection of intellectual property). 
 24.  See Polly J. Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747, 751–92 
(1998). 
 25.  See discussion infra Section V.A.2. 
 26.  94 U.S. 714, 733 (1878). 
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today’s contradictory positions of jurisdictional extraterritoriality and Equity 
Extraterritoriality. 
In Part IV, this paper will examine the Equity Extraterritoriality 
doctrine as it exists today, and identify its doctrinal problems. I first present 
the scale of the problems posed by Equity Extraterritoriality by focusing on 
a particular feature of modern economy:  intangible properties. Because 
intangible properties have no physical situs, controlling intangible properties 
increasingly requires controlling the person who controls the intangible 
properties. Such a mode of indirect control coincides with the operation of 
Equity Extraterritoriality. Accordingly, the importance of Equity 
Extraterritoriality is bound to rise as intangible property becomes more 
important.  Set against this background, I identify the two broad categories 
of problems presented by Equity Extraterritoriality:  the problems arising 
from extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, and the problems arising from 
the doctrine’s severe under-development and lack of limiting principles. 
Finally in Part V, this paper will propose a solution, facilitating 
application of territorial principles to Equity Extraterritoriality. Here, I give 
greater attention to international Equity Extraterritoriality, as it is less 
developed and poses more significant problems relative to domestic Equity 
Extraterritoriality. I find that a solution must address the ultimate source of 
the problem of Equity Extraterritoriality, i.e. regulating the clashing claims 
of various sovereigns. For Equity Extraterritoriality in the domestic context, 
the U.S. Constitution provides sufficient legal principles and infrastructure 
to mediate such conflicts. International Equity Extraterritoriality, however, 
lacks an analogous superstructure. Here, I submit that the solution is to be 
discovered in the two legal theories whose purpose is to balance the different 
interests of sovereigns: the concept of international comity, and the 
mechanism of conflict of laws. To this end, I propose a legal test that may 
be characterized as a “comity-fueled conflict of laws,” a more robust form 
of comity test that gives due respect for foreign sovereigns. 
II. UNDERSTANDING EQUITY EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Equity Extraterritoriality is a concept that eludes a concise descriptive 
definition, precisely because the types of extraterritorial orders that the court 
can make are so varied.27  Many of these orders may be categorized as 
remedies (for example, extraterritorial injunctions) but many others are not 
remedies in the strict sense (for example, extraterritorial discovery orders).  
 
 27.  See Spelling, supra note 14, at 5 (“The range of purpose for which this remedial writ [an 
injunction] may be invoked is almost infinite.”). 
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As discussed further below, the merger of law and equity created further 
confusion because court orders that were traditionally considered “legal” 
orders took on “equitable” characteristics post-merger.28 That is to say, 
although the term Equity Extraterritoriality points to the historical source of 
the court’s power—namely, the power of courts sitting in equity29—not all 
extraterritorial court orders can be characterized as equitable orders.30 
The best way to understand this amorphous concept, then, is to observe 
the actual operation of Equity Extraterritoriality and see how it applies U.S. 
laws beyond U.S. borders.  To that end, this section offers an extended 
example of Equity Extraterritoriality and discusses several other common 
variations of Equity Extraterritoriality. 
A. How Equity Extraterritoriality Governs Beyond Borders: a Case Study 
A brief exposition of one example of Equity Extraterritoriality may be 
helpful to demonstrate precisely how Equity Extraterritoriality is indeed an 
application of U.S. law beyond the U.S. courts’ territorial jurisdiction. U.S. 
courts’ collection of evidence located abroad is a good example of Equity 
Extraterritoriality. The courts’ power to guide discovery under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure originates from the courts’ equitable powers.31 
With this power, the court orders a person under its jurisdiction to take 
certain actions outside of its territorial jurisdiction—namely, preserve, 
collect, and produce physical evidence located outside the borders of the 
United States—and thereby regulates the pattern of foreign corporations’ 
record keeping. 
One must understand that discovery practice of U.S. courts is not 
merely rules of court administration, but a means of corporate governance in 
regards to corporate record-keeping. This is because, to a significant extent, 
discovery practice of U.S. courts dictates the routine business behavior of 
corporations. Under U.S. law, parties are required to preserve documents 
long before the actual commencement of the litigation, as soon as “a party 
 
 28.  See discussion infra Section III.B.2.a. 
 29.  See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 30.  For example, writ of mandamus is traditionally considered a legal remedy.  However, using 
this legal remedy, the court can order a government official to take actions beyond its territorial borders.  
In this sense, that mandamus is considered a legal remedy does not make it exempt from Equity 
Extraterritoriality. 
 31.  See John H. Langbein, Fact Finding in the English Court of Chancery: a Rebuttal, 83 YALE 
L.J. 1620, 1630 (1974); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 914–26 (1987); Rhonda Wasserman, 
The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer’s Last Vestige, 74 MINN. L. REV. 37, 43–45 (1989) (tracing the origin 
of U.S. court’s subpoena power to English Chancery procedures). 
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reasonably anticipates litigation.”32 To satisfy this requirement, American 
businesses are advised to create a document retention policy regardless of 
whether they actually anticipate litigation in the near term.33 When litigation 
appears on the horizon, particularly in large commercial cases, it is common 
for a corporation to retain the (very expensive) services of an e-discovery 
vendor in order to properly preserve the documents and produce them as 
necessary.34 Failure to do so, in severe cases, may result in the literal death 
of the corporation, as was the case with the accounting firm Arthur Andersen 
LLP in the aftermath of the Enron scandal.35 
This means that when a U.S. court orders a foreign corporation to 
produce documents and other physical evidence located outside of the 
territorial boundaries of the United States, the U.S. court is essentially 
mandating American-style corporate record keeping laws to foreign 
corporations. And U.S. courts quite frequently order foreign corporations to 
produce documents located outside of the courts’ territorial jurisdiction.36  
Several foreign corporations, sued in U.S. courts by U.S. plaintiffs, have 
been accused of failing to institute a U.S.-style litigation hold—a measure 
that is unheard of in their home jurisdiction.37 One foreign corporation lost 
its litigation and became subject to a judgment in the amount of more than 
$920 million, in large part because the corporation was sanctioned for 
spoliation of evidence after failing to preserve documents in the manner 
required by U.S. law.38 As a result, U.S.-style e-discovery vendors are 
hanging shingles throughout the world to assist foreign firms with American-
style document forensics.39  One could hardly find a surer sign of U.S. law’s 
 
 32.  Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Bd. of Regents 
of the Univ. of Neb. v. BASF Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82492, at *14 (D. Neb. 2007) (“When the 
prospect of litigation is present, parties are required to preserve documents that may be relevant to the 
issues to be raised, and their failure to do so may result in a finding of spoliation of evidence.”). 
 33.  See Nat’l Fed. Of Ind. Business, NFIB GUIDE TO DEVELOPING A DRP 3 (2016) 
http://www.nfib.com/Portals/0/PDF/AllUsers/legal/guides/document-retention-policy-guide-nfib.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3F7B-A7EC] (“A DRP [document retention policy] that is consistently followed may 
aid significantly in any litigation that might arise.”). 
 34.  See, e.g., FTI CONSULTING, http://www.ftitechnology.com/. 
 35.  See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 698 (2005); see also Brandon L. 
Garrett, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS 19–44 (2014). 
 36.  See Sant, supra note 23, at 181–84 (discussing the rise of extraterritorial discovery order that 
requires the party to break foreign laws). 
 37.  See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 803 F.Supp.2d 469, 505 (E.D. Va. 
2011) (issuing order for adverse jury instruction and attorneys fee award for failing to preserve evidence); 
Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co. Ltd., No. 11 civ 1846 (LHK) (PSG), slip op. at 1 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 
2012) (requesting adverse jury instruction for spoliation of evidence). 
 38.  See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 894 F.Supp.2d 691, 691 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
 39.  See, e.g., Deloitte Transactions and Business Analytics LLP, DELOITTE DISCOVERY:  THE 
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extraterritorial application than consultants who assist foreign companies to 
comply with American law while doing business outside of the United 
States. 
Seeing the conflicts created by an order to produce extraterritorial 
evidence is another way to realize that such an order truly is an 
extraterritorial exercise of the court’s power. The primary reason why there 
is a presumption against extraterritoriality is to avoid contravening an 
interest of a foreign sovereign.40  Yet an order to produce extraterritorial 
evidence routinely does exactly this.41 As the reporter of the Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations put it:  “No aspect of the extension of the 
American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has 
given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents in investigation 
and litigation in the United States.”42 Many foreign nations have passed 
blocking statutes specifically in response to U.S.-style document 
discovery.43  But U.S. courts usually ignore this clearly-expressed preference 
of foreign sovereigns and order the persons under the courts’ jurisdiction to 
submit extraterritorial evidence.44  Sometimes, U.S. court’s challenge to 
foreign sovereign’s interest in the context of discovery can be even more 
direct:  as the Supreme Court recently pronounced in Republic of Argentina 
v. NML Capital, Ltd., a U.S. court may order extraterritorial discovery of 
foreign sovereign’s assets as part of post-judgment discovery, regardless of 
the nature of the sovereign assets to be discovered.45 This deliberate rejection 
of foreign sovereign interests often puts a person under conflicting legal 
obligations—which, again, the U.S. courts usually ignore.46 
 
RIGHT TEAM FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION, at 17 (showing e-Discovery office locations in Amsterdam, 
Auckland, Bangkok, Beijing, Brussels, Buenos Aires, Cape Town, Calgary, Copenhagen, Dubai, Dublin, 
Dusseldorf, Edmonton, Frankfurt, George Town, Hong Kong, Hyderabad, London, Madrid, Melbourne, 
Mexico City, Milan, Moscow, Munich, Oslo, Paris, Prague, Pretoria, Sao Paolo, Santiago, Seoul, 
Shanghai, Sydney, Tokyo, Toronto, Vancouver, Vienna and Zurich), available at 
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/finance/us-advisory-discovery.pdf. 
 40.  See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355–58 (1909). 
 41.  See Sant, supra note 23, at 212–25. 
 42.  Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 442, n.1. 
 43.  See id. 
 44.  See Sant, supra note 23, at 185. 
 45.  134 S.Ct. 2250, 2258 (2014).  See also Aaron D. Simowitz, Transnational Enforcement 
Discovery, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3293 (2015) (discussing NML Capital in the context of post-judgment 
discovery). 
 46.  See Sant, supra note 23, at 212–21; see also First Nat’l City Bank of New York v. Internal 
Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616, 618–19 (2d Cir. 1959) (rejecting the conflicting obligation created by 
Panama’s bank secrecy laws).  For examples of other types of Equity Extraterritoriality that puts a foreign 
corporation under inconsistent legal obligations, see Fargo v. Redfield, 22 F. 373, 375 (1st Cir. 1884); 
United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 828 (11th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the claim by a 
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No matter—one may object:  isn’t submitting to the U.S. court’s 
jurisdiction (and dealing with occasional inconsistent judgments) the price 
that a corporation must pay for doing business in the United States?47 As 
long as Equity Extraterritoriality orders persons under the court’s 
jurisdiction, what is the problem? Yet a U.S. court need not have jurisdiction 
over the foreign party to extend its power beyond its territorial jurisdiction.  
This is so because extraterritorial application of the law is not merely a 
collection of instances in which a nation directly enforces its laws outside of 
the national borders. A speed limit over a stretch of highway governs the 
entire stretch, even if the police catch only a fraction of the drivers who 
violate the speed limit.  Similarly, even with statutes that explicitly authorize 
extraterritorial enforcement, actual enforcement is at best intermittent. As 
Professor Jack Goldsmith noted, extraterritorial application of the law may 
mean that “a nation uses the threat of force against local persons or property 
to punish, and thus regulate, extraterritorial acts.”48 To govern 
extraterritorially, a U.S. court only needs to raise the threat that a foreign 
party may be hauled into litigation in the United States. A foreign firm must 
comply with the U.S.-style document preservation at all times (or risk a 
disastrous litigation outcome), as long as there is at least some chance of 
litigation in the United States. And there is always some chance, because the 
U.S. legal doctrine on personal jurisdiction is notoriously far-reaching and 
unpredictable.49  If a foreign firm does business with the United States, the 
firm simply cannot afford to refuse U.S.-style document forensics because 
chances are good that the foreign firm will be subject to U.S. jurisdiction. In 
other words, U.S. courts’ extraterritorial discovery orders, set against the 
uncertain American legal doctrine on personal jurisdiction, regulate the 
document retention behaviors of the corporations outside of the court’s 
territorial jurisdiction long before a U.S. court actually establishes personal 
jurisdiction over any such corporation. 
 
Canadian bank that a U.S. court order would subject it to conflicting enforcement obligations).  See also 
discussion infra Section IV.B.3. 
 47.  See Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d at 828 (if a foreign corporation “voluntarily elected to do 
business in numerous foreign host countries,” it “has accepted the incidental risk of occasional 
inconsistent governmental actions. It cannot expect to avail itself of the benefits of doing business here 
without accepting the concomitant obligations.”). 
 48.  Jack L. Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 479 (1998) (emphasis added). 
 49.  See James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction:  Implications 
for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 171 (2004) (“Although the extensive body of commentary on 
federally imposed limitations on state court jurisdiction agrees on very little, the one point of consensus 
is that Supreme Court personal jurisdiction doctrine is deeply confused.”).  See also discussion on long-
arm jurisdiction infra Sections II.B.3.b and III.A.1.  
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B. The Operation of Equity Extraterritoriality 
As discussed above, Equity Extraterritoriality is a concept that eludes a 
concise descriptive definition. But through the aforementioned example, one 
can discern how the doctrine operates and reaches beyond the court’s 
territorial jurisdiction. 
Equity Extraterritoriality is an indirect form of extraterritoriality. A 
typical Equity Extraterritoriality situation is one in which a court obtains 
jurisdiction over a person, and then orders the person to take certain actions 
beyond the court’s territorial jurisdiction. In other words, Equity 
Extraterritoriality operates in transnational litigation through two links of 
control: the court’s control over a person, and the person’s control over an 
extraterritorial thing or conduct.50 The first link—the court’s control over the 
person—corresponds to personal jurisdiction, i.e. the court’s ability to have 
a person appear before the court.  The second link—the order that the court 
issues on the person—is the province of Equity Extraterritoriality. 
Equity Extraterritoriality may arise in two ways, domestic and 
international:  a court of one state may issue an extraterritorial order binding 
persons and conduct in another state, or a U.S. court may issue an 
extraterritorial order binding persons and conduct in another country. 
Although U.S. jurisprudence views both types as qualitatively the same, 
international Equity Extraterritoriality is the more significant problem, as it 
is simultaneously less developed than domestic Equity Extraterritoriality and 
creates the more significant foreign policy implications.51 
The visualization of transnational litigation as a chain with two links 
allows one to focus on the nature of the problems posed by Equity 
Extraterritoriality. Fundamentally, the problem of Equity Extraterritoriality 
is that the application of territoriality principles or, protection against 
extraterritoriality, occurs only on the first link, but not on the second.  
Through such legal doctrines as personal jurisdiction that largely operate on 
a territorial basis and on a presumption against extraterritoriality, U.S. 
jurisprudence applies the territoriality principles on the first link of the chain, 
the front end of the litigation.  Once the court obtains personal jurisdiction 
and reaches the second link, there is virtually no application of territoriality 
principles in the extraterritorial orders that the court may fashion. To be sure, 
the courts are admonished to be circumspect about their ability to enforce 
their extraterritorial orders,52 and they do frequently decline to issue 
 
 50.  See discussion infra Sections IV.B.3. and IV.C.1. 
 51.  See discussion infra Section III.C.4. 
 52.  See Charles Alan Wright and Arthur R. Miller, 11A FED. PRAC. & P.: CIV. § 2945 (“[V]arious 
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extraterritorial orders on this basis.53  However, the court’s sense of 
discretion fails frequently, leading to problems typically associated with 
extraterritorial application of national laws.  Further, as discussed in more 
detail below, the problems of Equity Extraterritoriality—the second link of 
the chain—puts additional pressure on the first link of the chain, hindering 
the internal consistency of the personal jurisdiction doctrine.54 
III. HISTORY OF EQUITY EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
The term “Equity Extraterritoriality” points to the historical origin of 
the court’s indirect extraterritorial authority—namely, the equity tradition.  
This section offers a brief history of Equity Extraterritoriality’s doctrinal 
development, set against the development of jurisdictional extraterritoriality 
to highlight the relative neglect that Equity Extraterritoriality has received. 
A. Birth of Equity Extraterritoriality in Pennoyer v. Neff 
Equity Extraterritoriality as a doctrine came into being in the landmark 
case of Pennoyer v. Neff.55  However, the potential for Equity 
Extraterritoriality existed long before the United States was established.  
Before the American Revolution, the English equity court freely reached 
beyond its territorial jurisdiction—typically, to adjudicate cases involving 
lands located outside of England.56  This was in marked contrast to the 
common law courts of England, which operated on a territorial basis.  It was 
held as early as 1280 that common law courts had no jurisdiction to redress 
a tort committed abroad.57  It was not until 1605 that a jury was permitted to 
determine a foreign fact.58  In the early 17th century, common law courts 
began considering cases involving obligations made outside of England, but 
 
considerations may induce [the court] to refrain from exercising this power in certain contexts.”); 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations § 442 cmt. 2 n.2 (cautioning against ordering extraterritorial 
discovery). 
 53.  See, e.g., Blue Ribbon Feed Co. v. Farmers Union Cent. Exch., 731 F.2d 415, 422 (7th Cir. 
1984); Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 80 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 54.  See discussion infra Section IV.C.3. 
 55.  95 U.S. 714, 724 (1878). 
 56.  See, e.g., Carteret v. Petty (1676)  2 Swans 324, 324 (Chancery Court ordering accounting waste 
in lands located in Ireland); Arglasse v. Muschamp 23 Eng. Rep. 322, 323 (1682) (Chancery Court issuing 
bill of relief against annuity charged on Irish lands); Toller v. Carteret (1705) 2 Vern. Ch. 494, 495 
(Chancery Court adjudicating a matter concerning mortgage of lands located in the island of Sark, in 
Channel Islands); Penn v. Lord Baltimore (1750) 1 Ves. Sr. 444, 447 (adjudicating the boundary dispute 
between England’s North American colonies, Pennsylvania and Maryland). 
 57.  See Huge le Pape v. the Merchants of Florence in London, 8−9 Edw. I (1280–1281); Alexander 
N. Sack, Conflicts of Laws in England,  LAW: CENTURY OF PROGRESS 1835–1935 342, 344 (1937). 
 58.  See Dowdale’s Case, 6 Co. Rep. 46(b) (1605); Sack, supra note 57, at 347–48. 
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only by relying on a ludicrous legal fiction that a foreign city was actually in 
England.59  The early courts of the United States inherited this split attitude 
on territoriality, with courts sitting in law operating on the basis of 
territoriality60 while courts sitting in equity reaching freely beyond its 
territorial jurisdiction.61  Early Supreme Court cases reflect a similar split.  
Several early cases (including Charming Betsy, in which the court held “an 
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if 
any other possible construction remains”) follow the territoriality 
principles.62  But in the same time period, the Supreme Court regularly 
allowed state courts sitting in equity to reach beyond their territorial 
jurisdiction.63 
 
 59.  For example in Ward’s case, decided in 1625, the plaintiff sued based on a debt on bill created 
in Hamburg, Germany.  In the judgment entered for the plaintiff, the court declared (presumably with a 
straight face):  “we shall take it that Hamburg is in London in order to maintain the action which otherwise 
would be without our jurisdiction, and while in truth we know that Hamburg is beyond the sea, as judges 
we do not take notice that it is beyond the sea.”  82 Eng. Rep. 244, 245 (1624–1628); see also Sack, supra 
note 57, at 346.   
 60.  See, e.g., Kibbe v. Kibbe, 1 Kirby 119, 126 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1786) (holding courts of 
Massachusetts lacked jurisdiction against a Connecticut resident because the plaintiff in the 
Massachusetts action failed to personally serve process on the Connecticut defendant within 
Massachusetts); Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37, 41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809); Rogers v. Coleman, 3 Ky. 
(Hard.) 422, 429 (1808).  For additional examples of early American, pre-Pennoyer cases that discuss the 
court’s territorial jurisdiction, see Weinstein, supra note 3, at 11 (collecting cases). 
 61.  See, e.g., Farley v. Shippen, Wythe (Va.) 254, 265 (1794) (Supreme Court of Virginia ordering 
a party to convey lands located in North Carolina); Sanford v. Sanford, 5 Day (Conn.) 353, 358 (1812) 
(Connecticut court ordering delivery of personal property outside of the state’s territorial boundaries); 
Jennison v. Hapgood, 27 Mass. 77, 110 (1830) (Massachusetts court ordering disposition of property 
outside of Massachusetts); Mitchell v. Bunch, 2 Paige Ch. (N.Y.) 606, 621 (1831) (New York court 
ordering the defendant to deliver personal property from Cartagena, Colombia); Mead v. Merritt, 2 Paige 
Ch. (N.Y.) 402, 405 (1831) (New York court ordering the defendant to convey real estate in Connecticut); 
McDowell v. Read, 3 La. Ann. 391, 395 (1848) (Louisiana determining the legality of conveyance of 
lands located outside of Louisiana); Dickinson v. Hoomes’s Administrator, 49 Va. 353, 439 (1852) 
(Virginia court ordering conveyance of real estate in Kentucky); MacGregor v. MacGregor, 9 Iowa 65, 
77 (1859) (Iowa court ordering conveyance of real estate in Illinois and Wisconsin); Gardner v. Ogden, 
22 N.Y. 327, 332 (1860) (New York court ordering conveyance of real estate in Illinois); Burnley v. 
Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474, 477 (1873) (Ohio court ordering conveyance of real estate in Kentucky); 
Moore v. Jaeger, 2 MacArth. (D.C.) 462, 471 (1876) (District of Columbia court ordering conveyance of 
land in West Virginia); Henderson v. McBee, 79 N.C. 219, 222 (1878) (North Carolina court ordering 
conveyance of real estate in Alabama); Seixas v. King, 39 La. Ann. 510, 512 (1887) (Louisiana court 
ordering conveyance of real estate in Mississippi); Winn v. Strickland, 34 Fla. 610, 631 (1894) (Florida 
court ordering conveyance of real estate in Georgia). 
 62.  Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 118.  Although the canon is phrased as a rule 
of statutory interpretation, the territoriality principle that underlies the canon is readily visible because in 
the early 19th century, the “law of nations” was almost entirely concerned with the relationship among 
territorially sovereign states.  See also The Schooner “Exchange” v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 
136 (1812) (holding Maryland court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on French warship). 
 63.  See, e.g., Massie v. Watts, 10 U.S. 148, 163 (1810) (allowing Kentucky court to compel 
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But it was not until Pennoyer v. Neff that the Supreme Court had the 
occasion to consider applying the territoriality principles to equitable 
remedies, and decided that they did not apply.  Accordingly, Pennoyer may 
be considered the moment of birth for Equity Extraterritoriality, in which the 
doctrine “found its highest expression.”64 
The facts of Pennoyer are well-known.  Marcus Neff, who was the 
plaintiff at the trial level, sought to recover the title of the land in Oregon 
that was sold to Sylvester Pennoyer.  Pennoyer acquired the land from John 
Mitchell, who purportedly obtained title of Neff’s land after prevailing in a 
lawsuit against Neff.  Unlike Mitchell, Neff did not reside in Oregon, and 
never appeared on the lawsuit that Mitchell filed.  Mitchell served Neff by 
publication pursuant to Oregon law, and won a default judgment when Neff 
failed to appear.  Therefore, the validity of Pennoyer’s title depended on the 
validity of Mitchell’s default judgment.  And the validity of the Mitchell’s 
judgment, in turn, depended on whether Oregon had jurisdiction over Neff 
when Mitchell sued Neff. 
Much of Pennoyer is about the application of territoriality principles to 
the doctrine of personal jurisdiction.  Pennoyer imported its territoriality 
principles from Joseph Story, who in turn borrowed and expanded the 
territoriality principles of the Dutch jurist Ulrich Huber.  Huber’s theory of 
territorial sovereignty, under which laws of a sovereign state are effective 
within the state’s territory but not beyond, formed the foundation of the 
Westphalian international order.65  Story inherited Huber’s principles, and 
transformed them into rules limiting judicial jurisdiction along the lines of 
territorial boundaries.66  In doing so, Story transformed “intellectual 
 
conveyance in lands located in Ohio); King v. Hamilton, 29 U.S. 311, 311 (1830) (ruling the circuit court 
of Ohio, sitting in Equity, may order specific performance regarding land located within the military grant 
given by Ohio to Virginia); Watkins v. Lessee of Holman, 41 U.S. 25, 57 (1842) (“A Court of Chancery, 
acting in personam, may well decree the conveyance of land in any other state, and may enforce their 
decree by process against the defendant.”); Corbett v. Nutt, 77 U.S. 464, 475 (1870) (“A court of equity 
acting upon the person of a defendant may control the disposition of real property belonging to him 
situated in another jurisdiction, and even in a foreign country.”); Muller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444, 449 (1876) 
(“It is here undoubtedly a recognized doctrine that a court of equity, sitting in a State and having 
jurisdiction of the person, may decree a conveyance by him of land in another State, and may enforce the 
decree by process against the defendant.”); Phelps v. McDonald, 99 U.S. 298, 308 (1878) (“Where the 
necessary parties are before a court of equity, it is immaterial that the res of the controversy, whether it 
be real or personal property, is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the tribunal.”). 
 64.  Price, supra note 24, at 804. 
 65.  See Alex Mills, The Private History of International Law, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 25–27 
(2005). 
 66.  See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 
241, 260 (1965). 
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constructs for critical enlightenment” into the principles of “administering 
the law in its intricate routine.”67 
The opinion in Pennoyer borrows its jurisdictional principles directly 
from Story:  “no tribunal established by [a state] can extend its process 
beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its 
decisions. ‘Any exertion of authority of this sort beyond this limit,’ says 
Story, ‘is a mere nullity.’”68  But how is a state to establish the required 
jurisdiction over the party?  Here, Pennoyer announced the decision for 
which it is primarily known today:  by serving the defendant personally.  This 
is the contribution from the English common law concept of territoriality, 
which was transplanted to the early American common law courts.  Early 
American common law courts had a form of territoriality principle whereby 
their jurisdiction was established by a service of process effectuated within 
the state boundaries.69  In short, Pennoyer grafted the Westphalian 
territoriality principles—derived from Huber’s theories, delivered through 
Story—onto the jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction, by requiring a 
territorial service of process upon a person before the courts may exercise 
jurisdiction over that person. 
But what about after the court establishes personal jurisdiction?  At that 
point, do territoriality principles apply to the orders that the court may issue 
upon the person over whom the court has jurisdiction?  To this core question 
of Equity Extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court answered simply:  no.  In the 
middle of propounding the strong territoriality principles inherited from 
Huber and Story, the Supreme Court gave this ringing endorsement of Equity 
Extraterritoriality: 
[T]he exercise of jurisdiction which every State is admitted to possess over 
persons and property within its own territory will often affect persons and 
property without it.  To any influence exerted in this way by a State 
affecting persons resident or property situated elsewhere, no objection can 
be justly taken. 
Thus the State, through its tribunals, may compel persons domiciled 
within its limits to execute, in pursuance of their contracts respecting 
property elsewhere situated . . . ; and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no 
manner interferes with the supreme control over the property by the State 
within which it is situated.70 
The Court concluded this approval of Equity Extraterritoriality by citing a 
line of English and American cases that upheld the central thesis of Equity 
 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 722–23. 
 69.  See Weinstein, supra note 3, at 10. 
 70.  Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 723. 
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Extraterritoriality:  once there is jurisdiction over a person, the court may 
reach beyond its territorial borders by way of ordering that person.71 
To be sure, Pennoyer’s approval of Equity Extraterritoriality comes in 
dicta, and its formulation of Equity Extraterritoriality is the same as the many 
prior Supreme Court cases that allowed courts sitting in equity to exercise an 
indirect extraterritorial authority.72  But the context in which the formulation 
appeared does matter.  In the middle of pronouncing perhaps the strongest 
statement of territoriality in U.S. constitutional history, the Supreme Court 
explicitly carved an exception:  as long as the court exercised its power 
beyond its territorial jurisdiction indirectly through persons within its 
territorial jurisdiction, “no objection can be justly taken.” 
According, Pennoyer is the moment where Equity Extraterritoriality 
had its doctrinal birth.  But of course, the court’s a priori approval of Equity 
Extraterritoriality begs the question: regardless of what the Supreme Court 
says, there must be some instances where Equity Extraterritoriality does 
interfere with another state’s territorial sovereignty as a practical matter. 
What happens in those instances?  To this day, nearly 140 years since 
Pennoyer, the Supreme Court has not given a comprehensive answer. 
B. Growth of Equity Extraterritoriality in Early and Mid-20th Century 
Pennoyer, decided in 1878, crystallized the split in the application of 
territoriality doctrine in the U.S. law: jurisdiction would be delimited by the 
territorial boundaries, while equity would reach beyond the territorial 
boundaries through persons under the court’s jurisdiction.  In the early 20th 
century, these two branches would continue stretching in opposite directions. 
Two developments from the mid-20th century would accelerate the split 
even further:  merger of law and equity, and the personal jurisdiction 
revolution involving “minimum contacts” and the “effects” test.  These two 
developments would serve as growth spurts for Equity Extraterritoriality, 
which emerged as an even more significant force by late 20th century. 
1. Equity Extraterritoriality in the Early 20th Century 
The split in the territoriality doctrine caused by Pennoyer continued into 
the 20th century:  territoriality principles applied to jurisdiction, but not to 
court orders thereafter.  In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., the 
Supreme Court applied Pennoyer’s concept of territoriality to legislative 
jurisdiction, holding that an act of Congress (in this case, Act to Protect 
 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See cases cited supra note 63. 
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Trade Against Monopolies) did not apply to injuries occurring outside the 
territorial boundaries of the United States. 73  If Pennoyer is not the strongest 
statement of territorial sovereignty in U.S. constitutional history, the honor 
may belong to American Banana. The Court’s opinion, penned by Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, expresses incredulity that anyone would doubt the 
idea that American law did not apply beyond the U.S. territorial borders: 
[T]he plaintiff’s case depends on several rather startling propositions.  In 
the first place the acts causing the damage were done, so far as appears, 
outside the jurisdiction of the United States . . .  It is surprising to hear it 
argued that they were governed by the act of Congress.74 
Justice Holmes also made clear that sovereignty was the animating principle 
of the territoriality doctrine, as he found extraterritorial application of a 
Congressional act “would be an interference with the authority of another 
sovereign.”75 
At the same time, however, the Supreme Court continued to find no 
issue with Equity Extraterritoriality, which at this point had received the 
blessings of Pennoyer.  In the aftermath of Pennoyer, the courts of the United 
States continued to approve the Equity Extraterritoriality power to order 
disposition of res located outside of the courts’ territorial jurisdiction.76 
Commentators from the early 20th century have considered Equity 
Extraterritoriality to be a settled doctrine:  “It is now firmly established that 
the courts of equity of one state can grant an injunction to restrain the 
proceedings in another state without interfering with the sovereignty of that 
other state.”77 
 
 73.  213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). 
 74.  Id. at 355. 
 75.  Id. at 356; see also Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 290 (1949) (U.S. overtime laws 
did not apply outside of the United States, despite the fact that both the employer and the employee were 
U.S. nationals). 
 76.  See, e.g., Robertson v. Howard, 229 U.S. 254, 261–62 (1913); Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 10 
(1909); Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U.S. 87, 105–06 (1891); Hart v. Sansom, 110 U.S. 151, 154–55 (1884); 
Lawrence v. Du Bois, 16 W. Va. 443, 455–56 (1880); Shillaber v. Robinson, 97 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1877); 
Elizabethtown Sav. Inst. v. Gerber, 35 N.J. Eq. 153, 156–57 (1882); Johnson v. Gibson, 6 N.E. 205, 208 
(Ill. 1886); Peters v. Neely, 84 Tenn. 275, 280–81 (1886); Smith v. Davis, 27 P. 26, 32 (Cal. 1891); Davis 
v. Cornue, 45 N.E. 449, 450–51 (N.Y. 1896); Noble v. Grandin, 84 N.W. 465, 467 (Mich. 1900); 
Pittsburg, C., C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Bartels, 56 S.W. 152, 152 (Ky. 1900); Schmaltz v. York Mfg. 
Co., 52 A. 522, 526 (Pa. 1902); Butterfield v. Nogales Copper Co., 80 P. 345, 347 (Ariz. 1905); Banco 
Minero v. Ross, 172 S.W. 711, 714 (Tex. 1915); Apple v. Smith, 190 P. 8, 9 (Kan. 1920). 
 77.  Ernest J. Messner, The Jurisdiction of a Court of Equity Over Persons to Compel the Doing of 
Acts Outside the Territorial Limits of the State, 14 MINN. L. REV. 494, 495 (1930); see also Charles Levin, 
Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction of Courts of Chancery, 9 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 399, 407 (1934) (“It is 
apparently well-established in this country that, on the theory that the action is purely one in personam, 
and not in rem, a court does have equitable power to make such an [extraterritorial] order.”) (italics in 
original); Walter W. Cook, The Power of Courts in Equity, Part II, 15 COLUM. L. REV. 106, 128 (1915); 
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By the early 20th century, now with Pennoyer’s blessing, Equity 
Extraterritoriality would not limit itself to the “classical” situations in which 
Equity Extraterritoriality arose in the 19th century—usually, adjudication of 
rights regarding a specific real property located outside of the court’s 
territorial jurisdiction.  As the economy of the United States expanded 
throughout North America and beyond in the late 19th century and early 20th 
century, there was an ever-greater need for American parties before a U.S. 
court to exercise control beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court. 
Accordingly, Equity Extraterritoriality would find new expressions with 
even greater extraterritorial impact.  With Equity Extraterritoriality, courts 
of the early 20th century were able to:  order a party to deliver physical 
evidence located outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction;78 order a party 
to stop pursing legal action with a court of another jurisdiction;79 order a 
party to engage in a construction project outside of the United States so as to 
prevent harmful environmental effects within the U.S.;80 prohibit a non-U.S. 
corporation from changing prices outside of the United States, although the 
price change was mandated by a foreign law.81  Every one of these 
expressions of Equity Extraterritoriality survives to this day. 
 
Spelling, supra note 14, § 8, at 10 (“But a court of equity may enjoin one from prosecuting a suit or 
selling property in another state, if justice so requires.”). 
 78.  See , e.g., Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541, 551 (1908) (finding no Due 
Process Clause violation when a Vermont grand jury ordered production of defendant company’s books 
and records located in Massachusetts); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 443 (1932) (upholding 
a contempt judgment over an American citizen residing abroad who refused to comply with a subpoena 
in a criminal case). 
 79.  See, e.g., Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 134 (1890) (permitting Massachusetts courts to 
enjoin the defendants from continuing the litigation pending in New York).  In Cole, the enjoined party 
cited Pennoyer to argue against the anti-suit injunction by the Massachusetts court.  Quoting the very 
language in Pennoyer that approved Equity Extraterritoriality, the court found that extraterritorial anti-
suit injunctions were permitted.  See also Wilson v. Josephs, 8 N.E. 616, 617 (Ind. 1886) (Indiana court 
enjoining the defendant from pursuing an attachment action in Illinois); Allen v. Buchanan, 11 So. 777, 
779 (Ala. 1893) (Alabama court enjoining a legal proceeding against property in Louisiana); Miller v. 
Gittings, 37 A. 372, 376–77 (Md. 1897) (Maryland court enjoining customers from suing a Maryland 
broker in New York); Dunlap v. Byers, 67 N.W. 1067, 1071 (Mich. 1896) (Michigan court upholding the 
validity of an Ohio court order adjudicating claims over lands located in Michigan); Kirdahi v. Basha, 74 
N.Y.S. 383, 384 (1902) (New York court enjoining disposition of property located in New Jersey); 
Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 N.Y.S. 87, 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st  Dep’t 1926) (New York court enjoining 
a husband from prosecuting a divorce action in a foreign country). 
 80.  See, e.g., The Salton Sea Cases, 172 F. 792, 819–20 (9th Cir. 1909) (upholding the California 
court’s order enjoining a New Jersey corporation from diverting water in Mexico in order to stop the 
flooding in Utah).  Salton Sea is notable because, although the court had no territorial jurisdiction over 
the defendant (a New Jersey corporation), the loci delicti (Mexico), or the damaged res (land in Utah), 
the court made the extraterritorial order solely based on long-arm personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 
 81.  See, e.g., Fargo v. Redfield, 22 F. 373, 375–76 (1st Cir. 1884) (prohibiting a Canadian railway 
company from adjusting the fares on the rail tracks that stretched into Vermont based on the contract 
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The problem caused by the growing split in the application of 
territoriality principles was becoming increasingly apparent to courts and 
legal scholars of the early 20th century.  Regardless of what the Supreme 
Court declared in Pennoyer, it was plain that at least in certain circumstances, 
Equity Extraterritoriality was inconsistent with the territoriality principle 
applied to judicial and legislative jurisdiction, and served as an affront to the 
principle of territorial sovereignty. Contemporary scholars were quite 
forward in noting that Equity Extraterritoriality allowed a party to do what it 
could not under the ordinary application of the territoriality principles.82  
Thus, eminent jurists of this time period attempted to find a limiting principle 
for Equity Extraterritoriality. 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes appears to be the first Supreme Court 
justice who paused at the state of the law regarding territoriality.  In Fall v. 
Eastin, the plaintiff fell on the “wrong” side of Equity Extraterritoriality, as 
the plaintiff’s divorce decree from the state of Washington ordered that the 
title of the land located in Nebraska should be changed to list the plaintiff as 
the land owner.83  The majority opinion by Justice Joseph McKenna decided 
the case along the lines of Pennoyer:  the Washington court cannot affect the 
title of the land in Nebraska, although the plaintiff could have prevailed if 
the decree merely ordered the defendant to deliver the title of the land.84  
Perhaps mindful of the strong territoriality principle that he announced in 
American Banana, decided only seven months prior to Fall, Justice Holmes 
penned a concurring opinion to find a place for Equity Extraterritoriality 
 
between the Canadian company and a Vermont rail company, although Canadian law required the fare 
adjustment).  Fargo is striking because around the same time Fargo was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court 
repeatedly held in several railroad cases that courts of one state could not regulate the railway 
management of another state.  See, e.g., N. Ind. R.R. Co. v. Mich. Cent. R.R. Co., 56 U.S. 233, 246 
(1854); Miss. & Mo. R.R. Co. v. Ward, 67 U.S. 485, 496 (1863); Cent. R.R. Co. v. Jersey City, 209 U.S. 
473, 480 (1908).  Thus, Fargo is an example of one of the most significant problems of Equity 
Extraterritoriality:  it allows a court to do indirectly what it is prohibited to do directly. See further 
discussion infra Section V.B.2.c. 
 82.  See Cook, supra note 77, at 110 (“We are now in a position to see to what extent these methods 
of procedure really differ. In practical effect there is some but only a little difference.”); Messner, supra 
note 77, at 528 (“The tendency of the modern decisions is to pay less attention to the state lines, which 
formerly were considered insurmountable barriers, and, when the court has personal jurisdiction over the 
parties to the suit, to render any suitable decree, directed to and binding upon the parties to the suit, even 
to the extent of directing an act to be done outside of the state.”). See also Israel S. Gomborov, Extra-
Territorial Jurisdiction in Equity, 7 TEMP. L.Q. 468, 474–76 (1933) (criticizing early Supreme Court 
cases on Equity Extraterritoriality on the grounds that they violate the principle of territorial sovereignty).  
 83.  215 U.S. 1, 4 (1909). 
 84.  See id. at 8 (“The territorial limitation of the jurisdiction of courts of a state over property in 
another state has a limited exception in the jurisdiction of a court of equity, but it is an exception well 
defined. A court of equity, having authority to act upon the person, may indirectly act upon real estate in 
another state, through the instrumentality of this authority over the person.”). 
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within the constitutional structure.  To Justice Holmes, the justification for 
Equity Extraterritoriality could be found in the Constitution’s Full Faith and 
Credit Clause:  “A personal decree is equally within the jurisdiction of a 
court having the person within its power, whatever its ground and whatever 
it orders the defendant to do.  Therefore, I think this decree was entitled to 
full faith and credit in Nebraska.”85  Justice Holmes, however, found other 
defects in the Washington court’s order that disqualified it from full faith and 
credit.86 
This formulation by Justice Holmes is not a great solution.  For one, it 
does nothing to limit the reach of Equity Extraterritoriality, as Justice 
Holmes would permit the court to reach extraterritorially in “whatever it 
orders the defendant to do,” as long as the court has the person “within its 
power.”  For another, Justice Holmes’ solution would do nothing in the 
international context, which has no equivalent of a Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.  Regardless, Justice Holmes’ concurring opinion in Fall appears to 
be the first attempt by the Supreme Court to limit the Equity 
Extraterritoriality doctrine with a constitutional mandate.  If engaged further, 
Fall v. Eastin could have developed into a more robust Equity 
Extraterritoriality doctrine that developed within the confines of the Full 
Faith and Credit jurisprudence.  But not much came of Fall; Justice Holmes’ 
proposed formulation of Equity Extraterritoriality only led to minimal 
further development,87 leading to Justice Breyer’s bewilderment 87 years 
later in Baker, where the Supreme Court was asked to ascertain the 
relationship between Equity Extraterritoriality and the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.88 
Judge Learned Hand, another titan of American legal history, tackled 
this issue as well.  The plaintiff in Amey v. Colebrook Guaranty Savings 
Bank filed suit in the U.S. District Court for Vermont to demand accounting 
over lands located in Maine.89  In this “classic” Equity Extraterritoriality 
case, Judge Hand shrewdly noted that Amey presented the same problem that 
Justice Holmes faced in Fall.90  In Amey, Judge Hand took a different tack 
from Justice Holmes by explicitly seeking to limit the application of Equity 
 
 85.  Id. at 15 (Holmes, J., concurring). 
 86.  See id. 
 87.  In Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 352 (1948), the Supreme Court held that divorce decrees 
were entitled to Full Faith and Credit across state borders.  But neither Sherrer nor any other Supreme 
Court case since Justice Holmes’ concurring opinion in Fall dealt with Equity Extraterritoriality until 
Baker in 1996. 
 88.  See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998). 
 89.  92 F.2d 62, 62 (2d Cir. 1937). 
 90.  See id. at 64 (citing Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 1 (1909)). 
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Extraterritoriality.  Responding to the argument that the court had 
jurisdiction over the defendant, Judge Hand noted: 
The word, “jurisdiction,” is in this connection somewhat equivocal; in one 
sense the judge had it; the [defendant] had personally appeared and was 
subject to his orders . . . But although he thus had the power to prevent the 
defendant from asserting its rights in Maine, it might still be improper for 
him to do so. Courts do not always exert themselves to the full, or direct 
parties to do all that they can effectively compel, and such forbearance is 
sometimes called lack of “jurisdiction.”91 
With this, Judge Hand was attempting to limit the worst excesses of 
Equity Extraterritoriality by limiting the basis upon which a court may issue 
an extraterritorial order.  For Judge Hand, merely having jurisdiction over a 
person would not be sufficient.  After detailed discussion of English and 
American cases on Equity Extraterritoriality, Judge Hand concluded:  “It 
would be more nearly true to say that the court may enforce any personal 
obligation of the defendant . . . When there is no such obligation, under the 
more general rule and the better considered decision, courts will abstain.”92  
In other words, Judge Hand would allow Equity Extraterritoriality to reach 
beyond the court’s territorial borders to enforce a specific obligation, such 
as a pre-existing contract or a judgment by a court, but not a general 
obligation such as the duty to avoid waste, as was the case in Amey.  This 
limitation would have cut down the many branches of Equity 
Extraterritoriality to a manageable level—but it was not to be.  The only time 
the U.S. Supreme Court addressed Judge Hand’s limiting principle was in 
Justice John Harlan’s dissent in United States v. First National City Bank, 
while the majority of the court continued the path of Equity 
Extraterritoriality.93  Beyond that moment of hurrah, Judge Hand’s limiting 
doctrine received little notice.94 
 
 91.  Id. at 63 (emphasis in original). 
 92.  Id. at 64 (emphasis added). 
 93.  379 U.S. 378, 387–388 (1965) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“But ‘jurisdiction’ is not synonymous 
with naked power.  It is a combination of power and policy.  Judge Learned Hand made this point in 
Amey, a case containing some of the same elements as the case before us.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 94.  Only two federal cases cite Judge Hand’s limiting principle with approval.  Gillis v. Keystone 
Mut. Casualty Co., 172 F.2d 826, 830 (6th Cir. 1949); Connell v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., 174 
F. Supp. 453, 457 (D.R.I. 1959).  See also Notes, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (AM. 
LAW INST. 1971) § 55 (citing Amey in a section that allows a state to issue an extraterritorial injunction 
as long as the person so ordered is within the court’s judicial jurisdiction). 
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2. Two Growth Spurts:  Merger of Law and Equity, and the Personal 
Jurisdiction Revolution 
Equity Extraterritoriality grew and expanded steadily in the early 20th 
century, despite attempts by eminent jurists to limit its reach.  In the mid-
20th century, Equity Extraterritoriality would undergo two major growth 
spurts that would push its reach even further away from the principle of 
sovereign territoriality:  merger of law and equity, and the revolution in the 
U.S. law’s personal jurisdiction doctrine. 
a. Merger of Law and Equity 
The merger of law and equity was the first growth spurt for Equity 
Extraterritoriality.  In the federal system, law and equity ceased to exist as 
separate systems in 1938 with the introduction of a uniform Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, while many state courts had done the same several decades 
earlier.95  The merger of law and equity represented a “triumph of equity,” 
as the post-merger civil procedure derived mostly from equity procedure 
rather than common law procedure.96  The triumph of equity in procedure 
meant, effectively, that the merger allowed legal remedies to be enforced 
through equitable procedures.  In the history of Equity Extraterritoriality, this 
is the moment at which the term “equity” in “Equity Extraterritoriality” 
becomes a historical marker rather than a descriptive term—because after 
the merger, courts may apply legal remedies extraterritorially by way of 
Equity Extraterritoriality. 
The merger of law and equity served to amplify the internal 
contradiction in the application of territoriality principles to a new level.  In 
17th century England, the inconsistency with which common law courts and 
the equity court approached the territoriality principle was manageable 
because common law and equity played separate and complementary roles:  
common law provided the general rules, and equity was an exception 
invoked only in extraordinary cases.  Eliminating the separation between 
common law and equity meant that the principles that served to limit the 
application of equity to extraordinary cases would fall away.97  Accordingly, 
equity—which was once considered “[a] special doctrine reserved for special 
occasions”—became “ordinary, not extraordinary, in remedies, procedure, 
and substance.”98  As a result, “the merger of law and equity contributed to 
 
 95.  See Price, supra note 24, at 811. 
 96.  See Subrin, supra note 31, at 943. 
 97.  See Weinstein, supra note 49, at 171–72 (lacking of understanding as to the historical 
background of a legal doctrine leads to a “doctrinal incoherence”). 
 98.  Douglas Laycock, The Triumph of Equity, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 53–54 (1993). See 
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a greater geographical coverage and type of activity affected than is seen in 
equitable decrees of earlier eras.”99 
One of the main limiting principles of equity had been that equity acted 
only in cases of “irreparable injury,” namely the types of injury for which 
there was no adequate remedy at law.  But in a court lacking a formal 
distinction between law and equity, with a fading memory of what remedy 
was legal versus equitable, that limiting principle became a non sequitur.100  
Another major limiting principle for equity had been that equity was 
confined to the protection of property rights.101  This is one of the reasons 
why the “classic” cases of Equity Extraterritoriality invariably involved a 
disposition of res of some kind.  This limitation, too, essentially disappeared 
after the merger of law and equity.102  Even in equity cases that purportedly 
stayed within the “property rights” limitation, the concept of “property 
rights” was stretched far beyond a disposition of res.  The creative expansion 
of “property rights” limitation in this time period would allow injunctions to 
govern strikes and labor disputes,103 shut down illegal saloons during 
Prohibition,104 and defeat racial segregation.105  As the court’s power 
 
also Willis L. M. Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IOWA L. REV. 183, 190–91 
(1957) (“Equitable relief has now become so common that it can hardly be considered more extraordinary 
than relief at law.”). 
 99.  Price, supra note 24, at 812. See also Spelling, supra note 14, at 5–6 (“The range of purpose 
for which this remedial writ may be invoked is almost infinite.”). 
 100.  See Price, supra note 24, at 815–16; Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury 
Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 609, 692 (1990) (arguing that the original meaning of the “irreparable 
injury” requirement was that a party did not have remedy at law, and this original meaning disappeared). 
 101.  See Frederick W. Stevens, Proper Use of the Writ of Injunction: From the Standpoint of Legal 
History, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 566 (1908) (“Unless statutes have prescribed otherwise, injunctions issue 
only where the controversy concerns property, or property rights, including, of course, contract rights; 
and not always then.”). 
 102.  See Knighton v. Knighton, 41 So. 2d 172, 174 (1949) (holding that, in an alienation of affection 
case, “[i]t is now well settled here and elsewhere that injunctive relief is not limited to the protection of 
property rights, but extends to the protection of personal rights in many fields where no adequate remedy 
at law is available.”) (quoting Henley v. Rockett, 8 So. 2d 852, 853 (Ala. 1943)); Everett v. Harron, 110 
A.2d 383, 387 (1955) (holding in a racial desegregation case that the “property rights” limitation of equity 
is “a generalization more honored in the breach than the observance, and runs counter to the cardinal need 
of flexibility in the domain of equity jurisprudence.”) (internal citation and quotation omitted). 
 103.  See, e.g., Regal Knitwear Co. v. Nat’l Labor Rel. Bd., 324 U.S. 9, 9 (1945).  See also Luke P. 
Norris, Labor and the Origin of Civil Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 462, 482–90 (2017) (recounting the 
history of equitable injunctions against the labor movement). 
 104.  Price, supra note 24, at 815. 
 105.  See GARY L. MCDOWELL, EQUITY AND THE CONSTITUTION 97–110 (1982) (discussing the 
difference between equitable reliefs in school desegregation cases from the traditional equitable reliefs). 
See also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1292–
96 (1976) (discussing the “the increasing importance of equitable relief” in issuing forward-looking 
equitable remedies to address social issues.). 
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deriving from equity grew exponentially following the merger of law and 
equity, so did the court’s authority to issue Equity Extraterritoriality orders. 
b. Personal Jurisdiction Revolution 
Also in the mid-20th century, the U.S. legal doctrine on personal 
jurisdiction would undergo a revolution, for the most part upending 
Pennoyer’s personal jurisdiction doctrine.  Legal realists led this revolution 
as a part of their broader attack against formalist assumptions in the law.106  
The revolution’s effect was an expansion of the court’s judicial jurisdiction 
on the basis of “reasonableness,” covering persons outside of the court’s 
territorial jurisdiction.107  In other words, for the first time in U.S. 
constitutional history, the territoriality principle would be applied 
consistently in favor of extraterritoriality.  This harmonization would be over 
by the late 20th century, when the Supreme Court began the retrenchment of 
personal jurisdiction.  But this brief period of harmonization would create a 
synergy that propelled Equity Extraterritoriality even farther away from the 
court’s territorial jurisdiction.  In fact, much of the Equity Extraterritoriality 
doctrine’s strength, as it stands today, derives from the jurisdictional theories 
of this time. 
The expansion of personal jurisdiction came on two fronts: “minimum 
contacts” doctrine and the “effects” test.  The Supreme Court announced the 
minimum contacts doctrine in International Shoe Co. v. Washington,108 a 
seminal case that restructured the territorial limitation on personal 
jurisdiction that Pennoyer imposed.  The Supreme Court famously 
announced that a person no longer needed to be within a court’s territorial 
jurisdiction to be subject to that court’s judicial jurisdiction; instead, having 
“certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does 
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” would 
suffice.109  Accordingly, the Court found that a Delaware corporation with a 
principal place of business in Missouri was properly subject to the 
jurisdiction of a court in Washington, as the corporation’s business activities 
with the state of Washington were “systematic and continuous.”110  The 
Supreme Court would later decide in Shaffer v. Heitner that the “minimum 
 
 106.  See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 35 (2d ed. 1995); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Counter-
Revolution in Conflicts Law?  From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 377, 379 (1966). 
 107.  See Austin Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident 
Alien Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 13–18 (2006) (describing the rise of reasonableness 
standard in the personal jurisdiction doctrine). 
 108.  326 U.S. 310, 310 (1945). 
 109.  Id. at 316 (citation omitted). 
 110.  Id. at 320. 
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contacts” test would govern the assertion of in rem and quasi in rem 
jurisdiction, in addition to the assertion of in personam jurisdiction.111 
The “effects” doctrine traces its genesis to United States v. Aluminum 
Co. of America (Alcoa),112 a decision by Judge Learned Hand announced on 
the same year as International Shoe.  Alcoa represents a union of the 
contemporary international law and then-existing domestic law, not unlike 
the way Pennoyer was the union between Westphalian territoriality concept 
and traditional Anglo-American law.  In 1927, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice decided the famous S.S. Lotus case, in which it 
established a presumption in favor of a nation’s legislative jurisdiction, even 
over conduct occurring abroad.113  Meanwhile, since American Banana, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has issued a series of cases that chipped away at 
American Banana’s territoriality doctrine.114  Drawing from these decisions, 
Judge Hand held in Alcoa that it was “settled law . . . that any state may 
impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct 
outside borders that has consequences within its borders which the state 
reprehends.”115  The “effects” test in Alcoa had an additional element of 
intent; unless the party intended to direct the effect to the United States, there 
was no jurisdiction.  Accordingly, the Sherman Act (the law sub judice in 
Alcoa) would not cover a trade between Europe and South America that 
incidentally affected the United States.116  The subsequent courts, however, 
gradually de-emphasized the intent requirement, requiring only that the 
effect be substantial and direct.117  According to Professor John Knox:  “By 
the late 1960s, there was little or no reason for lower courts to believe that 
the presumption against extraterritoriality barred the application of federal 
law to connected actions within and without U.S. territory, or to foreign 
actions with substantial domestic effects.”118 
 
 111.  433 U.S. 186, 195, 207 (1977). 
 112.  148 F.2d 416, 443–45 (2d Cir. 1945).  The Second Circuit decided Alcoa by virtue of a 
certificate from the Supreme Court, which did not have the quorum to decide the case.  See id. at 421.  
 113.  S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 16 (Sept. 7). 
 114.  See United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nav. Co., 228 U.S. 87, 105–6 (1913) (application 
of the Sherman Act to an antitrust scheme formed in Canada); Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88 (1917) 
(application of Sherman Act on an antitrust scheme formed in South Africa); United States v. Bowman, 
260 U.S. 94, 96–100 (1922) (applying criminal statute prohibiting fraud against a U.S. government-held 
corporation in a criminal scheme formed on the high seas); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 
268, 274–76 (1927) (application of the Sherman Act to an antitrust scheme formed in Mexico); see also 
Swaine, supra note 22, at 641–42. 
 115.  Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443. 
 116.  See id. 
 117.  See Swaine, supra note 22, at 642. 
 118.  John H. Knox, The Unpredictable Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 40 SW. L. REV. 635, 
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the wisdom of 
International Shoe’s minimum contacts test or Alcoa’s effects test;119 it is 
sufficient to say that these two doctrinal changes in personal jurisdiction 
greatly expanded the reach of Equity Extraterritoriality.  The essence of 
Equity Extraterritoriality is two links of control:  the court’s control over a 
person, and the person’s control over an extraterritorial thing or conduct.120  
The personal jurisdiction revolution stretched the first link close to its 
breaking point.  One must remember that, even as Pennoyer approved Equity 
Extraterritoriality, it placed an outer limit as to how far Equity 
Extraterritoriality could reach by way of its territorial jurisdiction doctrine.  
Under Pennoyer, the court could only assert jurisdiction over persons who 
were served with process within the court’s territorial jurisdiction.121  
Practically speaking, this meant that for the most part, the only way for the 
court to reach beyond its territorial jurisdiction via Equity Extraterritoriality 
was through the residents of the state in which the court was located.122  
Stated differently, Pennoyer limits the court’s extraterritorial reach in equity 
to the extraterritorial connections of residents or corporations within the 
court’s territorial jurisdiction. 
In this sense, the prohibition against extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
Pennoyer was one of the last limitations placed on the reach of Equity 
Extraterritoriality—because once jurisdiction was obtained, there was no 
longer any meaningful check on the distance that Equity Extraterritoriality 
might cover.  The personal jurisdiction revolution rendered this last 
remaining limitation by Pennoyer close to meaningless.  With the “minimum 
contacts” and “effects” tests combined, the court could (and can today) issue 
orders against foreign persons located anywhere in the world.123  For 
example:  a federal court in New York can first find that it has judicial 
jurisdiction over a foreign party—say, from Argentina—that previously 
never set foot in the State of New York, based on the finding that the party 
has sufficient minimum contacts with New York.  Then, pursuant to the well-
 
638 (2011). 
 119.  For a discussion criticizing the International Shoe rule, see, e.g., George Rutherglen, 
International Shoe and the Legacy of Legal Realism, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 347,  347 (2001).  For a 
discussion considering the merits of Alcoa, see Breyer, supra note 21, at 98−101. 
 120.  See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 121.  See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723–26 (1877). 
 122.  An exception would be the relatively rare case of transient jurisdiction, i.e. a case in which a 
non-resident is served with process while being within the court’s territorial jurisdiction.  See Burnham 
v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990). 
 123.  See Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
1455, 1478–79 (2008) (“The effects test thus gives license for near universal jurisdiction.”). 
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established principle of Equity Extraterritoriality, the court may issue an 
extraterritorial provisional order against the foreign party, prohibiting the 
party from taking certain actions in Argentina that would frustrate the object 
of the litigation pending in New York.  Further, the court can enjoin any third 
party from assisting the foreign party to violate the court’s order, no matter 
where such person may be located in the world, based on the “effects” test—
in other words, by claiming that such person’s actions would create an effect 
of frustrating the court’s order.  This example is not a fanciful imagination, 
but a close analogue of the actual events that transpired in the New York 
court case that attempted to enforce the sovereign debt of the Republic of 
Argentina.124  There, a federal court in New York not only enjoined the South 
American foreign sovereign, but also European financiers that were doing 
business with the foreign sovereign, based on the legal theories outlined 
above.125 
Pennoyer did approve Equity Extraterritoriality, which reached pretty 
far beyond the court’s territorial jurisdiction.  But ultimately, Equity 
Extraterritoriality under Pennoyer was orbiting around a central gravitational 
force:  the strong territoriality principle, derived from the Westphalian 
principle of territorial sovereignty and the common law tradition.  Once the 
rebel forces of the personal jurisdiction revolution destroyed that center of 
gravity, it had the effect of launching Equity Extraterritoriality beyond the 
orbit.  Without any legal principle to tie it down, Equity Extraterritoriality 
would fly adrift. 
C. Deepening Divide Between Common Law Extraterritoriality and 
Equity Extraterritoriality in Late 20th  Century 
The mid-20th century saw a brief period of harmonization in the 
application of territoriality principles in favor of extraterritorial reach.  This 
period of harmonization would end in the late 20th century, as the U.S. 
Supreme Court would issue a series of decisions that rejuvenated the strength 
of the presumption against extraterritoriality.  But this retrenchment from 
extraterritoriality would occur only on the side of personal and legislative 
jurisdiction.  Although the Supreme Court did sporadically address Equity 
Extraterritoriality in this time period, such efforts, taken together, did little 
 
 124.  See discussion infra Sections IV.C.2 and IV.C.3.  For general overview of the Argentina 
sovereign debt enforcement, see Andrew Pomager, Enjoining Foreign Conduct of Non-Parties: NML 
Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 29 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 349, 350 (2015); Karen H. Cross, 
The Extraterritorial Reach of Sovereign Debt Enforcement, 12 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 111,  126 (2015).   
 125.  See Cross, supra note 124, at 111. 
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to pull back the reach of Equity Extraterritoriality.  This resulted in the split 
attitudes in the application of U.S. territorial principles that we have today. 
1. Jurisdictional Extraterritoriality Retrenches 
The expansion of the U.S. court’s extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
occasioned by International Shoe and Alcoa, began to reverse by late 20th 
century.  In a series of decisions, the Supreme Court began curtailing the 
assertions of jurisdiction that arguably might have passed muster under 
International Shoe and/or Alcoa.126  This trend of retrenchment would 
accelerate in the 21st century, during which the U.S. Supreme Court issued 
a flurry of decisions that would mark the new high point of the doctrine of 
presumption against extraterritoriality that was unseen since Pennoyer and 
American Banana.127 
Kulko v. Superior Court of California, decided in 1978, marks the 
beginning of the retrenchment.128  In Kulko, a married couple residing in New 
York divorced pursuant to a separation agreement executed in New York.  
Thereafter, the wife moved to California and sought to modify the separation 
agreement before the court in California.  The court in Kulko found that the 
California court had no jurisdiction over the husband in New York, explicitly 
rejecting the theory that the husband had minimum contacts with California 
or engaged in conduct that caused an effect in California.129  Since Kulko, 
the Supreme Court regularly decided cases that tended to cut against the 
assertion of jurisdiction beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court.  In 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the court found that an 
Oklahoma state court had no jurisdiction over a New York car retailer who 
lacked minimum contact with Oklahoma, although Oklahoma residents 
purchased cars from the New York retailer and allegedly suffered injury in 
Oklahoma.130  In Rush v. Savchuk, the court held that a Minnesota state court 
 
 126.  See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From 
Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 90 (1990) (noting that the Supreme 
Court has invalidated perfectly reasonable assertions of jurisdiction in a series of cases in the late 20th 
century). 
 127.  See also Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1084 (2015) 
(noting the recent trend of U.S. courts using the combination of personal jurisdiction doctrine, forum non 
conveniens, presumption against extraterritoriality and abstention doctrines to avoid adjudicating 
transnational litigation). 
 128.  436 U.S. 84, 84 (1978).  It must be noted that Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958), 
the first case since International Shoe and Alcoa that invalidated a state court’s assertion of jurisdiction, 
pre-dates Kulko by 20 years.  However, Kulko marks the moment where the Supreme Court began the 
steady tendency to undercut the reach of the judicial jurisdiction. 
 129.  436 U.S. at 92–98. 
 130.  444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980). 
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could not assert jurisdiction over a case that involved an auto accident in 
Indiana between two Indiana residents.  Although one of the Indiana 
residents later moved to Minnesota and became a Minnesota resident, the 
court found that the Indiana defendant did not have sufficient minimum 
contacts with Minnesota.131  In Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. 
Hall, the court found that a Texas court had no jurisdiction over litigation 
arising from a helicopter crash in Peru, which involved a helicopter provided 
by a Colombian corporation, notwithstanding the fact that the Colombian 
corporation contracted with a Texan company to provide the helicopter.132  
In Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, the plurality of 
the court found that a Taiwanese company is not subject to litigation in 
California simply by placing its products in the stream of commerce, 
although the Taiwanese company’s product may have caused a fatal 
motorcycle accident in California.133 On the same theory, the court 
invalidated a New Jersey state court’s claim of jurisdiction over a British 
manufacturer of machine tools that allegedly caused personal injury, in J. 
McIntyre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro.134  In addition, the 2014 case of Daimler 
AG v. Bauman significantly curtailed the so-called “doing business” general 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations.135 
Beginning with E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. (ARAMCO), the 
court also started to focus more specifically on the extraterritorial 
applicability of American statutory law.136  Thus, in ARAMCO, the Court 
announced that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act did not apply to the 
employment practices occurring outside of the United States, 
notwithstanding the fact that both the employer and the employee were 
American.137  Since ARAMCO, the Supreme Court has used the same logic 
to limit the extraterritorial applicability of the Federal Tort Claims Act,138 
federal immigrant law,139 the Sherman Act,140 federal criminal firearms 
 
 131.  444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980). 
 132.  466 U.S. 408, 418 (1984). 
 133.  480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987). 
 134.  564 U.S. 873, 887 (2011). 
 135.  134 S. Ct. 746, 763 (2014). 
 136.  499 U.S. 244, 259 (1991). 
 137.  Id. at 258. 
 138.  See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993) (holding that the Federal Tort Claims Act 
is not applicable to tortious conduct in Antarctica). 
 139.  See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (holding that federal 
immigration law’s prohibition against returning refugees to countries where they could face persecution 
is not applicable to Haitian refugees apprehended on the high seas). 
 140.  See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 175 (2004) (holding that the 
Sherman Act did not provide a cause of action for a foreign injury caused by a foreign price-fixing 
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law,141 and federal patent law.142  The culmination of this trend is the trio of 
cases decided in the 2010s:  Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd.,143 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,144 and RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European 
Community,145 which respectively invalidated the extraterritorial application 
of the private right of action under Section 10(b) of the Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934, Alien Tort Statute, and private right of action under 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.  The typically 
incisive pronouncement by Justice Antonin Scalia in Morrison succinctly 
summarizes the court’s newly energized disposition against 
extraterritoriality:  “When a statute gives no clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application, it has none.”146 
2. Equity Extraterritoriality Grows in Neglect 
Compared to the zeal that the Supreme Court has shown on 
jurisdictional extraterritoriality in the late 20th and the early 21st century, the 
Court’s attention to Equity Extraterritoriality in the same time period has 
been intermittent at best.  The few cases that addressed Equity 
Extraterritoriality are inconsistent in their result, likely because the court 
never considered these cases to be dealing with the same, recurring problem 
of territoriality and sovereignty.  As a result, lower federal courts and state 
courts to this day have never truly relinquished the virtually limitless 
extraterritorial reach that they gained in the development of Equity 
Extraterritoriality in the mid-20th century. 
In Baker v. General Motors Corp., the case that confounded Justices 
Breyer and Kennedy, the Supreme Court sought to clarify the relationship 
between the Full Faith and Credit Clause and Equity Extraterritoriality.147  
Baker involved a complicated chain of events and a creative use of an 
extraterritorial injunction that is typical of late 20th century Equity 
Extraterritoriality.  Ronald Elwell, an engineering analyst, sued his former 
employer General Motors in Michigan.  General Motors counterclaimed, and 
the two parties settled with the Michigan court’s approval.  As a part of the 
 
scheme, although the scheme may have caused domestic injury as well). 
 141.  See Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385, 394 (2005) (holding that federal law’s prohibition of 
felons’ purchasing a gun does not apply when the felony conviction was from a Japanese court). 
 142.  See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437,  458–59 (2007) (holding that federal patent 
law is not applicable to software installation outside of the United States). 
 143.  561 U.S. 247, 273 (2010). 
 144.  569 U.S. 108, 125 (2013). 
 145.  136 S.Ct. 2090, 2111 (2016). 
 146.  Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255. 
 147.  522 U.S. 222, 241 (1998). 
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settlement, Elwell and General Motors stipulated to an anti-suit injunction of 
sorts:  a permanent injunction barring Elwell from testifying in any litigation 
involving General Motors.  Meanwhile, brothers Kenneth and Steven Baker 
were suing General Motors in Missouri, claiming that a faulty General 
Motors vehicle killed their mother.  The Baker brothers subpoenaed Elwell 
to testify in Missouri; the Missouri court allowed the testimony, overruling 
General Motors’ objection that the Michigan court order, issued pursuant to 
the settlement between Elwell and General Motors, prohibited Elwell from 
testifying in Missouri. 
The majority opinion by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg began its analysis 
by recounting the history of extraterritorial injunction obtained as a part of 
the final judgment.148  Classifying the injunction against Elwell as a 
judgment was important, because the Full Faith and Credit Clause applied 
only to judgments.149  Because the injunction against Elwell was a part of the 
Michigan court’s final judgment, it could possibly fall within the ambit of 
Full Faith and Credit, requiring the Missouri court to recognize the Michigan 
court’s order.150  In this instance, however, the Supreme Court found that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require the Missouri court to follow the 
Michigan court’s injunction:  “a Michigan court, cannot, by entering the 
injunction to which Elwell and GM stipulated, dictate to a court in another 
jurisdiction that evidence relevant in the Bakers’ case—a controversy to 
which Michigan is foreign—shall be inadmissible.”151 This was because “the 
Michigan decree cannot determine evidentiary issues in a lawsuit brought by 
parties who were not subject to the jurisdiction of the Michigan court.”152 
One can say that Baker is the Supreme Court’s most significant pull-
back on Equity Extraterritoriality in the late 20th century, but that would not 
be saying much.  It is true that Baker’s majority opinion holds within it a 
kernel that could have grown potentially into a more robust theory limiting 
the reach of Equity Extraterritoriality.  Indeed, the concurring opinion by 
Justice Anthony Kennedy makes this very point.153  Justice Kennedy 
 
 148.  See id. at 234. 
 149.  See id. at 232 (“The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel a state to substitute the 
statutes of other states for its statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to 
legislate.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
 150.  See id. at 234 (“The Court has never placed equity decrees outside the full faith and credit 
domain.”). 
 151.  Id. at 239. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  See id. at 244 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Our decisions have been careful not to foreclose all 
effect for the types of injunctions the majority would place outside the ambit of full faith and credit.  
These authorities seem to be disregarded in today’s holding.”). 
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observed that the formulation by Justice Ginsburg would limit extraterritorial 
court orders that are “purport[ing] to accomplish an official act within the 
exclusive province of [a sister] State.”154  This limitation could have 
potentially grown into some type of limiting principle on the extraterritorial 
equitable orders that offend the plenary jurisdiction of another territorial 
sovereign.  But this potential in Baker never materialized; the law today on 
Equity Extraterritoriality is the same as the day when Baker was announced 
nearly two decades ago.  Further, even if Baker did realize its potential, it 
would have covered no more than a quarter of the issues that arise with 
Equity Extraterritoriality, as it only would address one-half of the 
extraterritoriality issues arising within the United States.  That is to say:  like 
Justice Holmes’ suggestion in Fall, the hypothetical, fully-developed Baker 
doctrine would do nothing to extraterritorial court orders whose scope is 
international rather than interstate, operating in a world that lacks a 
sovereignty-harmonizing device like a Full Faith and Credit Clause.  Even 
within the domestic setting, the hypothetical Baker doctrine would not 
address court orders that are not considered final judgments, since the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause only operates on final judgments.155 
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund is another late 
20th century case in which the Supreme Court could have limited the reach 
of Equity Extraterritoriality.156 Grupo Mexicano presented a classic Equity 
Extraterritoriality scenario, a disposition of res located outside of the court’s 
jurisdiction.  One slight difference, however—the lower court in Grupo 
Mexicano (i.e. the federal district court in New York) restrained the 
disposition of assets located in Mexico by way of a preliminary injunction 
prior to the final judgment, to enforce the obligation owed under a simple 
contract.  This difference was sufficient for Justice Scalia to strike down this 
instance of Equity Extraterritoriality.  Historically, English equity court 
lacked the authority to issue a pre-judgment injunction like this one; 
therefore, according to Justice Scalia, the contemporary U.S. courts likewise 
lacked the authority, unless there was a statute stating otherwise.157 
 
 154.  Id. at 243. 
 155.  Thus, for example, the California Supreme Court decided Advanced Bionics Corp. v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 29 Cal. 4th 697, 700 (2002), a case involving an anti-suit preliminary injunction (as 
opposed to a final order) issued by a Minnesota court, without referring at all to the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.  The court, instead, made its decision “under principles of judicial restraint and comity.”  Id. 
 156.  527 U.S. 308, 319 (1999). 
 157.  See id. at 318–33. 
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Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, criticized this history-based approach,158 as 
did many learned commentators.159  For those concerned with the reach of 
Equity Extraterritoriality, however, Grupo Mexicano offered some hope. 
Like Justice Ginsburg’s formulation in Baker, Justice Scalia’s analysis of 
Grupo Mexicano provided a seedling of principle that, if fully grown, could 
perhaps govern Equity Extraterritoriality in general.  We have seen earlier 
that although Equity Extraterritoriality existed in the equity courts of 17th 
century England, the equitable extraterritorial remedies at the time served a 
complementary role, dispensed only in extraordinary instances in which the 
more generally applicable common law did not provide an adequate 
remedy.160  Applied consistently, Grupo Mexicano had the potential to grow 
into a more robust legal doctrine that regulated Equity Extraterritoriality, 
turning back the clock at least to the state of affairs that existed before the 
merger of law and equity.  However, like Baker, Grupo Mexicano did not 
lead to a larger doctrine; it merely cut off one particular extension of Equity 
Extraterritoriality, leaving many other branches to continue growing. 
At least part of the reason why Baker and Grupo Mexicano failed to 
grow into a larger doctrine may be that the Supreme Court did not see Equity 
Extraterritoriality as a standalone inquiry.  This tendency is evident from the 
pair of Supreme Court cases involving extraterritorial discovery:  Societe 
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court161 and Republic of 
Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.162 Both cases show that the Supreme Court’s 
respect for sovereignty decreases considerably when the sovereignty-
offending device is a discovery order—something that comes after the 
establishment of jurisdiction. One can discern that the Supreme Court did 
not recognize Equity Extraterritoriality as a standalone inquiry, because 
contrary to Baker and Grupo Mexicano, the Supreme Court extended the 
reach of Equity Extraterritoriality in Aerospatiale and NML Capital. 
In Aerospatiale, the court engaged in a particularly strained 
interpretation of the Hague Evidence Convention to find that the Convention 
did not provide exclusive or mandatory procedures for obtaining documents 
 
 158.  See id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) at 336 (“In my view, the Court relies on an unjustifiably static 
conception of equity jurisdiction. . . . Since our earliest cases, we have valued the adaptable character of 
federal equitable power.”). 
 159.  See, e.g., Richard H.W. Maloy, Expansive Equity Jurisprudence: A Court Divided, 40 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 641, 645 (2007); David Capper, The Need for Mareva Injunctions Reconsidered, 73 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2161, 2166 (2005); Stephen Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet:  Tradition, History, and 
Limitations of Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1297 (2000). 
 160.  See discussion supra at Section III.B.2.a. 
 161.  482 U.S. 522, 522 (1987). 
 162.  134 S.Ct. 2250, 2250 (2014). 
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and information located in the territory of a foreign signatory.163  In so 
finding, the court allowed the parties before a U.S. court to conduct 
discovery over material located outside of the United States pursuant to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than through the Hague Evidence 
Convention.164  The court in Aerospatiale did caution that “American courts 
. . . should exercise special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the 
danger that unnecessary, or unduly burdensome, discovery may place them 
in a disadvantageous position.”165 Lower courts came to ignore this caution, 
routinely ordering a foreign person under their jurisdiction to produce 
materials located outside of the United States, even if a foreign law 
specifically prohibited such a production.166 
In NML Capital, the Supreme Court found that the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (FSIA) did not prohibit post-judgment discovery of 
sovereign assets by way of subpoenas issued to third parties, no matter where 
the asset may be located.167  After finding that the FSIA completely pre-
empted the common law on foreign state’s sovereign immunity, the court 
found that discovery on sovereign assets was allowed because the FSIA was 
silent on the issue of post-judgment discovery.168  Argentina argued, to no 
avail, that such discovery would cover assets that could not be subject to 
execution under the FSIA, such as military weapons.  The court dismissed 
the argument, noting that the party issuing the subpoena would not know 
what property Argentina had and whether such property was executable.169 
From the perspective of territorial sovereignty, these two cases 
represent the apex of Equity Extraterritoriality—a total refusal to honor the 
sovereign interest of foreign states.  Aerospatiale renders meaningless the 
Hague Evidence Convention, a multilateral treaty in which various 
sovereigns (including the U.S. executive) came together to agree on a 
procedure of gathering extraterritorial evidence in a way that minimizes the 
infringement upon their sovereignty.  Aerospatiale further allows U.S. courts 
to ignore the foreign sovereign’s explicitly stated policy preference, such as 
bank secrecy or data privacy.  It seems difficult to imagine a way to ignore 
the concerns of foreign sovereignty more blatantly than Aerospatiale, but 
 
 163.  For criticism of the Aerospatiale decision, see George A. Bermann, The Hague Evidence 
Convention in the Supreme Court: A Critique of the Aerospatiale Decision, 63 TUL. L. REV. 525, 525 
(1989). 
 164.  See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 533. 
 165.  Id. at 546. 
 166.  See Sant, supra note 23, at 183–84. 
 167.  See NML Capital, 134 S.Ct. at 2250. 
 168.  See id. at 2256–58. 
 169.  See id. at 2257. 
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against all odds, the Supreme Court managed to find the way in NML 
Capital—under which U.S. courts can order a disclosure of property owned 
directly by the sovereign, no matter where the evidence for property or the 
property itself may be located, overruling the objections that the sovereign 
made directly to the court. 
D. Taking Stock of the U.S. Territoriality Doctrine Today 
Recent Supreme Court decisions and authoritative secondary materials 
firmly establish the validity of both jurisdictional presumption against 
extraterritoriality and Equity Extraterritoriality.  In Baker, Justice Ginsburg 
explicitly endorsed Equity Extraterritoriality yet again, with no further 
attempt to apply territoriality principles to court orders.170  Restatement 
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States cautions against 
extraterritorial assertion of jurisdiction,171 while Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws gives credence to Equity Extraterritoriality by attesting to 
the court’s power to issue extraterritorial orders affecting persons and things 
beyond its territorial jurisdiction.172 
Today, there are two broad categories of Equity Extraterritoriality.  In 
the first category, which may be called “traditional” Equity 
Extraterritoriality, the court issues extraterritorial orders based on the 
authority derived from traditional equity practice.  Examples of traditional 
Equity Extraterritoriality include discovery orders,173 post-judgment 
turnover orders,174 anti-suit injunction,175 and certain types of preliminary or 
permanent injunction that the court may fashion in response to the particular 
 
 170.  See Baker, 522 U.S. at 235 (“a sister State’s decree concerning land ownership in another State 
has been held ineffective to transfer title, although such a decree may indeed preclusively adjudicate the 
rights and obligations running between the parties to the foreign litigation.”) (internal citations omitted, 
emphasis in original). 
 171.  See, e.g., Restat. 3d Foreign Rel. § 421. 
 172.  See, e.g., Restat. 2d Conflict of Laws §§ 53–55, 65. 
 173.  See, e.g., Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1482 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(contempt sanctions issued against a Chinese party for non-compliance with discovery order); Bank of 
Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817, 829 (11th Cir. 1984) (contempt sanction issued against a Cayman Island party 
for non-compliance with discovery order). 
 174.  See, e.g., Rogers v. Webster, 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 13968 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 1985) (ordering 
delivery of stock certificates located in Canada to Michigan); In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1204 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2001) (ordering delivery of bank accounts in Scotland to New 
York). Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 12 N.Y.3d 533, 541 (ordering delivery of stock certificates 
located in Bermuda to New York). 
 175.  See, e.g., Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., 10 F.3d 425, 433 (7th Cir. 1993) (enjoining 
a French party from bringing a claim in a French tribunal that had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute 
under French law); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 956 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (enjoining parties from seeking anti-suit injunction in Britain). 
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circumstance of the case, pursuant to the court’s inherent power derived from 
the equity tradition.176  The second category may be referred to as “statutory” 
Equity Extraterritoriality, in which the court issues extraterritorial orders to 
extend the reach of a statute or a regulation beyond the U.S. borders.  The 
statute or regulation in question may or may not include an explicit 
authorization for extraterritorial application.  For example, federal 
regulations governing embargoes against certain countries,177 or federal 
statutes designed to detect tax evasion by U.S. nationals residing abroad,178 
explicitly authorize extraterritoriality.  In many cases, however, the court 
issues extraterritorial orders pursuant to statutes that do not have any explicit 
authorization for extraterritorial application.179  In such a case, jurisdictional 
extraterritoriality and Equity Extraterritoriality work in tandem to stretch the 
authority of the statute beyond U.S. borders:  jurisdictional extraterritoriality 
provides the court with the basis for extraterritorial prescriptive jurisdiction, 
and Equity Extraterritoriality with the basis for extraterritorial remedies.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court has done this in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. 
California, when it applied the Sherman Act on the allegedly collusive 
scheme on British insurance companies,180 over Justice Scalia’s vigorous 
dissent that Sherman Act’s “boilerplate language” is an “insufficient 
indication to override the presumption against extraterritoriality.”181  
Although Justice Scalia’s insistence on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality eventually prevailed in the last decade, Hartford Fire 
remains standing as a valid precedent, flying in the face of Morrison’s 
admonition that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application, it has none.”182 
Numerous similar examples exist, in which courts have virtually 
ignored the presumption against extraterritoriality in statutory 
 
 176.  See, e.g., Inst. of Cetacean Research v. Sea Shepherd Conservation Soc’y, 702 F.3d 573, 573 
(9th Cir. 2012) (issuing preliminary injunction against physically attacking the vessels on the high seas); 
Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F.Supp. 723, 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (issuing preliminary injunction prohibiting 
circulation of magazine cover with an unauthorized image of Muhammad Ali in Britain). 
 177.  See, e.g., Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 515.201(b) (1998) (prohibiting a foreign 
party from re-selling products from United States to Cuba). 
 178.  See Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–74 (2010) (requiring non-U.S. 
financial institutions to enter into an agreement with the Internal Revenue Service to identify their 
customers suspected of being persons subject to U.S. taxation). 
 179.  See Parrish, supra note 123 at 1474–75 (“if foreign conduct substantially affects the United 
States, then extraterritoriality is now often assumed.”). 
 180.  509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993).  For criticism of Hartford Fire’s extraterritorial application, see 
Swaine, supra note 22, at 678–84. 
 181.  Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 814. 
 182.  Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255. 
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interpretation.183  Many bankruptcy courts have ruled that the automatic stay 
provided by the Bankruptcy Code applies extraterritorially,184 although the 
automatic stay provision in the Bankruptcy Code contains no authorization 
for extraterritorial application.185 Courts have justified this extraterritoriality 
by pointing to the Bankruptcy Code’s regulatory aims.  For example, Judge 
Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the 
automatic stay provision applied to the debtor’s assets located in the 
Caribbean because “[t]he efficacy of the bankruptcy proceeding depends on 
the court’s ability to control and marshal the assets of the debtor wherever 
located”186—although the presumption against extraterritoriality announced 
in ARAMCO, and later again in Morrison, makes no reference to the need to 
maintain the efficacy of proceedings provided by a statute as a valid ground 
for the statute’s extraterritorial application.  More frequently, however, the 
court does not even give a flawed justification for extraterritorial application 
of a statute.  In Wojnarowicz v. American Family Association,187 for 
example, a New York court enjoined the global distribution of a pamphlet 
that contained an unauthorized reproduction of the plaintiff’s artwork 
pursuant to New York’s Artists’ Authorship Act, although the New York law 
has no reference to extraterritorial application.188  Although the terms of the 
injunction make clear that the injunction is to be applied beyond the 
territorial borders of the State of New York,189 the court did not address the 
issue of extraterritoriality at all. 
 
 183.  See Parrish, supra note 123, at 1475–76 (discussing cases in which the effects test has 
“overpowered” the territoriality assumption). 
 184.  See In re Rimsat, Ltd., 98 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that bankruptcy court’s in 
rem jurisdiction over estate property allows an international proceeding to be enjoined pursuant to the 
automatic stay); In re Likes Bros SS Co, Inc., 207 B.R. 282, 287 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (holding that 
foreign creditor violated automatic stay in arresting Chapter 11 debtor’s vessel in Belgium; U.S. 
bankruptcy court had exclusive jurisdiction over the vessel); In re Joseph Nakash, 190 B.R. 763, 771 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that an Israeli official who commenced involuntary liquidation 
proceedings in Israel against a Chapter 11 debtor violated automatic stay); In re McLean Industries, 74 
B.R. 589, 603 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that creditor over whom bankruptcy court had personal 
jurisdiction violated automatic stay in seizing Chapter 11 debtor’s vessel in Hong Kong); but see In re 
Maxwell Communications Corp., 170 B.R. 800, 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that avoidance under 
Bankruptcy Code § 547 does not apply extraterritorially). 
 185.  See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Bankruptcy Code section governing automatic stay). 
 186.  Rimsat, 98 F.3d at 961. 
 187.  745 F. Supp. 130, 149 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 188.  See N.Y. Art & Cult. Affr. § 14.03 (McKinney 1990). 
 189.  See Wojnarowicz, 745 F. Supp. at 148–49. 
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IV. PROBLEM OF EQUITY EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
Having reviewed the history of Equity Extraterritoriality’s doctrinal 
growth, this section offers an analysis of the problems caused by Equity 
Extraterritoriality.  At its heart, the problem of Equity Extraterritoriality is 
the problem of extraterritoriality.  Regardless of the U.S. law’s Orwellian 
treatment that considers Equity Extraterritoriality to be “territorial,” Equity 
Extraterritoriality as a practical matter causes the usual problems associated 
with extraterritorial application of a national law—including putting persons 
under conflicting legal obligations and straining diplomatic relations. The 
changes in modern commerce, which relies greatly on intangible property 
without a physical situs, are certain to amplify this problem of 
extraterritoriality.  Without a guiding principle to rein in the excess of Equity 
Extraterritoriality, this pressure caused by increased use of Equity 
Extraterritoriality is bound to cause even greater problems, because the 
doctrine of Equity Extraterritoriality is far too under-developed to meet the 
new challenges posed by the contemporary economy. 
A. Measuring the Size of the Problem: the Case of Intangible Properties 
Whatever one’s assessment of the doctrine may be, it cannot be denied 
that Equity Extraterritoriality has a sterling historical pedigree that 
potentially reaches as far back as medieval English law.190 Sometimes a 
doctrine’s long history alone is enough to overcome the dubiety of the 
wisdom behind the doctrine.191  If Equity Extraterritoriality has been in 
operation in the Anglo-American legal tradition for centuries, why is it a 
problem now? 
The historical trajectory of Equity Extraterritoriality provides some 
answers.  In the pre-independence English law, it was possible to say that 
Equity Extraterritoriality was a gap-filling doctrine, deployed in small doses 
when the general rule under the common law and its restrictive territoriality 
doctrine caused an unfair result.192  This was arguably no longer true after 
Pennoyer, when the Supreme Court gave its imprimatur to Equity 
Extraterritoriality, and certainly not true after the mid-20th century when law 
and equity merged and equity-style orders became commonplace. With the 
advent of the modern regulatory state, and the looseness of the “effects” test 
of personal jurisdiction discussed above, the courts can potentially apply any 
statute beyond the territorial borders of the United States using Equity 
 
 190.  See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 191.  See, e.g., Burnham, 495 U.S. 604, 628 (1990). 
 192.  See discussion supra Section III.B.2.a. 
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Extraterritoriality.193  In other words, the history of Equity Extraterritoriality 
is one marked by the doctrine’s increasing reach. 
What, then, is in store for Equity Extraterritoriality in the 21st century?  
The changes in modern commerce indicate that parties will resort to Equity 
Extraterritoriality even more frequently, pushing the reach of the doctrine 
even further. Speaking of increasing global commerce may be a cliché, but 
the increase does incentivize the persons engaged in international commerce, 
as well as the national governments overseeing such persons, to reach 
beyond their borders.194  Reliance on Equity Extraterritoriality will only 
increase in this environment, in large part because it allows the 
extraterritorial reach that jurisdictional extraterritoriality prohibits.  Beyond 
this general observation, however, one specific feature in the modern 
marketplace is expected to drive the growth of Equity Extraterritoriality:  
intangible properties. 
1. Rise of Intangible Properties 
Modern capitalism continuously generates more types of intangible 
properties of ever-greater dollar amount and ever-greater level of 
abstraction.  The days when intangible properties were mostly debts, shares 
in a corporation, and simple forms of intellectual property, are firmly behind 
us as much as the days when horse and buggy was a common mode of 
transportation.  Today’s drive for efficient financing means that even 
tangible properties are converted into intangible properties, and simple 
intangible properties are converted into more complex and ethereal 
derivative products. A real estate investment trust (REIT), for example, is 
made up of interests in real properties or mortgages in real properties, and its 
shares are traded on major exchanges like shares of a mutual fund.195  Thus, 
REIT is essentially a device that converts real estate (as tangible a property 
as any property gets) into highly liquid securities (intangible property).  For 
another example, in April 2014, Fantex Brokerage Services completed a $4.2 
 
 193.  See discussion supra Section III.B.2.b. 
 194.  In the past forty years, the share of world trade in the global economic output has doubled, 
going from around 15 percent to more than 30 percent.  In the same time period, America’s imports have 
increased from 6.4 percent to 16.8 percent of the national GDP, and the exports from 6.7 percent to 13.5 
percent.  See World Bank, WORLD DATABANK: WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, available at 
http://databank.worldbank.org. See also Gunther Handl, Extra-territoriality and Transnational Legal 
Authority, BEYOND TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION 3 (Gunther Handl, Joachim Zekoll, Peer Zumbansen eds. 2012) (“a general consensus 
exists among experts  that the single most significant trait of globalization is a fundamental change in the 
time and space dimensions of human existence.”). 
 195.  See generally RICHARD GARRIGAN & JOHN PARSONS, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 
(1997). 
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million initial public offering of Vernon Davis, then the tight end for the San 
Francisco 49ers of the National Football League.  Fantex had previously paid 
Davis $4 million for the right of 10 percent of Davis’s future earnings, 
including the money earned through his NFL contract, endorsement, post-
career broadcasting deal, and so on.  Fantex then converted the right in 
Davis’s future earnings into shares, to be traded on its website.196  These new 
types of intangible properties, as well as the old types, may then be packaged 
into derivative products. A collateralized debt obligation (CDO), for 
example, packages a massive number of collateralized debts, typically a 
mortgage secured by a house, and divides them into several tranches of 
securities with different levels of risk and return.197 This packaging can be 
repeated multiple times, resulting in financial products called CDO-squared, 
CDO-cubed, and so on, to be sold in the financial market in a form that is 
radically different from the underlying assets. The net effect of this trend is 
the massive growth in the size and complexity of the intangible properties 
with murky obligor-obligee relationships—which came back to haunt the 
world in the 2008 financial crisis following the bankruptcy of Lehman 
Brothers, one of the largest brokers of intangible properties.198 
The internet further complicated the issue of intangible properties. 
Much of the intangible properties are memorialized in the form of electronic 
data.  (Indeed, much of the money in the bank in the world today is no more 
than an entry in the electronic books.)  The data that makes up the intangible 
properties can be transferred near-instantaneously around the world.  
Focusing on this feature of the internet and intangible properties, some 
commentators in the early days of the internet argued that a significant 
portion of human wealth might be placed beyond the control of any country, 
whose authority was bounded by its territory.  They predicted that the 
internet would become an autonomous province, unregulable by existing 
territorial sovereigns because “efforts to control the flow of electronic 
information across physical borders . . . are likely to prove futile, at least in 
 
 196.  See ESPN, Vernon Davis Stock Hits $12 in Debut, Apr. 28, 2014,  
http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/10852827/vernon-davis-ipo-gains-20-percent-limited-debut. 
 197.  See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:  FINAL 
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 128 (2011). 
 198.  To give a perspective:  in just four years between 2003 and 2007, the U.S. financial industry 
generated nearly $700 billion worth of just one type of intangible property, namely mortgage-backed 
securities.  See id. at 129.  Some of the issuers of CDO additionally issued liquidity puts on CDOs, 
creating too long of a chain of obligations for the bank to properly calculate the cost of risk in case of a 
contingency.  See id. at 137–39. 
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countries that hope to participate in global commerce.”199 These predictions, 
of course, did not come to pass; as it turned out, these commentators severely 
underestimated the ability of Equity Extraterritoriality to control intangible 
properties. 
2. Controlling Intangible Properties Through Equity Extra-
territoriality 
Traditionally, courts have dealt with intangible properties by engaging 
in a legal fiction: assigning them a situs, pretending that the intangible 
property is located at one place but not another.  A seminal decision on situs 
is Harris v. Balk, in which the Supreme Court found that the situs of a debt 
was the location of the obligor.200  In the hundred years since Harris, courts 
have continued to designate a situs for each new type of intangible property 
that appeared.  A copyright, for example, is located at the domicile of the 
owner of the copyright.201  Under New York’s “separate entity rule,” a bank 
account is located in the particular bank branch that holds the account and 
not elsewhere, even if the bank may have numerous branches throughout the 
world.202  Membership interest in a limited liability corporation is located on 
the person who holds the interest, and travels with the person even if the 
person crosses territorial boundaries.203  An Internet domain name is located 
at the registry where the domain name is registered, and not elsewhere.204 
The function of the situs fiction is to bring the intangible property within 
the ambit of territorial jurisdiction.  If a court’s power is bounded by its 
territorial jurisdiction, these intangible properties must be made to have a 
territorial location for the court to be able to regulate them.205  The explosion 
of intangible properties in terms of their size, type, and complexity, makes 
the determination of situs—and ultimately, judicial control—of intangible 
properties resemble an exercise in absurdity and futility.  This apparent 
 
 199.  David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—the Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. 
L. REV. 1367, 1372 (1996); see also WALTER B. WRISTON, THE TWILIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY: HOW THE 
INFORMATION REVOLUTION IS TRANSFORMING OUR WORLD (1992). 
 200.  198 U.S. 215 (1905); but see Aaron D. Simowitz, Siting Intangibles, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 259, 280–81 (2015) (arguing Harris stands for the proposition that intangible properties have no 
situs at all). 
 201.  See, e.g., Pablo Star Ltd. v. Welsh Gov’t, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33846, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 
16, 2016). 
 202.  See, e.g., Global Tech., Inc. v. Royal Bank of Can., 943 N.Y.S.2d 791, 791 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2012). 
 203.  See, e.g., Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Falor, 14 N.Y.3d 303, 315–16 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2010). 
 204.  See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Barbie-Club.com, 310 F.3d 293, 306 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 205.  In this sense, the situs fiction is not unlike the 17th century common law courts’ insistence that 
a foreign city was really in London. 
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inability to determine the situs of intangible properties was the basis for the 
futuristic predictions of the internet beyond government regulations.206  But 
these predictions were wrong, because they ignored the central feature of 
intangible properties:  their dependence on humans, who are subject to 
territorial authority.  As it turned out, the territorial state did not really need 
to enforce the situs rules to regulate intangible property.  To control an 
intangible property, the state only has to control the person within its 
territorial borders who controls the property.207  Regulatory authorities 
around the world have recognized this truth and responded accordingly. In 
2014, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) launched an investigation 
into the anti-competitive effect of Microsoft’s acquisition of Nokia’s 
smartphone division.  Based on KFTC’s conclusion that Microsoft’s 
acquisition of Nokia’s patent portfolio would likely restrain competition, 
KFTC and Microsoft ultimately entered into a consent decree whereby 
Microsoft committed to license its patents in a non-discriminatory manner.208  
It hardly mattered to KFTC that most of Microsoft’s patents—an intangible 
property—were “located” outside Korea, as Korean patents were less than 
five percent of Microsoft’s patent portfolio.209 KFTC was able to control the 
disposition of Microsoft’s non-Korean patents simply by controlling 
Microsoft’s presence in Korea.210 
The rise of intangible property, and states’ subsequent response, have 
significant implications for Equity Extraterritoriality. Recall that the 
regulation of intangible properties through two links of controls—
controlling the person who controls the property—is precisely how Equity 
Extraterritoriality works.211  In Equity Extraterritoriality, the court controls a 
person through exercise of jurisdiction, and the court orders the person to 
take an extraterritorial action, often with respect to property located outside 
 
 206.  See Johnson & Post, supra note 198, at 1371–72 (using the example of intellectual property to 
discuss the predicted changes in private property interest). 
 207.  See Paul B. Stephan, Courts on Courts: Contracting for Engagement and Indifference in 
International Judicial Encounters, 100 VA. L. REV. 17, 57 (2014) (“Even electronic events have a 
location, because the person who commands such events exists somewhere.”); Goldsmith, supra note 48, 
at 476 (“The Internet is not, as many suggest, a separate place removed from our world.  . . . Territorial 
sovereignty supports national regulation of persons within the territory who use the Internet.”). 
 208.  See John A. Jurata & Inessa M. Owens, A New Trade War: Applying Domestic Antitrust Laws 
to Foreign Patents, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1127, 1139–43 (2015). 
 209.  See id. at 1141 note 83. 
 210.  For general discussion on how one regulatory state may regulate beyond its borders by dint of 
the size of its market and other considerations, see Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 Nw. U.L. Rev. 
1, 10 (2012). 
 211.  See discussion supra Section II.B. 
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of the court’s territorial jurisdiction—which is, in the case of intangible 
properties, nowhere. Two specific implications are notable. 
First, resorting to Equity Extraterritoriality to control intangible 
properties effectively discards the situs fiction.  There are many good reasons 
to abandon the situs fiction, an “intellectual disaster” rife with conflicting 
legal theories that are ill-suited for the modern market.212  But the situs fiction 
does serve one useful function:  applying the territoriality principles upon 
intangible properties.  In an ideal world, the situs fiction would be replaced 
by a global regime that harmonizes the plenary jurisdiction over intangible 
properties.  In our less-than-ideal world with no such regime,213 discarding 
the situs fiction and relying instead on Equity Extraterritoriality to regulate 
intangible properties invites clashes with foreign sovereigns, because the 
ethereal nature of intangible properties allows multiple states to make 
plausible claims of plenary jurisdiction over them.214 Today, in the case of 
most intangible properties that have more than de minimis value, the 
purchase, sale, creation and use of those intangible properties occur in 
multiple countries.  The following hypothetical situation is typical: a U.S. 
video game company and a Japanese video game company jointly create an 
augmented-reality game that collects the player’s location data, and sells the 
game in Australia.215 The Australian videogame player’s every movement 
(tracked by player’s GPS navigation system embedded in her smartphone) is 
stored in the data center located in Canada.  Depending on the particularities 
 
 212.  Simowitz, supra note 200, at 270, 284–292. 
 213.  Arguably, one subset of intangible properties—intellectual property—is subject to such a global 
regime, based on the numerous international treaties on intellectual property.  See World Intellectual 
Property Organization, WIPO-Administered Treaties, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/.  But the 
example with Microsoft and KFTC indicates the weakness of this regime to a state governing the 
intellectual property “located” beyond its territorial jurisdiction by controlling the party who controls 
such intellectual property.  In addition, the virtually limitless nature of Equity Extraterritoriality means 
the U.S. court may even override the executive branch’s decision to entire into such treaties.  See, e.g., 
Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. 522, 522 (1987) (finding that the Hague Evidence Convention is not the exclusive 
means of conducting discovery abroad, effectively allowing extraterritorial discovery through ordinary 
civil procedure).  See also discussion supra Section III.C.2. 
 214.  I do not consider multiple claims of plenary jurisdiction per se to be a problem.  Rather, the 
problem arises from the fact that it is a single district court, rather than the political branches, that is 
making the claim of plenary jurisdiction.  See further discussion infra at Section IV.2.  Professor Aaron 
Simowitz, who advocates for discarding the situs fiction, anticipates this issue and proposes a similar 
solution for intangible properties as I do for Equity Extraterritoriality—namely, a conflict of laws-based 
approach.  See Simowitz, supra note 200, at 292–323. 
 215.  This example is loosely based on Pokémon GO, an augmented-reality game that is considered 
one of the most successful mobile apps of all time.  See Sarah Perez, Pokémon Go Installed on More 
Devices than Candy Crush, LinkedIn, Lyft, Tinder & More, TECHCRUNCH, July 14, 2016, 
https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/14/pokemon-go-installed-on-more-devices-than-candy-crush-linkedin-
lyft-tinder-more/. 
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of a potential legal claim, any two or more of Australia, Canada, Japan and 
the United States can plausibly assert plenary jurisdiction over the intangible 
property in this scenario—namely, data created by the physical movements 
of Australian gamers.  If a U.S. court does seek to control this data, it is likely 
to rely on Equity Extraterritoriality, since it has personal jurisdiction over the 
U.S. Company that has the ability to control the data’s disposition.  For 
example, a U.S. court may issue a subpoena compelling the U.S. Company 
to produce the location data of a certain Australian individual who plays the 
game.  Unless the Equity Extraterritoriality doctrine is modified to 
accommodate the interests of foreign sovereigns—in this case, interest of the 
Australian government to protect the privacy of its citizens’ movement data, 
the interest of the Canadian government to manage the data that is housed 
within its territorial jurisdiction, and the interest of the Japanese government 
to regulate a company incorporated and doing business within its territory—
the regulation of intangible properties is likely to become a free-for-all 
endeavor in which “economic might is right.”216 
Second, regulating intangible properties through Equity 
Extraterritoriality does not only direct the court’s authority to the ultimate 
owner of the intangible property, but also to the property’s entire chain of 
custody.  To a much greater degree than tangible properties, intangible 
properties rely on intermediary custodians.  (You can own and keep a gold 
bar under your physical possession, but you cannot own a bank account 
without a bank.)  In the many instances in which the owner of intangible 
property is not amenable to the court’s jurisdiction, the court will simply 
assert jurisdiction over the intermediary that is within the court’s jurisdiction 
to control the disposition of the intangible property. In addition, as discussed 
earlier, the court will also assert jurisdiction over any intermediary that may 
potentially interfere with its orders, even if the intermediary has no other 
contact with the forum.217 
Such exercise of Equity Extraterritoriality applied to third parties can 
very quickly become abusive.  Simply being haled to court incurs cost on 
third parties.  They have no stake in the lawsuit, but they must appear lest 
they should become subject to double liability.218  As discussed above, third 
parties who would be ordinarily beyond the court’s jurisdiction are haled to 
 
 216.  J.S. Stanford, The Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside of the United States: A 
View from Abroad, 11 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 195, 213 n.46 (1978) (quoting a Canadian governmental 
official protesting the application of U.S. antitrust laws on Canadian corporations). 
 217.  See discussion supra Sections II.A., III.B.2.b. 
 218.  See discussion infra Section IV.B.3. 
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the court based on the most tenuous claim of jurisdiction.219  In the Argentina 
sovereign debt case, the Southern District of New York did not simply 
prohibit Argentina from paying one group of creditors versus another; the 
court also specifically enjoined a number of intermediaries who serviced 
Argentina’s bond payments, including Euroclear S.A./N.V. of Belgium and 
Clearstream Banking S.A. of Germany and Luxembourg.220  These 
intermediaries were located in Europe, and had no contact with New York 
in relation to the Argentina case except indirectly through their relationship 
with the Republic of Argentina.221  The New York court’s sole basis of giving 
this order to the European intermediaries was that they might interfere with 
the court’s own extraterritorial order.  The Second Circuit’s reaction to this 
bootstrapping claim of jurisdiction was a dismissive hand-wave:  “By 
naming certain foreign payment system participants . . . the district court 
was, again, simply recognizing the automatic operation of Rule 65 [of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].”222  Although the district court issued an 
order that, in all practicality, governed parties outside of New York and 
regulated their conducts occurring entirely outside of the court’s territorial 
jurisdiction, the Second Circuit did not consider the issuance of the order to 
be an exercise of jurisdiction:  “the amended injunctions enjoin no one but 
Argentina . . . If others in active concert or participation with Argentina are 
outside the jurisdiction or reach of the district court, they may assert as much 
if and when they are summoned to that court.”223 
To return to this section’s initial question:  if Equity Extraterritoriality 
has been in operation in the Anglo-American tradition for centuries, why is 
this a problem now?  One answer is that the use of intangible property will 
only increase in the coming decades of globalized commerce, which will 
likely lead to greater reliance on Equity Extraterritoriality.  Through Equity 
Extraterritoriality, the courts will reach even farther beyond their territorial 
jurisdiction, to adjudicate upon property of astronomical value and persons 
 
 219.  See discussion supra Section III.B.2.b., infra Section IV.C.3. 
 220.  See NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 
2012), aff’d, 727 F.3d 230, 244 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2819, 2819 (2014). 
 221.  See Brief for Non-Party Intervenors Euro Bondholders at 16–20, NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic 
of Argentina (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 2013), No. 12-105, Dkt. No. 702. 
 222.  NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230, 244 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 223.  Id.  In an Equity Extraterritoriality case following NML Capital, the Second Circuit made an 
extremely fine distinction—one that cannot be sustained in my view—that while issuing an order against 
extraterritorial third parties does have the effect of compelling them to act, but is not an exercise of 
jurisdiction.  See Gucci Am. v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122, 129–130 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Granted, once a 
district court issues a preliminary asset freeze order enjoining parties over whom it has jurisdiction, that 
injunction automatically forbids others  . . .  But such injunctions do not directly restrain the conduct of 
nonparties.”). 
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who are not even parties to the litigation.  This is the scale of the problems 
of Equity Extraterritoriality that we may expect to face, based on the 
anticipated growth and spread of intangible property. 
The future of global commerce will expose the flaws of Equity 
Extraterritoriality even more and make them worse. What, then, are the flaws 
of Equity Extraterritoriality?  The doctrinal problems of Equity 
Extraterritoriality may be divided into two broad categories: (1) problem of 
extraterritoriality, namely the problems arising from the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. laws, and; (2) problem of under-development, i.e. the 
problems arising from the fact that there are very few limitations on the reach 
of Equity Extraterritoriality.  The paper examines each category in turn. 
B. First Problem of Equity Extraterritoriality: Problem of Extra-
territoriality 
By allowing U.S. courts to reach beyond U.S. borders, Equity 
Extraterritoriality causes problems usually associated with extraterritoriality, 
which may be categorized into three interrelated types: (1) interference with 
the interest of a foreign sovereign; (2) strife in diplomatic relations; and (3) 
conflicting legal obligations. 
1. Interference with Foreign Sovereign Interest 
Equity Extraterritoriality may infringe upon the interests of a foreign 
sovereign proper. U.S. courts regularly issue extraterritorial orders directly 
against foreign sovereigns.  The Argentina bond litigation, of course, is the 
famous example.224  In another recent example, the federal court for the 
District of Maryland issued an anti-suit injunction directly against the 
Republic of Korea, prohibiting it from pursuing litigation in the Korean 
courts against a U.S. defense contractor regarding a contract to upgrade 
Korea’s F-16 fighter jets.225  When foreign sovereigns refuse to comply with 
a U.S. court’s Equity Extraterritoriality orders, the courts have held the 
foreign sovereigns in contempt.  The federal court for the District of 
Columbia, for example, held the Russian government in contempt for failing 
to return religious books and artifacts, located in Russia, to a Jewish religious 
organization in New York.226 
 
 224.  See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 254–55. 
 225.  See BAE Sys. Tech. Solution & Servs. v. Republic of Korea’s Def. Acquisition Program 
Admin., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94028 (D. Md. July 19, 2016). 
 226.  See Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Fed’n, 915 F.Supp. 2d 148, 155 (D. 
D.C. 2013).  See also FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Republic of Congo, 637 F.3d 373, 380 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (holding Congo in contempt for failing to cooperate in post-judgment asset discovery); Autotech 
Techs. LP v. Integral Research & Dev. Corp., 499 F.3d 737, 752 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding the district court 
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More commonly, Equity Extraterritoriality infringes upon a foreign 
sovereign’s regulatory or adjudicatory interests. A foreign sovereign, for 
example, may have an interest in protecting data and information originating 
from its territory.  There is a significant amount of governmental interest in 
prescribing the extent to which sensitive personal data, such as medical or 
financial information, becomes available to third parties.  Accordingly, a 
number of countries passed laws concerning bank secrecy and data 
privacy.227  Some countries passed “blocking statutes” specifically to express 
their disapproval of the U.S.-style extraterritorial discovery.228Yet the U.S. 
law on extraterritorial discovery does not merely disregard the foreign law 
regarding bank secrecy or data privacy, but overrules them as illegitimate.229  
In doing so, the U.S. law all but made a dead letter out of a multilateral Hague 
Evidence Convention that the United States bargained for and signed—a 
“truly unprecedented attack on the basic mechanism of international 
treaties.”230  Another example is anti-suit injunctions issued by a U.S. court, 
which deprive the jurisdiction of a foreign court over the same matter, and 
sometimes lead to “inter-jurisdictional judicial warfare.”231 
2. Strife in Diplomatic Relations 
Because Equity Extraterritoriality infringes upon a foreign sovereign’s 
interest, it frequently causes diplomatic strife.  The Argentina bond case, 
litigated before a New York federal court, provided anti-American fodder to 
Argentina’s politicians.232  Reporters for the Restatement have noted the 
level of friction and acrimony caused by extraterritorial discovery orders.233  
 
had jurisdiction to issue a contempt judgment against an instrumentality of the government of Belarus 
while overturning the contempt judgment on the merits). 
 227.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., § 442, n.1 (Am. 
Law Inst. 1987); Christopher Kuner, EUROPEAN DATA PRIVACY LAW AND ONLINE BUSINESS §§ 3.12–
3.36 (2d ed. 2007). 
 228.  See Mark A. Cotter, The Hague Convention: Selfish U.S. Interpretation Aggravates Foreign 
Signatories and Mandates Changes to Federal Discovery Rules, 6 FLA. J. INT’L L. 233, 243 (1991). 
 229.  See Sant, supra note 23, at 213–19. 
 230.  Bermann, supra note 162, at 545. 
 231.  George A. Bermann, The Use of Anti-Suit Injunctions in International Litigation, 28 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 631 (1990).  See also George A. Bermann, Parallel Litigation: Is Convergence 
Possible?, 13 Y.B. Pvt. Int’l L. 21, 29 (2011) (“The fact that anti-suit injunctions are addressed to private 
parties, and never to foreign courts themselves, does not minimize either their impact . . . or their potential 
offensiveness to foreign States.”). 
 232.  See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff, In Court Battle, a Game of International Brinksmanship with 
Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2012, at B11.  
 233.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S., § 442, n.1 (Am. Law 
Inst. 1987) (“No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of 
the United States has given rise to so much friction as the requests for documents in investigation and 
litigation in the United States.”). 
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Extraterritorial orders issued pursuant to U.S. antitrust laws have “provoked 
the loudest and most consistent foreign protests.”234 Discussing American 
antitrust laws, a Canadian government official did not mince words:  “For 
one government to seek to resolve the conflict in its favor by invoking its 
national law before its domestic tribunals is not the rule of law but an 
application, in judicial guise, of the principle that economic might is 
right.”235  Foreign governments would file amicus curie briefs objecting to 
U.S. extraterritoriality, but the U.S. court’s deference to such views is not 
consistent.  The In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation opinion is an example of 
hostility, in which the Seventh Circuit called the governments of Australia, 
Canada, South Africa, and the United Kingdom “surrogates” of the foreign 
corporation defendants who “subversively presented for them their case.”236 
The Uranium court’s hostility toward the foreign states prompted the State 
Department to inform the court that the opinion “has caused serious 
embarrassment to the United States in its relations with some of our closest 
allies.”237 
It is a significant problem that the unelected judiciary, which is often a 
state court or a federal court applying state law, is effecting foreign policy 
consequences.  When a court issues an extraterritorial order, it is conducting 
an indirect type of diplomacy against its constitutional mandate.238  The 
problem is worse when a state law is involved.  Territoriality principles 
prohibit a state law from being applied beyond state borders, much less 
beyond U.S. borders.239  Yet under Equity Extraterritoriality, a state law may 
 
 234.  William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY 
J. INT’L L.85, 122 (1998). 
 235.  Stanford, supra note 214, at 213 n.46.   
 236.  617 F.2d 1248, 1256 (7th Cir. 1980).  In many cases including this one, the extraterritoriality 
dispute in antitrust is framed as a dispute over jurisdictional extraterritoriality rather than Equity 
Extraterritoriality.  But in case of “statutory” Equity Extraterritoriality, the question of jurisdictional 
extraterritoriality inevitably leads to the question of Equity Extraterritoriality, because once the court 
obtains jurisdiction, it is virtually certain that it will issue an extraterritorial order, should the court find 
liability.  See discussion supra Section III.D. 
 237.  Letter from Legal Advisor Roberts Owen to Assistant Attorney General John H. Shenefield 
dated Mar. 17, 1980, reprinted in part in Marian L. Nash, U.S. Practice, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 657, 665–67 
(1980). 
 238.  See Steven A. Kadish, Comity and the International Application of the Sherman Act: 
Encouraging the Courts to Enter the Political Arena, 4 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 130, 134–39 (1982) 
(criticizing the potential entanglement with the U.S. courts with international politics through 
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws).   
 239.  See, e.g., Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (striking down 
local taxes on shipping containers because foreign commerce is “preeminently a matter of national 
concern.”); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 556 (1973) (holding a state’s copyright power ended 
at its borders). 
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be applied anywhere in the world, causing diplomatic strife with foreign 
sovereigns. 
3. Creation of Conflicting Legal Obligations 
A different type of problem involving Equity Extraterritoriality is where 
there is a breakdown in one of the two links of control through which the 
doctrine operates—the court’s control over the person, and the control of the 
person ordered over the extraterritorial action or properties.240  This problem 
is different from the two problems identified above in that it is not a state-to-
state issue, but an issue facing the person appearing before the U.S. court. 
The court may order a person to take certain extraterritorial action, but the 
person’s ability to execute the action may be compromised—which causes a 
problem, as the person becomes unable to carry out the court’s order.  One 
of the ways in which the person’s control over extraterritorial action or 
property may be compromised is the presence of a foreign legal obligation; 
that is to say, the extraterritorial action to be accomplished, or the 
extraterritorial property to be disposed of, may be subject to competing legal 
obligations or conflicting foreign regulations.  In these cases, the person must 
make an in terrorem choice between disobeying the U.S. court and violating 
foreign law or obligation. 
U.S. courts can be quite cavalier about this dilemma.  Courts of New 
York have developed a “strong and perhaps surprising”241 tradition of 
summarily dismissing claims of double liability by banks, curtly finding that 
“[i]f the Bank cannot, as it were, serve two masters and comply with the 
lawful requirements both of the United States and [a foreign country], 
perhaps it should surrender to one sovereign or the other the privileges 
received therefrom.”242  U.S. courts routinely order foreign parties who are 
subject to foreign bank secrecy or data privacy law to break that law, so that 
the opposing party may conduct discovery over evidence located abroad.243  
 
 240.  See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 241.  Simowitz, Siting Intangibles, supra note 199, at 308 n.180 (parenthesis omitted). 
 242.  First Nat’l City Bank, 271 F.2d 616, 620; See also Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 978 F. Supp. 
2d 205, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“it is well established that banks assume the risk of double liability as an 
ordinary cost of doing business in multiple jurisdictions.”). 
 243.  See, e.g., AstraZeneca LP v. Breath Ltd., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42405 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2011) 
(ordering the plaintiff to produce documents protected by Sweden’s Trade Secret Protection Act); Gucci 
Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20834 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010) (ordering a bank to 
produce Malaysian bank records in violation of Malaysian bank secrecy laws); Reino de Espana v. Am. 
Bureau of Shipping, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54112 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006) (ordering a party to produce 
records from a criminal proceeding in Spain in violation of Spain’s Law of Criminal Procedure).  See 
also Sant, supra note 23, at 181 (noting “court-ordered law breaking” as to discovery “has increased at 
an exponential rate,” as sixty percent of all court orders ordering violation of foreign laws have occurred 
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In many cases, it is the exercise of Equity Extraterritoriality that compounds 
the problem of conflicting legal obligations.  For example, foreign 
governments have responded against extraterritorial discovery orders and 
antitrust injunctions by passing blocking statutes.244 These blocking statutes 
create conflicting legal obligations for foreign or multinational parties—
which, again, the U.S. courts frequently ignore.245 
C. Second Problem of Equity Extraterritoriality: Problem of Under-
Development 
The second problem associated with Equity Extraterritoriality is that of 
under-development.  Extraterritorial application of U.S. law per se is not the 
only issue; after all, there are many situations in which a U.S. court’s 
extraterritorial reach may be warranted.246  After all, the core intuition behind 
Equity Extraterritoriality is defensible under the traditional principles of 
territoriality:  the court is merely exercising its power over persons and 
properties found within its territorial jurisdiction.  Problems of 
extraterritoriality arise when the court begins to over-stretch this core 
intuition to a point that it interferes with another state’s power over that 
state’s territorial jurisdiction.  Theoretically, when the court does reach 
extraterritorially, it is supposed to exercise discretion and modulate the reach 
of its orders.  It is received wisdom that “if the requested decree would 
interfere seriously in some way with the sovereignty of another state, the 
injunction should be denied.”247 But because Equity Extraterritoriality as a 
doctrine is so severely underdeveloped, this admonition lacks the legal 
structure to rigorously rein in the excess of Equity Extraterritoriality. 
Specifically, Equity Extraterritoriality’s underdevelopment leads to 
four major issues:  (1) practical over-extension of Equity Extraterritoriality; 
(2) inconsistency in the application of territoriality principles; (3) fostering 
inconsistency in jurisdictional territoriality, and; (4) transnationality 
blindness. 
 
between 2010 and 2015). 
 244.  See Cotter, supra note 228, at 243; Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S. 
Assertions of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 505, 505 n. 3 (1998); Carl A. Circa, 
Jr., The Challenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions, 18 STAN. J. INT’L L. 247, 247 
(1982). 
 245.  See Sant, supra note 23, at 213–19. 
 246.  For example, a U.S. court must be able to enforce a trade embargo against an enemy state, 
regardless of the fact that doing so may require the court to reach beyond its territorial jurisdiction.  See 
discussion infra Section V.A.2.c. 
 247.  Wright and Miller, 11A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2945. 
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1. Practical Over-Extension of Equity Extraterritoriality 
Earlier, we noted how Equity Extraterritoriality leads to problems when 
the control of the person ordered by the court over the extraterritorial action 
or property is compromised.  As discussed earlier, one of the ways in which 
such control is compromised is when there is a competing legal obligation.248  
Another way in which the control may be compromised—and cause 
problems with Equity Extraterritoriality—is when the person ordered by the 
court lacks practical control.  This often occurs with intangible properties 
whose existence, as noted earlier, depends greatly on third party 
intermediaries who act as custodians of the intangible properties.249 These 
third parties may have constructive control over the intangible properties, but 
not necessarily practical control.  When a third party becomes subject to 
Equity Extraterritoriality in such a situation, the harm is felt far beyond the 
third party itself, and threatens the stability of the whole system that manages 
the existence of the intangible property. 
This happened in the notorious Winter Storm Shipping Ltd. v. TPI, in 
which the Second Circuit considered whether electronic fund transfers 
(EFTs) passing momentarily through New York were attachable property 
under Rule B of the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty and Maritime 
Claims.250  An EFT, the intangible property at issue in Winter Storm, 
typically involves an intermediary bank, especially when the EFT crosses 
the national border.  In most cases, the intermediary bank processes the EFT 
in several hours.  The Second Circuit ruled that, because the funds were 
located in New York in that small window of time, they were attachable by 
serving a restraining notice to the intermediary bank located in New York—
regardless of the fact that both the sender and the recipient of the EFT might 
be outside of New York.  In doing so, the Second Circuit created another 
type of Equity Extraterritoriality situation:  adjudicating the claims of the 
parties outside of its jurisdiction by asserting jurisdiction over a third party 
intermediary and the property under the intermediary’s (constructive) 
control. 
It is not an exaggeration to say that if the holding in Winter Storm had 
been pushed to the fullest extent allowed by the current Equity 
Extraterritoriality doctrine, banking in New York as we know it would have 
ceased to exist.  Just a small taste of the coming doom was enough for the 
Second Circuit to completely reverse its course just seven years later, in 
 
 248.  See discussion supra Section IV.B.3. 
 249.  See discussion supra Section IV.A.2. 
 250.  Winter Storm Shipping v. TPI, 310 F.3d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi Overseas PTE Ltd.251 The Second Circuit’s 
opinion in Jaldhi, explicitly overturning Winter Storm, is a rare display of 
judicial self-flagellation.  The court noted that, thanks to Winter Storm, one-
third of all lawsuits filed with the Southern District of New York were Rule 
B maritime attachment applications.252  Every day, major banks were served 
with 800 to 900 restraining notices from creditors who issued multiple 
restraining notices throughout the day in hopes to stop the EFT in the few 
hours that the intermediary banks took to process the transfer.253  The sheer 
volume of the restraining notices caused so many false identifications of the 
transfer to be restrained that it disrupted the entire process of electronic fund 
transfer.254  The court noted that this uncertainty threatened New York’s 
standing as a center of international banking, and even the status of the U.S. 
dollar as the world’s primary reserve currency, as foreign corporations 
avoided wiring money through New York in dollar-denominated EFTs.255 
But the self-flagellation in Jaldhi is not the only remarkable aspect of 
the opinion.  Jaldhi is also remarkable in that it had very little legal analysis 
for an opinion that so completely disavows the governing precedent decided 
only years earlier. The court in Jaldhi found that Winter Storm should not 
have relied on United States v. Daccarett,256 a Second Circuit precedent on 
criminal forfeiture.  But the opinion in Jaldhi provides no legal explanation 
as to why Winter Storm was wrong to rely on Daccarett, a valid Second 
Circuit precedent; the opinion only points to the long recitation of Winter 
Storm’s “unforeseen consequences.”257  A more robust doctrine of Equity 
Extraterritoriality could have provided the missing explanation.  If the court 
had recognized its exercise of Equity Extraterritoriality was in fact an 
extraterritorial application of the U.S. law, it would have been more cautious 
in issuing an opinion like Winter Storm that, in all practicality, adjudicated 
the obligations between two foreign parties.  If territoriality principles 
applied to Equity Extraterritoriality, the court in Winter Storm would have 
treaded cautiously, giving due deference to the foreign interests involved.  
But that is not the state of the Equity Extraterritoriality doctrine today; the 
Second Circuit could not offer any legal reasoning in Jaldhi because Equity 
 
 251.  Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi Overseas PTE Ltd., 585 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 252.  See id.  
 253.  See id. (quoting Cala Rosa Marine Co. Ltd. v. Sucres et Deneres Group, 613 F. Supp. 2d 426, 
431–32 n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). 
 254.  See id. 
 255.  See id. at 61–62. 
 256.  6 F.3d 37, 59 (1993). 
 257.  See Jaldhi, 585 F.3d 58 at 62; see also id. at 68 (“Upon further consideration, we find Winter 
Storm’s reasons unpersuasive and its consequences untenable.”). 
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Extraterritoriality has no limiting principle other than the court’s own sense 
of discretion.  Thus, when its sense of discretion malfunctioned, the court 
could only point to the disastrous consequences that came as a result of its 
decision, rather than a principled, legal reason why its decision was wrong. 
2. Inconsistent Application of Territoriality 
It is worth repeating that U.S. law’s concern with territoriality is almost 
entirely focused on the area of judicial and legislative jurisdiction.   U.S. 
legal doctrine on jurisdiction operates under the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, and treads gingerly when the U.S. law does assert 
jurisdiction beyond the U.S. borders, lest it should infringe upon the province 
of a foreign sovereign.  Equity Extraterritoriality, in contrast, has no such 
concern—which means Equity Extraterritoriality allows a party to achieve 
what it could not under the ordinary application of territoriality principles. 
This has been true of Equity Extraterritoriality since the early days of the 
United States:  a court may order a debtor to deliver a property located 
beyond the court’s territorial border to satisfy a debt, although the court 
could not change the title of the extraterritorial property.258 This is a facile 
distinction that many commentators have criticized for more than a hundred 
years.259  As Professor Linda Silberman aptly put it, the distinction makes 
the absurd claim that “an accused is more concerned with where he will be 
hanged than whether.”260  Yet the Supreme Court continues to maintain this 
distinction, explicitly stating in Baker that “a sister State’s decree concerning 
land ownership in another State has been held ineffective to transfer title, 
although such a decree may indeed preclusively adjudicate the rights and 
obligations running between the parties to the foreign litigation.”261 
Sophisticated parties and their attorneys are exploiting this gap between 
the two doctrines.  The Argentina bond case is the most sensational example.  
Under the FSIA, which is an expression of the principle of sovereign 
immunity that underlies territoriality principles, a foreign sovereign enjoys 
immunity from execution against its property located outside the United 
States.262  The court bypassed this immunity by issuing an injunction against 
the Republic of Argentina, effectively compelling Argentina to bring its 
extraterritorial, and immune, assets into the United States to pay its 
 
 258.  See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 259.  See discussion supra Section III.B.1. 
 260.  Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88 (1978). 
 261.  Baker by Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998) (internal citations 
omitted; emphasis in original). 
 262.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1609–10. 
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creditors.263  In the end, this is exactly what Argentina did by settling with 
its creditors.264Another example is the popularity of “judgment arbitrage,” in 
which multinational creditors bring a foreign judgment to be domesticated 
in the U.S., to rely on the broad reach of Equity Extraterritoriality in the post-
judgment context.265  At least two New York courts have held that there is 
no jurisdictional requirement for an action to obtain recognition of a foreign 
judgment.266 This means that a judgment creditor may bring a money 
judgment from any foreign court and convert it into a New York judgment.  
With the newly minted New York judgment, the creditor may engage in the 
far-reaching extraterritorial asset discovery and obtain asset turnover orders 
against anyone over whom the New York court is willing to assert personal 
jurisdiction (most likely a third party intermediary, like a bank in New 
York).267  One may address this issue by introducing jurisdictional or other 
requirements for giving recognition to foreign judgments.268  But the more 
fundamental cause of this issue is the reason why foreign creditors come to 
New York courts in the first place—the ability to reach any part of the world 
through the Equity Extraterritoriality orders that New York courts may make 
in the course of judgment enforcement.269 
These inconsistencies in the application of territoriality undermine the 
confidence in the rule of law.  Many commentators who observed the 
inconsistent application of territoriality offer a cynical explanation.  
Professor Jonathan Turley, for example, argued that the U.S. territoriality 
doctrine has been applied selectively, allowing “market” cases like ones 
 
 263.  See Cross, supra note 124, at 137–38. 
 264.  See Vinod Sreeharsha, Argentina’s Senate Votes to Allow Payment to U.S. Bondholders, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 31, 2016 at B2. 
 265.  See Gregory H. Shill, Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional Competition and the 
Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the United States, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 459, 460 (2013). 
See also Marcus S. Quintanilla and Christopher A. Whytock, New Multipolarity in Transnational 
Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 31, 35–37 (2011) 
(projecting a significant increase in foreign judgment creditors attempting to obtain recognition of 
judgment from U.S. courts). 
 266.  See Abu Dhabi Comm. Bank PJSC v. Saad Trading, Contracting and Fin. Svcs. Co., 986 N.Y.S. 
2d 454, 613 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2014); Lenchyshyn v. Pelko Elec. Inc., 723 N.Y.S. 2d 285, 292 
(N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t 2001). 
 267.  See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5201 (2015) (providing for third party garnishment); id. § 5223 (providing 
for post-judgment asset discovery); id. § 5225 (providing for delivery of debtor property).  
 268.   For discussion on adding requirements for foreign judgment recognition to prevent abuse, see 
Linda J. Silberman and Aaron D. Simowitz, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and 
Awards: What Hath Daimler Wrought?, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 344, 359 (2016).  
 269.  See id. at 385 (“creditors enforcing judgments or awards in the United States typically seek two 
particular remedies—discovery of the debtor’s assets within and without the state and turnover of the 
debtor’s assets held by third parties.  These remedies are powerful tools and class in personam remedies 
that may extend beyond the territorial borders of the United States.”). 
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involving the Sherman Act to apply extraterritorially while “nonmarket” 
cases faced the presumption against extraterritoriality.270Similarly, Professor 
Mark Gibney argued that “U.S. law has been applied extraterritorially when 
that has served the national interest of the United States or its corporate 
actors, and it has been given a territorial application when a restrictive 
interpretation would serve those same ends.”271  This perception of 
situational application of the law will continue until territoriality principles 
apply to the operation of Equity Extraterritoriality in a meaningful way. 
3. Fostering Inconsistency Within Jurisdictional Territoriality 
The problem of inconsistency caused by Equity Extraterritoriality does 
not merely plague the application of the territoriality doctrine as a whole. 
The very availability of Equity Extraterritoriality fosters inconsistency 
within jurisdictional territoriality, or on how territoriality principles apply to 
personal jurisdiction. 
As noted earlier, U.S. courts often raise the threat of force against 
extraterritorial persons or property by using extraterritorial jurisdiction and 
Equity Extraterritoriality together.  Earlier, we used the example of 
extraterritorial document discovery to see Equity Extraterritoriality induces 
compliance with the U.S. laws from persons located outside of the territorial 
boundaries of the United States long before the court establishes jurisdiction 
over them.272  The threat of force, in that instance, is the threat of U.S. court 
finding jurisdiction over a person located beyond its territorial jurisdiction, 
and issuing extraterritorial orders pertaining to properties (i.e. documents) 
located beyond its territorial jurisdiction. 
The unpredictability of jurisdictional extraterritoriality does much to 
fuel the strength of Equity Extraterritoriality.  While it is true that the 
Supreme Court in recent years greatly strengthened the territorial limitations 
on jurisdiction, a number of legal theories are still available for a U.S. court 
that wishes to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court’s 
endorsement of “tag” jurisdiction in Burnham—denounced as “closer . . . to 
robbery than justice”273—remains good law.274  The same is true for general 
 
 270.  See Jonathan Turley, “When in Rome”: Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption 
Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598, 608 (1990). 
 271.  Mark P. Gibney, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law: The Perversion of Democratic 
Governance, the Reversal of Institutional Roles, and the Imperative of Establishing Normative Principles, 
19 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 297, 304–05 (1996). 
 272.  See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 273.  Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: the “Power” Myth and 
Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 290 (1956). 
 274.  See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 251 (2d Cir. 1995) (asserting personal jurisdiction 
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jurisdiction over foreign corporations “doing business” in the United States 
through affiliates, although Daimler did significantly reduce its 
application.275  The interaction between Equity Extraterritoriality and the 
“effects” test deserves emphasis.  Numerous commentators have criticized 
the “effects” test, the “Great Grimpen Mire”276 of a legal doctrine that the 
courts have applied “[w]ith almost haphazard nonchalance.”277  Yet the far-
reaching “effects” test, a holdover doctrine from the mid-20th century 
personal jurisdiction revolution, remains a favorite among courts that seek 
to extend their jurisdiction beyond their territorial boundaries.278  This, in 
turn, extends the reach of Equity Extraterritoriality. 
However, it is important to note that the reverse is also true.  It is not 
merely that jurisdictional extraterritoriality strengthens Equity 
Extraterritoriality; the availability of unchecked Equity Extraterritoriality 
causes further extension of jurisdictional extraterritoriality. Because there is 
no territorial restriction on the reach of Equity Extraterritoriality after the 
court obtains personal jurisdiction, the parties are incentivized to push the 
court to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction as much as possible, in order to 
access the extraterritorial orders that become available once jurisdiction is 
established.  The parties, then, naturally focus on the weakness within the 
territoriality principles in the personal jurisdiction doctrine, namely the 
inconsistency between the presumption against extraterritoriality and the 
various theories of extraterritorial jurisdiction, including the “minimum 
contacts”/“effects” test.  Often, this endeavor results in a situation where the 
tail wags the dog:  because Equity Extraterritoriality seems necessary, the 
court summons the “effects” test as a post hoc justification for its power.  
This is evident in In re Rimsat, Ltd., in which Judge Posner found that the 
automatic stay provision in the Bankruptcy Code applied to extraterritorial 
 
over individual who was served within the forum); Doe I v. Liu Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1275 (N.D. 
Cal. 2004) (same). 
 275.  See post-Daimler cases such as: Hume v. Farr’s Coach Lines, Ltd., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
133000 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) (ordering further jurisdictional discovery over a Canadian corporation 
to assess the potential basis of “doing business” general jurisdiction); Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Hospira, 
Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45826 (D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2016) (finding continued validity of “doing business” 
general jurisdiction over an out-of-state corporation that appointed an agent for service of process in the 
forum state). 
 276.  Joseph E. Fortenberry, Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Antitrust Violations—Paths Through 
the Great Grimpen Mire, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 519 (1971). 
 277.  GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 658–59 (4th ed. 2007).  See also Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application 
of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 179–80 (1991); Gibney, supra note 271, at 302; Parrish, supra 
note 123, at 1480. 
 278.  See Parrish, supra note 123, at 1457 (“At the heart of most extraterritoriality cases lies the 
effects test.”). 
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assets because “[t]he efficacy of the bankruptcy proceeding depends on the 
court’s ability to control and marshal the assets of the debtor wherever 
located,”279 without making any further attempt to square the need of the 
bankruptcy court with the presumption against extraterritorial interpretation 
of the Bankruptcy Code. 
This problem is particularly visible when the court compounds Equity 
Extraterritoriality by issuing an order against an extraterritorial third party 
who violated the court’s (separate) extraterritorial order.  In Waffenschmidt 
v. Mackay, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that nonparties residing 
outside the territorial jurisdiction of a district court were subject to that 
court’s contempt jurisdiction if they knowingly aided and abetted a party 
violating the court’s order, even if such nonparties had no other contact with 
the forum.280  The court found that the nonparty’s interference with the 
court’s order alone constituted sufficient minimum contact, because such 
interference caused a substantial effect in the forum.281  The Seventh Circuit 
reached a similar conclusion in S.E.C. v. Homa, also based on the “effects” 
test.282  In no other context would the court leverage such a tenuous 
connection to the forum to assert extraterritorial personal jurisdiction.  Under 
ordinary circumstances, it is a settled rule that the court cannot assert specific 
jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant whose only contact with the 
forum is through the plaintiff.283  But in Waffenschmidt and Homa, two 
Circuit Courts have declared that they have personal jurisdiction over an 
extraterritorial third party whose only contact with the forum is through the 
court’s extraterritorial order, based on the “effects” test.  Under this 
formulation, there is simply no corner in the world that the court cannot 
reach:  the court may first establish extraterritorial jurisdiction by way of any 
one of the long-arm jurisdiction theories, then issue extraterritorial orders 
pursuant to Equity Extraterritoriality, and then assert jurisdiction over any 
extraterritorial third party that may interfere with the enforcement of that 
 
 279.  98 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 280.  763 F.2d 711, 721 (5th Cir. 1985). 
 281.  See id. at 722–23. 
 282.  514 F.3d 661, 673–75 (7th Cir. 2008); see also ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc. v. Bowers, 651 F.3d 
1200, 1215–16 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming that a “district court may properly exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a nonparty for purposes of entering contempt orders, when the nonparty, with actual 
notice of an injunctive order issued by the district court, and in active concert or participation with a party, 
violates that order”); but see Gucci Am., Inc. v. Bank of China, 768 F.3d 122, 137 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting 
that in Waffenschmidt, the nonparties at issue were out of the court’s territorial jurisdiction but still within 
the United States, and that in Homa, although the nonparties were outside of the United States, they were 
U.S. citizens). 
 283.  See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 298–99 (1980); McIntyre 
Mach. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886–87 (2011).  
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extraterritorial order.  Indeed, this is essentially what happened to the third 
party European banks in the Argentina bond litigation.284 
The existence of Equity Extraterritoriality itself appears to motivate this 
jaw-dropping declaration that there is no corner of the world that the court 
cannot reach.  The court must be able to enforce its own order; if the order 
happens to be extraterritorial, how else is the court supposed to enforce its 
order other than by exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction over the person 
outside of the court’s territorial jurisdiction?  Yet such an exercise of 
jurisdiction is plainly inconsistent with other territorial limitations upon 
personal jurisdiction, such as presumption against extraterritoriality.  The 
availability of Equity Extraterritoriality motivates the courts to perpetuate 
such inconsistency, rather than to streamline the personal jurisdiction 
doctrine along the lines of territoriality principles. 
4. Transnationality Blindness 
Yet another critical area of underdevelopment in Equity 
Extraterritoriality is what may be termed “transnationality blindness”—the 
lack of distinction between domestic and international litigation.  This, in 
fact, is a cognitive challenge from which the entire U.S. transnational 
litigation jurisprudence suffers.  Facing transnational litigation, U.S. courts 
generally equate foreign nations with one of the U.S. states, with little to no 
separate consideration for foreign policy implications that may arise with the 
foreign nations.285  Although eminent commentators have long criticized this 
peculiar tendency,286 transnationality blindness continues to affect all stages 
of litigation in the United States, including jurisdiction,287 provisional 
 
 284.  See discussion supra Section IV.A.2. 
 285.  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Practice and Procedure: the World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 1456, 1458–59 (1991) (raising doubt as to whether transnational litigation may be considered a 
separate field within the U.S. law); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation: 
A Vehicle for Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 431–433 (2001) (noting that 
transnational intellectual property disputes are treated in the same manner as domestic disputes). 
 286.  See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 167 
(Feb. 5) (Jessup, J.) (stating that jurisdictional rules which are “valid enough for inter-state conflicts 
within the constitutional system of the United States, may be improper when placing a burden on 
international commerce”). 
 287.  See Donald E. Childress III, Rethinking Globalization: the Case of Transnational Personal 
Jurisdiction, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1548 (2013) (proposing a new rule on personal jurisdiction 
specifically for nonresident alien defendants).  
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orders,288 and judgment recognition.289  This lacuna is evident from the 
history of Equity Extraterritoriality as well, as courts weighing in on Equity 
Extraterritoriality cases have rarely paused to give an extra layer of 
consideration for international cases.290 
Equity Extraterritoriality may arise in two ways, domestic and 
international:  a court of one state may issue an extraterritorial order binding 
persons and conducts in another state, or; a U.S. court may issue an 
extraterritorial order binding persons and conducts in another country.291  
U.S. jurisprudence views both instances as qualitatively the same.  While 
such a view may be defensible in theory, as a practical matter, an intra-
federation dispute and an inter-national dispute plainly have very different 
implications.  Ignoring such implications “elevates domestic interests over 
international considerations.”292 That is to say:  transnationality blindness 
results in an anomalous situation in which a domestic party receives more 
procedural safeguards than a foreign party, although the latter would have 
the greater need for those safeguards. 
Domestic Equity Extraterritoriality has a number of legal and practical 
safeguards to prevent the most outrageous forms of the court’s 
extraterritorial excursions.  Chief among the safeguards is the Constitution 
of the United States, which serves as a device for harmonizing multiple 
claims of sovereignty made by the various states.293  The states send their 
representatives to the federal legislature, which passes statutes of general 
 
 288.  See George A. Bermann, Provisional Relief in Transnational Litigation, 35 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 553, 560 (1997) (noting U.S. courts’ indifference toward parties’ nationalities in granting 
provisional relief); S. Nathan Park, Recognition of Enforcement of Foreign Provisional Orders in the 
United States: Toward a Practical Solution, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 999, 1034 (2017) (noting the 
discrepancy posed by U.S. courts’ indifference toward parties’ nationalities in granting provisional relief).  
 289.  See Peter D. Trooboff, Ten (and Probably More) Difficulties in Negotiating a Worldwide 
Convention on International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: Some Initial Lessons, in A 
GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE 263, 264 (John J. Barcelo 
III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002) (“In general, American courts have not subjected judgments of the 
courts of other nations to a separate test to determine whether they are entitled to recognition and 
enforcement.”). 
 290.  See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 159, at 1334 (criticizing Grupo Mexicano for failing to “take 
account of special needs and concerns when foreign parties are involved”); see also RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 102 cmt. g. (AM. LAW. INST. 1971) (calling for recognition of foreign 
injunctive orders because “American courts . . . have usually given the same measure of respect to 
judgments rendered in foreign nations . . . that they give to judgments rendered in sister States”). 
 291.  See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 292.  Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict, 57 
AM. J. COMP. L. 631, 649 (2009). 
 293.  See, e.g., Welkowitz, supra note 23, at 80 (noting that the Commerce Clause, Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, and the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution necessarily limits a state court’s 
extraterritorial reach). 
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applicability.294  When there is a dispute as to the applicability of the federal 
statutes, the states and their residents ultimately submit to the jurisdiction of 
the U.S. Supreme Court,295 the highest court of the land that conclusively 
resolves the dispute by referring to an established and shared legal tradition.  
The various states of the United States have centuries of common history, 
language and culture, such that the real-life impact of an extraterritorial court 
order is minimized as a practical matter.  Taken together, this means that 
more often than not, domestic Equity Extraterritoriality disputes are 
essentially disputes concerning the determination of the proper venue rather 
than a true clash of sovereign authorities. 
Same cannot be said for Equity Extraterritoriality in the context of 
transnational litigation. There is no superstructure that governs the many 
nations of the world in a manner similar as the federal government governs 
the states within the United States.  For example, the U.S. Congress 
attempted to address the Equity Extraterritoriality issue in 1927 by proposing 
a bill that would have required state and federal courts to accord full faith 
and credit to all injunctive and other equitable decrees.296  The failure of the 
bill—the first and only attempt to resolve the problem of Equity 
Extraterritoriality by federal legislation—serves as a sad testament for the 
severe underdevelopment of the doctrine, even in the domestic context.297  
But in the international context that lacks the overarching legislature that is 
analogous to the Congress of the United States, this type of legislative 
harmonization is completely unavailable, leading to the free-for-all battles 
that international Equity Extraterritoriality often generates.  The states within 
the United States, for instance, generally would not pass blocking statutes to 
protest another state’s exercise of sovereignty beyond its territorial borders, 
unlike the numerous national governments that passed blocking statutes in 
order to protest the application of U.S. laws.  In the domestic context, the 
federal government generally would have headed off the dispute before it 
reached the stage at which sister states each passed a law to block the laws 
 
 294.  See U.S. CONST. ART. I. 
 295.  See U.S. CONST. ART. III; see also Messner, supra note 77, at 526 (noting that the Constitution’s 
Full Faith and Credit clause would govern Equity Extraterritoriality, requiring sister state courts to 
recognize the force of other state courts’ extraterritorial injunctions). 
 296.  See Report of the Standing Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, 50 ANNU. REP. ABA. 
292, 319 (1927). 
 297.  See also Price, supra note 24, at 760 (“Only a few courts have held unequivocally that full faith 
and credit must be accorded permanent injunctions of sister states.  Even in these instances, however, it 
is unclear whether the underlying theory is more akin to recognition of the res judicata effect of the prior 
proceeding, or that the injunction is directly enforceable in the second state.”). 
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of other states.298  This lack of superstructure in the international arena brings 
about an upside-down world in transnational litigation:  although a foreign 
party requires greater procedural safeguards to prevent being haled into an 
unfamiliar court and become subject to an extraterritorial order that may 
create conflicting legal obligations, Equity Extraterritoriality doctrine gives 
less protection to the foreign party compared to the domestic party in the 
same situation. 
V. SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF EQUITY 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
The problem of Equity Extraterritoriality is a problem of 
extraterritoriality and underdevelopment, which is bound to become worse 
as the needs of modern commerce place increasingly greater pressure on the 
underdeveloped doctrine.  What can be done to address this problem?  The 
nature of Equity Extraterritoriality would require a two-track approach:  one 
for interstate/domestic instances of Equity Extraterritoriality, and another for 
international.  Domestic Equity Extraterritoriality is the easier to fix, as there 
are constitutional principles that may be utilized to harmonize the territorial 
sovereignty of various states.  Reining in the excess of international Equity 
Extraterritoriality, on the other hand, would require a new framework.  In 
this section, I propose a sovereignty-allocating legal test that harkens back 
to the origin of the territoriality principles, by forging a practical application 
of the principle of international comity. My proposed solution injects the 
comity concern into the framework of conflict of laws, resulting in a more 
muscular test that demands the court to give due consideration for the 
interests of the foreign sovereign. 
A. Devising a Solution for Equity Extraterritoriality 
The mechanism of Equity Extraterritoriality relies on two links of 
control:  a court relies on the unpredictable personal jurisdiction doctrine to 
control the person with extraterritorial capacity (such as a multinational 
corporation) and then orders the person to take actions beyond the court’s 
territorial jurisdiction.  The solution, then, must be twofold as well:  on the 
front end of litigation, install a more consistent standard for establishing 
extraterritorial jurisdiction to guard against the erratic exercise of long-arm 
jurisdiction and, on the back end of litigation, place additional safeguards 
against extraterritorial orders based on territoriality principles. 
 
 298.  Cf. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199 (1996) (federal statute allowing each state 
to refuse to give recognition to same-sex marriage consummated in a sister state). 
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It is beyond the scope of this paper to address in depth the first part of 
the solution, involving personal jurisdiction.  Much ink has been spilled 
about creating a more definite and consistent limit on the court’s assertion of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.299  To that end, the U.S. courts’ recent trend of 
avoiding transnational litigation is encouraging.300  In addition to the recent 
Supreme Court cases discussed earlier,301 the court’s opinion in Sinochem 
International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp. does much to 
assist the lower courts navigating the personal jurisdiction issue in 
transnational cases.302  In Sinochem, the court found that forum non 
conveniens dismissal was available at any stage of the litigation, even before 
the court establishes personal and subject matter jurisdiction.303Although this 
trend of “litigation isolationism” is not without its problems,304 such 
retrenchment would at least partially address the problems of Equity 
Extraterritoriality by cutting back on the U.S. judiciary’s interaction with the 
international arena, which would then reduce the necessity for the U.S. courts 
to issue extraterritorial orders. 
But streamlining the personal jurisdiction doctrine alone is insufficient 
to address the full extent of the problems posed by Equity Extraterritoriality.  
There are plenty of situations in which the court’s claim of personal 
jurisdiction is unassailable, but the court’s extraterritorial order causes a 
problem regardless.  In the Argentina bond case, for example, the Republic 
of Argentina partially waived its sovereign immunity by voluntarily 
submitting itself to the U.S. court’s jurisdiction in relation to its bonds.305  
Thus, the New York federal court’s jurisdiction over Argentina was never in 
question. But Argentina retained other types of sovereign immunity, 
including immunity against execution of the assets that it owned.306  It is this 
execution immunity of Argentina—which Argentina never relinquished—
that the New York federal court overrode by resorting to Equity 
Extraterritoriality, i.e. by prohibiting Argentina from paying the creditors 
 
 299.  For a well-considered discussion on finding consistency in the doctrine of personal jurisdiction, 
see, e.g., Silberman & Simowitz, supra note 268, at 393–95; Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer was Right: 
Jurisdiction and General Law, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1315–16 (2017). 
 300.  See Bookman, supra note 127, at 1119.  
 301.  See discussion supra Section III.C.1. 
 302.  See 549 U.S. 422, 432–35 (2007). 
 303.  See id. at 432 (“A district court therefore may dispose of an action by a forum non conveniens 
dismissal, bypassing questions of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, when considerations of 
convenience, fairness, and judicial economy so warrant.”). 
 304.  See Bookman, supra note 127, at 1136 (noting the possibility that “litigation isolationism” may 
lead to a compromise in U.S. sovereign interest of hearing Americans’ disputes in American courts). 
 305.  See NML Capital v. Arg., 699 F.3d 246, 263 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 306.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (2012). 
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that held new exchanged bonds, regardless of where the payment might 
occur, unless it also paid the holders of the old non-exchanged bonds that 
Argentina tried to restructure.307  In this instance, the problem of Equity 
Extraterritoriality arises independently from the problem of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.  For an alternative example, recall the augmented-reality 
smartphone game developed by a U.S. videogame company that records 
physical movements of an Australian gamer.308  A court of the United States 
would have a perfectly valid claim of jurisdiction over the U.S. videogame 
company.  Yet the court may order the U.S. company to produce the location 
data of an Australian citizen and resident—at which point the Australian 
sovereign may have a legitimate interest in protecting the privacy of its 
subjects.  Here again, the problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the 
problem of Equity Extraterritoriality are not coterminous. Further, as 
discussed above, the very availability of Equity Extraterritoriality hinders the 
streamlining of personal jurisdiction doctrine, as parties are incentivized to 
push the court to exercise expansive jurisdiction so that they may obtain an 
extraterritorial Equity order.309 
Equity Extraterritoriality, therefore, must be addressed on its own 
terms, rather than as a side effect of jurisdictional extraterritoriality.  The 
problem of extraterritoriality may arise on the front end of the litigation, as 
well as on the back end.  Finding the legal principles that may serve as 
safeguards against the abuse of extraterritoriality on the back end of the 
litigation—the portion governed by Equity Extraterritoriality—is the more 
urgent part of the problem, precisely because so little attention is paid to it. 
As noted earlier, the problem of Equity Extraterritoriality may arise in 
two contexts: interstate/domestic and international.  The instances of 
domestic and international Equity Extraterritoriality require two different 
responses, because the environments in which these two arise are markedly 
different. 
1. Domestic Equity Extraterritoriality 
“Domestic” Equity Extraterritoriality, i.e. extraterritorial court orders 
whose ordered activities occur within the United States, is the easier problem 
to address. The stakes are lower for the problem of domestic Equity 
Extraterritoriality, as it is nearly interchangeable with the question of proper 
venue within the United States to issue the court order.  Further, the legal 
 
 307.  See NML Capital, 699 F.3d at 254–55; see also Cross, supra note 124, at 111; Pomager, supra 
note 124, at 349–50. 
 308.  See discussion supra Section IV.A.2. 
 309.  See discussion supra Section IV.C.3. 
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principles that may serve as limiting principles already exist.  The problem 
is not so much a lack of structure but a lack of development.  The 
foundational principles to harmonize the various states’ territorial 
sovereignty are already in place in the form of the U.S. Constitution, and the 
institutional infrastructure to implement the principles are also in place in the 
form of the U.S. Supreme Court.  Stated differently, the problem of domestic 
Equity Extraterritoriality is a problem of neglect, of the kind that the 
Supreme Court would be able to address with a few opinions.310  
Accordingly, I present here only a brief overview of the proposed solution. 
At least five constitutional principles are available to limit the reach of 
state courts (which include federal courts applying state law) beyond the 
state boundary lines:  separation of powers, federalism, Commerce Clause, 
Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. Evaluating Equity 
Extraterritoriality in light of these five constitutional principles makes visible 
the limits of extraterritorial power that a state court sitting in equity may 
wield.  That is to say, the necessary consequence of these principles is that 
there is a constitutional limit as to a state court’s exercise of extraterritorial 
powers. 
Separation of powers and federalism set the outer edges of domestic 
Equity Extraterritoriality by limiting a state court’s extraterritorial authority 
to the territorial boundaries of the United States, because the state court’s 
Equity Extraterritoriality beyond the U.S. borders impermissibly infringes 
upon the power to conduct foreign policy given exclusively to the political 
branches of the federal government.311  The Commerce Clause, Full Faith 
and Credit Clause and Tenth Amendment define the extent to which a state 
court may reach beyond its territorial jurisdiction within the United States.312  
The Tenth Amendment, on its face, guarantees the sovereignty of the various 
states.313  Such sovereignty is to be harmonized through the workings of the 
federal government, including the U.S. Supreme Court.314  Commerce 
Clause protects the federation from internally inconsistent economic 
regulations that may be caused by each state’s extraterritorial overreach.315  
 
 310.  Legislative intervention, of course, is also an option.  In the context of intellectual property, for 
example, the relevant statutes provide for nationwide injunctive power from a federal district court.  See, 
e.g., Trademark Act § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012). 
 311.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 10; id. art. II, § 2. 
 312.  See Welkowitz, supra note 23, at 80. 
 313.  See U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 314.  See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropo. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985) (rejecting the 
claim based on the Tenth Amendment that a state agency is immune from federal law). 
 315.  See Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989) (“our established view [is] that a state 
law that has the ‘practical effect’ of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside of the State’s borders 
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The Full Faith and Credit Clause requires the states to “respect the legitimate 
interest of other States and avoid infringement upon their sovereignty”316 by 
setting the standard as to which state court orders deserve recognition and 
which do not. 
Of course, these five principles do not give the precise line of limitation 
upon a state court’s claim of Equity Extraterritoriality.  But collectively, 
these constitutional doctrines give the general contours of the principles that 
may serve to limit the excess of domestic Equity Extraterritoriality.  Further, 
the Supreme Court has implied in several opinions that no single 
constitutional provision contains the territoriality principle for the states.317  
Given the foregoing, it is a relatively easy task for the Supreme Court to 
locate some type of constitutional limitation on domestic Equity 
Extraterritoriality. 
2. International Equity Extraterritoriality 
International Equity Extraterritoriality is a different matter. None of the 
superstructures imposed on top of the various states within the United States 
exist above the various nations of the world.  Also, the stakes are higher.  As 
a practical matter, domestic Equity Extraterritoriality does not amount to 
much more than a battle to determine a proper venue that may issue the court 
order.  If domestic Equity Extraterritoriality heats up beyond the venue fight, 
one can expect that national legislation would be introduced to address the 
issue.318  That is not so in the case of international Equity Extraterritoriality:  
when courts of two national sovereigns collide, the result is almost always a 
free-for-all in which one national court pressures the other to capitulate.319  
This is the result to be avoided.  One obvious step to take is to drop the 
transnationality blindness and insist that U.S. courts apply a different rule 
when a case involves a foreign element. This much is possible by applying 
 
is invalid under the Commerce Clause.”); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (striking down 
Illinois state law that regulates transactions that take place across state lines); Japan Line Ltd. v. County 
of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (striking down local taxes on shipping containers because 
foreign commerce is “preeminently a matter of national concern.”). 
 316.  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 322 (1981) (Stevens, J. concurring). 
 317.  See Welkowitz, supra note 23, at 80–81 (noting that several Supreme Court opinions, such as 
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 546 (1973) and Edgar, 457 U.S. at 624, did not cite the Constitution 
to apply territorial limitations upon state intellectual property regulations).  
 318.  See Welkowitz, supra note 23, at 58 (“Just as the sovereign interest of the states vis-à-vis the 
federal government may be protected by their representation in the federal government, the sovereign 
interests of states vis-à-vis each other may be protected by their ability to protect those interests through 
national legislation.”). 
 319.  See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 932–36 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). 
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the existing constitutional doctrine on federalism and separation of 
powers.320  Beyond that, however, there is no off-the-shelf legal principle 
with which to limit the reach of international Equity Extraterritoriality. 
The history of Equity Extraterritoriality may offer some guidance in 
identifying a limiting principle that may be of service, because Equity 
Extraterritoriality has not always been as unbridled as it is today.  Looking 
back on Equity Extraterritoriality’s history, three moments that restricted the 
reach of Equity Extraterritoriality stand out.  In Amey, Judge Hand limited 
the application of Equity Extraterritoriality to enforcement of concrete and 
previously existing personal obligation.321  In Pennoyer, the Supreme Court 
limited the application of Equity Extraterritoriality to those persons found 
and served within the court’s territorial jurisdiction.322  And in 17th century 
England, the equity court dispensed Equity Extraterritoriality selectively as 
exceptions to the general rule of territoriality to which the common law 
courts adhered.323 All three moments offer examples of the limits that may 
be placed on Equity Extraterritoriality.  But it is far too late in the day to 
actually implement any one of these three types of limitations.  The Amey 
limitation would mean turning back the clock on the modern regulatory state, 
as it excludes Equity Extraterritoriality from being applied to enforce a 
general, statutory obligation instead of a previously existing personal 
obligation.  Enforcing the Pennoyer-style strict territoriality in jurisdiction is 
not feasible in a world in which many nations are moving toward effects-
based jurisdiction,324 and at any rate, it ultimately commits the same error 
that today’s Equity Extraterritoriality doctrine does—namely, depending 
entirely on the front end of the litigation to regulate the extraterritorial 
excursions occurring at the back end of the litigation.  Finally, reverting U.S. 
law to the times prior to the merger of law and equity simply to address the 
extraterritoriality problem is out of the question, despite the inchoate efforts 
by Justice Scalia in Grupo Mexicano v. All. Bond Fund, Inc.325 
If we cannot turn back time, what remains to be learned from history?  
Although history may not offer an off-the-shelf solution, we may yet find in 
history the principle needed to build an appropriate new legal test.  The 
 
 320.  See discussion supra Section IV.C.4.  
 321.  See discussion supra Section III.B.1. 
 322.  See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 323.  See discussion supra Sections III.A. and III.B.2.a. 
 324.  See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 16 (Judgment of Sept. 7); 
Raustiala, supra note 2, at 125. 
 325.  527 U.S. 308, 318–19 (1999). 
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original source of the territoriality principles supplies just such a principle:  
international comity. 
a. International Comity as the Animating Principle 
“Comity?!”, cried the reader of this long article thus far.  For those 
trained in the U.S. legal tradition, the comity doctrine may be an uninspiring, 
weak tea of a doctrine.  Such reaction usually stems from the doctrine’s 
vagueness and uncertainty.  Hilton v. Guyot, the most cited U.S. Supreme 
Court precedent for comity, gives this ambivalent description of the concept:  
“comity is, and ever must be, uncertain; that it must necessarily depend on a 
variety of circumstances which cannot be reduced to any certain rule.”326  
Courts and legal academics have waged a sustained series of attacks against 
this ambiguous character of comity.  Judge Benjamin Cardozo said “comity” 
suggested “a discretion unregulated by general principles.”327  Professor 
Harold Maier called comity “an amorphous never-never land whose borders 
are marked by fuzzy lines of politics, courtesy and good faith.”328  Professor 
Paul Stephan similarly said:  “Vague terms, such as ‘comity’ promise much 
and deliver little in terms of usable instructions for judges facing a potential 
encounter with foreign courts.”329  Calling for the comity doctrine to be 
abandoned, Professor Joel Paul gave a litany of different definitions that 
“comity” has had: 
Comity has been defined variously as the basis of international law, a rule 
of international law, a synonym for private international law, a rule of 
choice of law, courtesy, politeness, convenience or goodwill between 
sovereigns, a moral necessity, expediency, reciprocity, or “considerations 
of high international politics concerned with maintaining amicable and 
workable relationships between nations.”330 
This confused state of the law led to an inconsistent application of the comity 
doctrine.  For example, in a pair of cases decided in 1997, the Peruvian 
government fell on both sides of the comity doctrine. In Pravin Banker 
Associates, Ltd. v. Banco Popular del Peru, the Second Circuit found that 
Peruvian government’s request for a moratorium on the payment of certain 
bank debts (which Peru guaranteed) did not warrant an application of 
 
 326.  159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
OF THE U.S. § 403 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (providing examples of eight factors while calling the court to 
“evaluat[e] all relevant factors” when considering whether to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
 327.  Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201–2 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1918) (citing Joseph Beale, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 71). 
 328.  Harold Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at Crossroads: The Intersection Between Public 
and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 281 (1982). 
 329.  Stephan, supra note 207, at 205. 
 330.  Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 3–4 (1991). 
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comity.331  Only eight weeks later in Torres v. Southern Peru Copper Co., 
the Fifth Circuit held that comity required accepting Peru’s request that the 
U.S. litigation be stopped so that the Peruvian government might regulate its 
own matters, in this case involving industrial pollution.332 
Given this confusion, criticisms of comity as the current U.S. legal 
doctrine are well-placed. But the criticisms are off the mark if they are 
directed to the original conception of comity from the times of the Peace of 
Westphalia.  Ulrich Huber’s writing, for example, makes clear that Huber—
the source of the territoriality doctrine in Pennoyer—conceived comity as a 
mandatory obligation. 333  To Huber, comity was not discretionary, unlike the 
comity doctrine in U.S. law today.  Huber intended comity to be a part of the 
universal international law, on par with the principles of territorial 
sovereignty.334 
Early Supreme Court decisions on territoriality lend support to Huber’s 
more muscular type of comity. In The Schooner “Exchange” v. M’Faddon, 
the Supreme Court’s first pronouncement of the territoriality principle 
simultaneously held that a sovereign’s law is supreme within its territory and 
the interest of the foreign sovereign must be respected, even if the foreign 
sovereign’s interest is in the form of a warship located within the United 
States.335  Although M’Faddon did not use the word “comity” to support its 
holding, Justice Story would write just a decade later in The Santissima 
Trinidad that the M’Faddon decision “stands upon principles of public 
comity and convenience.”336  Hilton did much to weaken the application of 
comity by holding that “comity is, and ever must be, uncertain.”337  Yet the 
idea that comity is the principle that mediates the clash between sovereigns 
has survived the damage that Hilton wrought. Comity’s staying power is 
particularly visible in the Full Faith and Credit jurisprudence, which is seen 
as implementing the rules of comity to regulate the sovereign interests of the 
 
 331.  109 F.3d at 850, 852–54 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 332.  113 F.3d 540, 541 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 333.  See Mills, supra note 65, at 26; ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE COMITY OF ERRORS: 
A CASE STUDY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 8–9 (1992). 
 334.  Although beyond the scope of this paper, the history of comity doctrine in U.S. law and the 
process through which Huber’s conception of mandatory comity turned into a discretionary one is highly 
interesting.  For a compelling account, see Watson, supra note 333, at 27–44. 
 335.  11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136–46 (1812); see also Theodore D. Woolsey, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (1895) (“Comity is another duty of nations.  . . . the term seems to 
embrace not only that kindness which emanates from friendly feeling, but also tokens of respect which 
are due between nations on the ground of right.”). 
 336.  20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 353 (1822). 
 337.  159 U.S. at 164. 
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various states.338  The principle of comity also remains alive in the 
international context, as many of the landmark Supreme Court cases reining 
in the lower court’s assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction beyond U.S. 
borders have cited comity as the basis for giving respect to foreign 
sovereigns.339  What is more, even in the cases that allowed the U.S. court to 
venture beyond the national borders, the Supreme Court usually felt the need 
to give some considerations for the principle of international comity.340 
Comity has much to offer if we consider it a higher-order principle that 
is on par with the principle of sovereign territoriality.  Ulrich Huber, whose 
territoriality principles form the basis of the U.S. territoriality doctrine, 
considered comity to be obligatory.  Although it is true that the current U.S. 
doctrine on comity is vague and uncertain, comity may be re-imagined as the 
governing principle that animates the legal test that resolves the competing 
interests of various sovereigns in the context of Equity Extraterritoriality. 
b. Proposed Approach: Comity-Fueled Conflict of Laws Test 
My reliance on Huber’s theory of comity is not to say that Huber had 
worked out all the details on how the comity principle would operate as a 
legal test—after all, Huber’s principles were closer to being political theories 
rather than a workable legal doctrine.341 What would the comity-fueled legal 
 
 338.  See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 
1309 (1833) (The Full Faith and Credit Clause “import[s] no more than that the same faith and credit are 
to be given to [state court judgments], which, by comity of nations, is ordinarily conceded to all foreign 
judgments[.]”); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2003) (discussing the implication of 
comity within the context of Full Faith and Credit Clause).  See also Kelly Stoner and Richard A. Orona, 
Full Faith and Credit, Comity, or Federal Mandate?  A Path that Leads to Recognition and Enforcement 
of Tribal Court Orders, Tribal Protection Orders, and Tribal Child Custody Orders, 34 N.M. L. REV. 
381, 382 (2004) (discussing interaction between Full Faith and Credit Clause and the comity doctrine 
with respect to recognition of Native American tribal court orders). 
 339.  See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“For another 
jurisdiction . . . to treat him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did the 
acts  . . . would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of 
nations . . . .”); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 128 (2013) (Kennedy, J. concurring) 
(“Adjudicating any such claim must . . . also be consistent with those notions of comity that lead each 
nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations . . . .”); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 
763 (2015) (“The Ninth Circuit, moreover paid little heed to the risks to international comity its expansive 
view of general jurisdiction posed.”).  See also Breyer, supra note 21, at 92 (“In applying [comity], our 
Court has increasingly sought interpretations of domestic law that would allow it to work in harmony 
with related foreign laws, so that together they can more effectively achieve common objectives.”). 
 340.  See, e.g., Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. D. for the S.D. Cal., 482 U.S. 522, 
537 n. 23 (1987) (“Both comity and concern for the separation of powers counsel the utmost restraint in 
attributing motives to sovereign states which have bargained as equals.”); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 
509 U.S. 764, 770 (1993) (“[T]he principle of international comity does not preclude District Court 
jurisdiction over the foreign conduct alleged.”). 
 341.  See Hazard, supra note 66, at 260. To the extent that Huber developed a legal test based on 
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test that governs Equity Extraterritoriality look like?  I submit that it would 
look fairly similar, but not identical, to conflict of laws.342  Comity’s chief 
concern is to harmonize the competing interests of the sovereigns.  Brainerd 
Currie noted that conflict of laws jurisprudence has the same concern:  “The 
central problem of conflict of laws may be defined, then, as that of 
determining the appropriate rule of decision when the interests of two or 
more states are in conflict—in other words, of determining which interest 
shall yield.”343  Professor Donald Childress noticed this parallel between 
comity and conflict of laws, and argued that international comity may be re-
situated as conflict of laws.344  I broadly agree with Childress’s observation, 
and believe that conflict of laws jurisprudence may inform the way in which 
Equity Extraterritoriality may be restrained. 
However, a caveat is necessary:  Equity Extraterritoriality is not entirely 
a question of conflict of laws, whose operation usually involves choosing the 
law to be applied to determine a given controversy.345  Despite Currie’s 
observation that the chief concern of conflict of laws is the mediation of 
competing sovereign interests, the conflict of laws test that actually operates 
within the U.S. jurisprudence usually involves mediation of competing laws, 
which is not entirely synonymous with mediation of the competing sovereign 
interests.346  “Foreign sovereign interest” is a higher-order concept than 
“foreign law”; a foreign sovereign’s interest covers a greater range than what 
is expressed in its laws.  Thus, the test to regulate Equity Extraterritoriality 
may be characterized as “conflict of sovereign interests” test, analogous to 
 
comity, such a test was for situations in which courts of one country had to apply the laws of another 
country, and not necessarily for balancing sovereign interests.  See generally Paul, supra note 330, at 15–
17. 
 342.  See William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2079 
(2015) (classifying conflict of laws as one of the expressions of the comity principle). 
 343.  BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICTS OF LAWS 178 (1963).  See also 
FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 168 (2001) (“Interest analysis is, 
after all, an attempt to derive solution to conflicts problems from the notion of sovereignty.”); Dodge, 
supra note 342, at 2073 (“Comity has long served as the basis for the conflict of laws . . . .”). 
 344.  See Donald E. Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as Conflict 
of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 62–78 (2010). 
 345.  See Welkowitz, supra note 23, at 17. 
 346.  See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993) (“The only substantial 
question in this litigation is whether there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and foreign law.”) 
(internal quotation omitted); In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 17135, at *23 (“To 
determine . . . whether a ‘true conflict’ exists, we must determine conclusively what the law of each 
country requires.”) (emphasis added).  See also Welkowitz, supra note 23, at 17 (noting that the problem 
of extraterritorial injunctions is not reducible to conflict of laws, because “[t]he problem is not with the 
application of the forum law to the problem in the first instance, but rather with granting an extraterritorial 
remedy”). 
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conflict of laws in structure but with the greater range of concern motivated 
by comity.347  This is because the problem of Equity Extraterritoriality is not 
merely an interference with a foreign law, but an interference with a foreign 
sovereign interest. In other words, the test may be described as “comity-
fueled conflict of laws.” 
Considering the points discussed above, I propose the following legal 
test to restrain the excess of international Equity Extraterritoriality. I propose 
that Equity Extraterritoriality analysis should resolve the competing 
sovereign interests by way of shifting presumptions.  So far, to the extent 
that the courts have analyzed Equity Extraterritoriality at all, they did so 
based on some type of balancing test.  The Supreme Court in Aerospatiale, 
for example, explicitly refused to provide any guidance as to how lower 
courts might issue an extraterritorial discovery order.348  The lower courts, 
grasping for straws, formulated a number of different balancing tests that 
evaluated anywhere between three and seven factors.349  These balancing 
tests mostly failed to give proper respect to the interests of foreign 
sovereigns, resulting in a dramatic increase in the number of extraterritorial 
discovery orders that explicitly mandated the party to break a foreign law.350  
This was to be expected; indeed, the dissenting opinion in Aerospatiale 
predicted this exact result, noting “courts are generally ill equipped to 
assume the role of balancing the interests of foreign nations with that of our 
own.”351 
 
 347.  See, e.g., Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 448 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that conflict of 
laws test is the incorrect standard for applying international comity, because “the only issue of 
international comity . . . is whether adjudication of this case by a United States court would [sic] amicable 
working relationships” with a foreign state) (internal quotation omitted); Freund v. Republic of France, 
592 F. Supp. 2d 540, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that Hartford Fire-style conflict analysis “is most 
often applied when comity principles intersect with issues of statutory construction[,]” and comity 
considerations operate beyond the “true conflict” analysis). 
 348.  Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. D. for S.D. Cal., 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987) 
(“We do not articulate specific rules to guide this delicate task of adjudication.”); see also Timberlane 
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976) (proposing a seven-factor balancing test 
for applying U.S. antitrust law extraterritorially). 
 349.  See Sant, supra note 23, at 187. 
 350.  See id. at 225–32.  For criticisms of balancing tests applying territoriality principles, see Breyer, 
supra note 21, at 100 (“[T]he [Timberlane balancing] test is complex, opening the door to broad judicial 
discretion, and thus it creates unpredictability.”); Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American 
Law After the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 750, 754 (1995) (“Case-by-case balancing is a bad idea . . . . The considerations being weighed are 
always imprecise enough to permit several answers and to dictate none.”); Meyer, supra note 222, at 160 
(“[W]hen this balancing analysis is foisted upon judges, it undermines the appropriate role of courts as 
neutral interpreters of the law.”). 
 351.  Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 552 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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If we are to stay true to Huber’s principle that comity is obligatory, a 
more forceful approach is necessary.  My proposal is a legal test of shifting 
presumptions, which is often employed when vital interests such as civil 
rights are at stake.352  The baseline presumption should remain the same as 
it is today: the court may exercise its authority over persons under its 
jurisdiction, including the authority to issue extraterritorial orders.353  This is 
consistent with the territoriality principle that a sovereign may govern the 
affairs occurring within its own territory.354  But the burden of proof would 
shift if the person who would be so ordered makes a prima facie case that 
the court’s exercise of Equity Extraterritoriality unduly contravenes an 
important interest of a foreign sovereign.  The party seeking the 
extraterritorial order must then establish that the order does not unduly 
contravene an important foreign sovereign interest. 
The final result of this test would turn on two factors, which are to be 
considered on a staggered scale:  (1) the type and quality of foreign sovereign 
interest involved, and; (2) the type and quality of the clash in sovereign 
interests that the extraterritorial order would cause if granted. 
The first factor would consider the type of foreign sovereign interest 
involved on a cascading scale of importance.  Topping the scale as the most 
important would be when the foreign sovereign’s interest is implicated 
directly,355 such as when the extraterritorial order directly binds the 
sovereign356 or directly affects sovereign assets.357 Under such 
circumstances, only a clear and unequivocal mandate from the political 
branches would allow the court to rely on Equity Extraterritoriality to 
infringe upon these interests.   Next on the scale is the regulatory interest of 
the foreign state that is expressed as a specific piece of law.358 Lower on the 
 
 352.  See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03 (1973) (announcing a test 
of shifting presumption in applying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 353.  See CURRIE, supra note 343, at 183 (“Normally, even in cases involving foreign elements, the 
court should be expected, as a matter of course, to apply the rule of decision found in the law of the 
forum.”). 
 354.  See discussion supra Section III.A. 
 355.  See Dodge, supra note 342, at 2099 (noting that one of the types of comity is “sovereign party 
comity,” i.e. deference to foreign governments as litigants). 
 356.  See, e.g., Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States v. Russian Fed’n, 915 F. Supp. 2d 148, 
154–55 (D. D.C. 2013); FG Hemisphere Assocs. v. Dem. Republic of Congo, 637 F.3d 373, 380 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011); BAE Sys. Tech. Solution & Servs. v. Republic of Korea’s Def. Acquisition Program Admin., 
195 F. Supp. 3d 776, 801–03 (D. Md. 2016). 
 357.  See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2258 (2014).  
 358.  See DAVID F. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 100 (1965) (It is “reasonable to ascribe 
to the state a desire to have the purposes its laws effectuated in situations where this would appear to 
advance those purposes”).  An intermediate position between the direct sovereign interest and regulatory 
sovereign interest may be the sovereign interest in a state-owned enterprise, doing business in the 
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scale is the position of the foreign sovereign on a discrete issue that is not 
necessarily expressed as written law, but expressed clearly to the U.S. 
judiciary through diplomatic communications or amicus curie briefs.  Even 
lower on the scale is any remaining interest of foreign sovereigns that is not 
formally expressed but otherwise discernible, such as recent trends in the 
laws of the foreign states or a statement from a high-ranking foreign 
government official in charge of the relevant area.  As the importance of the 
foreign sovereign interest implicated rises, so too must be the burden that the 
party applying for the extraterritorial order to satisfy.  When the foreign 
sovereign interest is in the first category, a petition for Equity 
Extraterritoriality order should almost always be denied; when the foreign 
sovereign interest is in the last category, such a petition should almost always 
be granted. 
The second factor would consider the type and quality of the clash 
between the interests of the U.S. sovereign and the foreign sovereign.  The 
scale for assessing the quality of the clash corresponds to the scale of 
weighing foreign sovereign interests discussed above.  The most significant 
level of clash between the two sovereigns is when a U.S. court is called to 
directly challenge the interest of the foreign sovereign itself; accordingly, the 
presumption against an Equity Extraterritoriality order in such a situation 
should be the most difficult to overcome. The next significant level is when 
an extraterritorial order commands an action that is prohibited by the foreign 
sovereign by law or regulation, such that the party to be ordered by the court 
would end up violating the foreign law or regulation as a result of complying 
with the U.S. court order.  Next on the scale is when the Equity 
Extraterritoriality order does not necessarily violate a foreign law, but puts 
the party to be ordered under competing legal obligations, such as a pre-
existing contractual duty owed to a foreign third party, such that the order 
creates double liability.  Lowest on the scale would be when the U.S. court 
order commands an action that is neither explicitly prohibited by the foreign 
sovereign nor causing conflicting legal obligations, but contravenes the 
general public policy aims of the foreign sovereign.  The same calculus 
would apply to this factor:  when the clash of sovereign interests is in the 
first category, petition for an Equity Extraterritoriality order should almost 
always be denied; when the clash is in the last category, such a petition 
should almost always be granted. 
Below, I further propose several general principles that would govern 
the operation of this test. 
 
marketplace in a way indistinguishable from private actors.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2012) 
(allowing execution against sovereign property used for commercial activity). 
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First, the analysis for Equity Extraterritoriality outlined above must be 
available at any point during the litigation, at any time when the court 
considers issuing an order that may have an extraterritorial effect. This is 
because a situation involving Equity Extraterritoriality may arise at any point 
during the litigation—for example, in a temporary restraining order, pre-
judgment attachment, discovery, or post-judgment asset discovery.359  
Because comity is an obligation, it must be ready to come into play at any 
time there is a potential clash of sovereign interests. This has the same logic 
that drove the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sinochem, in which the 
court found that forum non conveniens doctrine is available at any time 
during the litigation, even before the court established personal and subject 
matter jurisdiction.360  Forum non conveniens is another mechanism to 
mediate the potential clash of sovereign interests, in that it is invoked when 
there is an alternate forum outside of the United States, presumably with its 
own interest in adjudicating the dispute.361 It would be sensible that our 
proposed mechanism to harmonize the competing interests of sovereigns 
operates in the same way by making itself available throughout litigation. 
Second, the coverage of extraterritorial orders cannot reach beyond the 
person whose personal jurisdiction the court already established.  This is to 
stop the courts from bootstrapping their way into reaching every corner of 
the world by way of an extraterritorial order, by claiming that assisting the 
violation of its orders causes an effect within the United States.362 On the 
jurisdictional extraterritoriality side, it is a settled rule that the court cannot 
assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant whose only contact 
with the forum is through the plaintiff.363 A similar rule must hold for Equity 
Extraterritoriality:  the court cannot assert jurisdiction over a foreign person 
whose only contact with the forum is through the court’s extraterritorial 
order.  To ensure compliance with its Equity Extraterritoriality order, the 
court may order the person who is already under the court’s jurisdiction.  To 
 
 359.  Somewhat alarmingly, an Equity Extraterritoriality situation regularly arises in the 
“jurisdictional discovery,” under which the U.S. courts order discovery over a foreign party to find 
evidence that may establish personal jurisdiction.  See generally S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in 
the United States Federal Courts, 67 WASH & LEE L. REV. 489, 492 (2010).  Such discovery, by 
definition, occurs before the court establishes personal jurisdiction, and almost always involves discovery 
of evidence located beyond the court’s territorial jurisdiction, as it is conducted over a foreign party. 
 360.  Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007). 
 361.  See id. at 430. 
 362.  See discussion supra at Section IV.C.3. 
 363.  See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); McIntyre Mach. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 
873, 885–90 (2011). 
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reach third parties, the court must first establish an independent basis for 
jurisdiction over them. 
Third, even in situations that warrant the issuance of an extraterritorial 
order, the court must modulate the reach of its order by taking into account 
the strength of the two links of control that make up Equity 
Extraterritoriality:  the court’s control over a person, and the person’s control 
over properties or conduct subject to the court’s order.  If personal 
jurisdiction was established by a relatively weak basis, such as “tag” 
jurisdiction, the court must be particularly circumspect in issuing a far-
reaching extraterritorial order.  Similarly, if the person to be ordered is a third 
party to the litigation whose control over the properties is constructive rather 
than actual—such as the intermediary banks that are “holding” the funds 
during an electronic fund transfer—the court must consider the 
extraterritorial effects of its order even more carefully than usual. 
Fourth, in weighing the sovereign interests, the court must actively 
solicit the views of the foreign governments and the U.S. political branches, 
and give due deference to those views.364  This is to address the current 
situation in which “U.S. courts will often unilaterally decide that the foreign 
states’ interests are something different from what the foreign states 
assert.”365  Direct expression of the sovereign interest is necessary because 
submissions by private parties are inadequate to accurately assess the views 
of the foreign sovereign.  To be sure, foreign sovereigns need not weigh in 
on every instance of Equity Extraterritoriality; their silence could also be an 
indication of the level of their interest.  The involvement of the U.S. political 
branches—which would be primarily the U.S. Department of State—is also 
important, as mediating the competing sovereign interests is “a political 
function of a very high order” 366 that merits an input from the political 
branches that reflect the nation’s democratic will. 
Fifth, in making the determination, the court must leave a clear 
statement of the manner in which it applied the various factors such as the 
identified interest of the foreign sovereign, the importance of the said 
interest, the level of challenge that its extraterritorial order would pose to the 
said interest, views of the foreign sovereign and the United States, and so on.  
 
 364.  See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 218–20 (1942) (treating the Russian government’s 
interpretation regarding a Russian decree as “conclusive”); In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 
186–89 (deferring to the declaration by the Chinese government’s interpretation of Chinese law regarding 
price controls).  See also Childress, supra note 344, at 53–59 (discussing statements submitted by the 
governments of South Africa and the United States in In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 
228, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)). 
 365.  Sant, supra note 23, at 222. 
 366.  Currie, supra note 353, at 182. 
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This may seem to be too obvious of a point in a common law system like the 
U.S. law, which depends on the courts’ opinions to build the body of the law.  
Yet the lack of the courts’ attention on Equity Extraterritoriality has precisely 
been the problem, leading to the doctrine’s underdevelopment.  Particularly 
when they are called to give shape to principles of international law such as 
comity, courts have been engaged in “a practice of compounded avoidance—
avoiding,”367 refusing to give a more definite construction of international 
law principles as applied to the U.S. law. The problem of Equity 
Extraterritoriality, in large part, is a problem of neglect.  To redress this 
problem, the courts must make a concerted effort to develop a rigorous test 
that could respond to the many different situations under which Equity 
Extraterritoriality concerns may arise. 
c. Application of the Proposed Test 
The effect of this proposed test is admittedly far-reaching, because the 
proposal completely reverses the treatment of Equity Extraterritoriality in 
the U.S. law.  But the cases at the top and the bottom of the scale will remain 
the same.  At the top of the scale, for example, the U.S. court may issue an 
extraterritorial order to enforce an embargo, authorized by the political 
branches, against a state sponsor of terrorism.  Although the interest of the 
foreign sovereign may be directly implicated in such a situation, the U.S. 
sovereign clearly made known its intention to override the foreign sovereign 
interest.  As an apparatus of the U.S. sovereign, the U.S. court must be able 
to implement its own sovereign interest in such a situation.  At the bottom of 
the scale, for example, the U.S. court may issue an Equity Extraterritoriality 
order to command a defendant to return a specific piece of physical, personal 
property that he illegitimately took out of the court’s territorial jurisdiction.  
Unlike intangible property, physical property is unlikely to invite the foreign 
sovereign’s regulatory interest—especially if the physical property was not 
present in the foreign sovereign’s territory in the first place.  Physical 
property is also less likely to be subject to multiple competing claims of 
ownership and encumbrance, creating less risk of conflicting legal 
obligations. 
The intermediate cases, however, would have a different result from the 
current regime.  Both of the Argentina bond cases—one involving the order 
prohibiting payment,368 and the other involving sovereign asset 
discovery369—would have a different outcome, because they directly bind 
 
 367.  Swaine, supra note 22, at 716. 
 368.  See NML Capital, 699 F.3d 246, 254 (2012). 
 369.  See NML Capital, 134 S.Ct. 2250, 2258 (2014). 
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the foreign sovereign or the assets owned by the foreign sovereign.  In those 
cases, the U.S. courts would be prohibited from issuing an extraterritorial 
Equity order.  Cases that are next on the scale, which may cause a person to 
violate foreign law, would likely have a different result as well.  An example 
of a case on level is Fargo v. Redfield,370 in which the federal district court 
in Vermont enjoined a Canadian corporation from adjusting the rail fare on 
the tracks that went from Vermont to Canada, although a Canadian law 
mandated the fare adjustment. Under my proposed test, this would not be 
permissible:  the Canadian sovereign expressed its interest by passing a law, 
which the Canadian rail company would be forced to violate if the company 
followed the U.S. court’s Equity Extraterritoriality order.  There is no U.S. 
sovereign interest in this case, other than the diffuse and generalized interest 
in overseeing the contracts made by a U.S. party.  In such a case, the U.S. 
court must respect the clearly expressed interest of a foreign sovereign, and 
refrain from issuing the requested order.371 
A close case would be a situation like Koehler, in which a New York 
court ordered a Bermudan bank (that submitted to the court’s jurisdiction) to 
deliver stock certificates in order to satisfy the debt owed by the judgment 
debtor who kept the certificates at the bank.372  Under the proposed test, it is 
likely that the result in Koehler will remain the same.  There is no indication 
that the stock certificates are subject to competing claims of ownership in 
Bermuda, and there is no other discernible interest expressed by the 
sovereign of Bermuda.  Although the bank is a third party, the court’s claim 
of jurisdiction over the Bermudan bank is strong, and so is the bank’s control 
over the stock certificates.  But small tweaks in the facts may change the 
outcome.  For example, if the stock certificates were serving as collateral for 
a loan, and the judgment debtor’s loss of control in the stock certificates 
would trigger a default such that the (foreign) guarantor of the loan would 
have to immediately repay the loan, the U.S. court would have to give due 
consideration to this extraterritorial effect of its turnover order.  (In my view, 
this is probably the closest case in which Equity Extraterritoriality order may 
be justified.)  Similarly, cases involving extraterritorial discovery would be 
a close, fact-intensive call.  The outcome would depend on several factors, 
such as the presence of foreign blocking statutes or other expressions of 
foreign sovereign interest, the nature of the evidence to be discovered 
 
 370.  22 F. 373, 375 (C.C.D. Vt. 1884).   
 371.  This is similar to the current doctrine of international comity abstention.  See, e.g., Royal & 
Sun All. Ins. Co. of Can. v. Century Int’l Arms, Inc., 466 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Vitamin C 
Antitrust Litig., 837 F.3d 175, 183 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 372.  Koehler v. Bank of Bermuda, 12 N.Y.3d 533, 536 (2009). 
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(tangible or intangible, for example,) and the quality of control that the party 
to be ordered has over the evidence to be discovered, and so on. 
B. Potential Objections to the Proposed Test 
My proposed test will certainly invite objections, because it represents 
a sea change in the U.S. law’s territoriality and comity doctrines.  This 
approach requires that Equity Extraterritoriality be considered 
extraterritorial, although the current U.S. legal thought mostly equates 
extraterritoriality with jurisdictional extraterritoriality.373 It also requires 
comity and deference to foreign sovereigns as an obligation, not 
discretion.374   It may be argued that this approach takes away from the courts 
the flexibility traditionally accorded to equitable remedies, potentially 
turning the courts into “a mere errand boy for the Executive Branch which 
may choose to pick some people’s chestnuts from the fire, and not others,” 
as the Supreme Court put it in a case involving Equity Extraterritoriality.375 
To these objections, I submit respectfully: as far as Equity Extraterritoriality 
is concerned, those results are exactly what this approach seeks to achieve. 
As it stands today, Equity Extraterritoriality has no real legal boundaries.  
Only the court’s variable sense of modesty stops it from ordering parties to 
break foreign laws, putting parties under double liability, or compelling 
foreign sovereigns to disclose its military assets.  A squishy concept like the 
current U.S. doctrine of discretionary comity is not up to the task of putting 
a more meaningful check on these extraterritorial excursions.  If the U.S. law 
is to give any meaning to the doctrine of sovereign territoriality—the 
foundational principle of modern international world order—it must also 
accept as foundational the principle that manages the conflict among the 
interests of various sovereigns.  Assessing competing sovereign interests is 
a highly political act, more properly left to the political branches that are 
empowered with the authority to conduct foreign policy under the 
Constitution.  The necessary conclusion, then, is any legal test that seeks to 
restrain the excess of Equity Extraterritoriality cannot avoid being in some 
way rigid, and in some way deferential to the Executive, Congress, and 
foreign sovereigns.376 
 
 373.  See discussion supra at Section II.B. 
 374.  See discussion supra at Section V.A.2.a. 
 375.  First Nat’l Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
 376.  See Dodge, supra note 355, at 2071 (noting that only in the case of “adjudicative comity” does 
the comity operate more as a general standard rather than a specific and rigid rule). 
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However, there is a stronger, more fundamental objection.  The problem 
of Equity Extraterritoriality is ultimately the problem of applying the 
territoriality principle. But what if you do not care about territoriality?  
Perhaps no solution is necessary for Equity Extraterritoriality, because 
extraterritoriality is not a problem. 
There are solid arguments in favor of being more permissive on 
extraterritoriality.  Chief among them is a sense of national competition—”if 
we don’t have it our way, they will have it their way.”377  The U.S. judiciary 
is certainly not the only one reaching beyond its nation’s territorial 
boundaries, as a number of countries including Germany, Japan, Canada and 
United Kingdom have also adopted some version of the “effects” test to 
regulate matters occurring outside of their territory.378  In doing so, the courts 
of these countries—just as much as the U.S. courts—do little to restrain 
themselves.379  One may also argue that not all sovereigns are created equal, 
such that not all sovereign interests are equal.  The United States’ 
commitment to liberal democracy may mean that the U.S. courts must not 
give any deference to foreign sovereign interests that are not an expression 
of the democratic will (such as the interest of the North Korean sovereign) 
or those that contravene the established liberal principles (such as foreign 
laws compelling racial discrimination.)380  Practicality of regulations is yet 
another reason to soften the stance on territoriality.  It may be argued that if 
the United States wants to regulate actions occurring beyond its borders that 
significantly affect it, it can only do so through its courts because a sovereign 
nation has no true political recourse to control the non-resident individual’s 
actions that occur outside of the country.381 Failure to regulate 
extraterritorially undermines the domestic regulatory scheme, because 
companies doing business in the United States may be able to opt out of the 
 
 377.  See Burbank, supra note 159, at 1342. 
 378.  See RAUSTIALA, supra note 2, at 125; see also Handl, supra note 194, at 4 (“[T]erritorial 
sovereignty could never convincingly be posited as an absolute principle.  Instead, it was understood to 
require some adjustment in view of states’ physical co-existence and associated transboundary spill-over 
effects, and the desirability of international trade and diplomatic intercourse.”). 
 379.  See Swaine, supra note 22, at 687–88; see also Paul, supra note 330, at 7 (“deference to foreign 
sovereigns in the name of comity is neither required by customary international law nor reciprocated in 
practice.”). 
 380.  See LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 9 (1995) (“Sovereignty, a 
conception deriving from relations between a prince and his/her subjects, is not a necessary or appropriate 
external attribute for the abstraction we call a state.”); W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human 
Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 866, 876 (1990) (“Those who . . . continue 
to trumpet terms like ‘sovereignty’ without relating them to the human rights conditions within the states 
under discussion do more than commit an anachronism.  They undermine human rights.”). 
 381.  See Welkowitz, supra note 23, at 52–53. 
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stricter regulatory regime.382  This problem is particularly acute in the 
context of Equity Extraterritoriality, which often involves parties already 
under the court’s jurisdiction. Giving additional considerations for actions 
occurring beyond the U.S. borders, in essence, creates a two-track system 
within the court that favors the party engaging in actions abroad.  Indeed, 
this was one of the key reasons why the Supreme Court in Aerospatiale 
upheld the Equity Extraterritoriality in the context of discovery, even at the 
cost of ignoring the Hague Evidence Convention.383 
What about the conflicts with other sovereigns that the “spillover” of 
regulations may cause?  It may be argued that more often than not, the effect 
of the spillover is a net positive.  Actions occurring across national borders 
tend to be under-enforced at any rate.  It is preferable to have the regulation 
spill over beyond the national territory than to suffer the harms arising from 
no regulation at all.384 Further, such spillover, and the resulting (temporary) 
diplomatic strife, may ultimately lead to the harmonization of the 
international regulatory scheme.  The initial extraterritorial excursion could 
function like “an initial bid in a kind of contractual bargaining between the 
United States and the rest of the world.”385  The courts of the various nations 
could behave like arms-length parties negotiating toward an agreement, and 
their respective claims of extraterritorial authority would serve as the device 
for such negotiation.386 
For the practical-minded, these arguments can be quite attractive. 
Equity Extraterritoriality is often the best friend of a U.S.-based attorney 
representing a client who is harmed by a foreign party’s conducts occurring 
abroad.  Ultimately, however, I fall on the side of respecting tradition and 
enhancing predictability of the law.387  There is a good reason why our courts 
have adhered to the territoriality principle since the beginning of the 
Republic, despite the periods of waxing and waning doctrinal strength.  
Because the concept of territorial sovereignty rests at the heart of the 
international order, the logical conclusion of ignoring the territoriality 
principles is the undoing the Westphalian order.  I do not intend to be overly 
 
 382.  See Paul, supra note 330, at 73–74. 
 383.  See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 561–67; see also Bermann, supra note 163, at 543–46 (criticizing 
the court’s reasoning in Aerospatiale). 
 384.  See Goldsmith, supra note 48, at 490 (arguing in favor of regulatory spillover in the internet 
context). 
 385.  Stephan, supra note 207, at 92. 
 386.  For contract-negotiation theory of international judicial cooperation, see Stephan, supra note 
207.  For a theory of global regulatory harmonization through spillover effects, see Bradford, supra note 
208. 
 387.  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458 (1897). 
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dramatic, as the Peace of Westphalia would surely survive some 
modifications around the edges.  Nor is it the case that I oppose all 
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws—my proposed solution makes clear 
that even under more rigorous application of territoriality principles, U.S. 
courts may still make extraterritorial orders.  What I do find concerning, 
however, is that a single district court may cause a far-reaching international 
event, such as cutting off a sovereign nation from the international capital 
market.388  Modifications to the Westphalian order, and extraterritorial 
application of national laws, must come through the political branches 
reflecting the democratic will, because assessing the interest of the various 
sovereigns is a “political function of a very high order.”389  Yet the current 
state of the Equity Extraterritoriality doctrine allows the Court to ignore the 
decisions of the political branches, as the Supreme Court did in Aerospatiale 
by making the Hague Evidence Convention—a bargained-for multilateral 
treaty that the U.S. executive signed—all but a dead letter.390  To the extent 
the courts have to reach beyond their territorial jurisdiction, it must do so in 
a cautious manner that gives a proper nod to the political branches of the 
United States, as to the interests of other sovereigns.  The current Equity 
Extraterritoriality doctrine, whose contours are poorly defined, is not up to 
this task. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Equity Extraterritoriality is all instances of the court issuing an 
extraterritorial order, which originates from the court’s equity tradition. 
Considering its practical significance, the neglect of Equity 
Extraterritoriality is surprising.  The doctrine has a long history dating back 
to pre-American Independence English law.  Supreme Court approved 
Equity Extraterritoriality in Pennoyer, despite the fact that Equity 
Extraterritoriality contradicted the territoriality principles that Pennoyer 
applied on judicial jurisdiction.  The merger of law and equity and the 
personal jurisdiction revolution in the mid-20th century removed the last 
remaining checks on the reach of Equity Extraterritoriality, by allowing the 
courts to exercise jurisdiction far beyond their territorial jurisdiction in 
situations that the courts sitting in equity previously could not reach.  
Although the jurisprudence on personal jurisdiction retrenched in the late 
20th century and early 21st century, such retrenchment only served to widen 
the gap between jurisdictional territoriality, which cautions against 
 
 388.  See Cross supra at note 124; Pomager supra note 124. 
 389.  Currie, supra note 343, at 182. 
 390.  See Bermann, supra note 163. 
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extraterritorial assertion of judicial power, and Equity Extraterritoriality, 
which is indifferent to the problems of extraterritoriality. 
The heart of the problem with Equity Extraterritoriality is the problem 
of extraterritoriality, as Equity Extraterritoriality truly is an exercise of U.S. 
court’s authority beyond its territorial jurisdiction, notwithstanding the 
current U.S. territoriality jurisprudence to the contrary.  The developing 
trends of modern capitalism, in particular its ever-increasing reliance on 
intangible property, indicate that Equity Extraterritoriality will become even 
more important in the coming decades, as the interests of multiple sovereigns 
will cross paths more frequently.  But the under-developed state of the 
doctrine, including its inconsistency with the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and transnationality blindness, makes it ill-equipped to 
bear this weight. 
To deal with Equity Extraterritoriality is to deal with the problem of 
extraterritoriality, which in turn is the problem of competing sovereign 
interests.  There are two contexts in which this problem may arise:  
interstate/domestic and international.  To harmonize the competing 
sovereign interests involved in a case of domestic Equity Extraterritoriality, 
courts may look to the established principles of the U.S. Constitution, 
including federalism, separation of powers, the Commerce Clause, the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, and the Tenth Amendment.  Addressing the problem 
of international Equity Extraterritoriality requires a more novel approach, 
because a legal superstructure like the U.S. Constitution does not exist in the 
international context.  International comity as a mandatory principle, on par 
in terms of strength as the principles of territorial sovereignty, may serve as 
an animating principle for a conflict of laws-like legal test that would rein in 
the excess of Equity Extraterritoriality. 
 
